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SUMMARY
This study contributes to the contemporary debate about the language
of D. H. Lawrence concentrating on metaphor as the necessary vehicle
of Lawrence's 'metaphysic'. The focus is on the different levels of
attention to language in his work, and to Lawrence's responsiveness to
the levels of metaphor within language. Lawrence is seen here as one
who, in the Heideggerean sense, 'poetically thinks'. The texts
outlined below are given special consideration, representing a
particular body of language and thought within Lawrence's oeuvre
Chapter 1 outlines the purpose of the study and establishes the
Importance of Nietzsche, Heidegger and Paul Ricoeur on language,
specifically metaphor, in setting up the necessary philosophical
context for discussion of Lawrence. Chapter 2 addresses the self-
consciously metaphorical language of the nominally 'discursive'
essays, Psychoanalysis and the Unconscious and Fantasia of the
Unconscious, underlining Lawrence's alertness to the efficacy of
metaphor rather than a referential or conceptual idiom. Fresh emphasis
is given to Psychoanalysis and the Unconscious as a central text in
the language debate. The insights afforded by these essays make it
possible to move to the fiction and, in chapter 3, to Women in Love.
Here the thesis builds on Lawrence's philosophical understanding of
the concept 'metaphor': in this novel, principally through a
consideration of 'love', Lawrence is seen to pull metaphor away from
its merely rhetorical status. Chapter 4 examines the different mode
and language of The Rainbow focusing on its more enveloping, less
'frictional', medium. By chapter 5, called 'Lawrence and Language',
the philosophical questions which emerge from a reading of these texts
can be addressed more explicitly. Finally, a conclusion underlines the
difficulties of talking about language stressing the importance,
implicit throughout, of reading Lawrence on his own terms. The
conscious and subliminal levels of metaphor within Lawrence's language
have been seen to bear his thought. What philosophy generally explains
analytically, Lawrence's language communicates metaphorically.
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1CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION: THINKING METAPHORICALLY
The purpose of this study is to explore Lawrence's language. The texts
discussed are Lawrence's essays on the unconscious, Psychoanalysis and
the Unconscious and Fantasia of the Unconscious, and the novels Women
in Love and The Rainbow. These share a provenance coming as they do
from the central period of Lawrence's writing. Their collective
importance lies in their being texts which give us access to what is
here called the sense of language in D. H. Lawrence.
The structure of this thesis bears witness to the need to approach
Lawrence's writing radically. For anyone who is interested in
Lawrence's language in iksa, or as a theme in the fiction and
particularly in The Rainbow and Women in Love, there has been no
shortage of critical involvement in the subject, particularly in
recent years.' Even so, much more remains to be said perhaps because
in some instances Lawrence's own sense of language has been
subordinated to a more general insistence on how language works. My
own interest in Lawrence's language derives from the period in his
career which engendered the texts represented here, in which the
language itself beckoned as a way of 'saying' something which
'ordinary' language could not say.
When I say that my intention is to explore Lawrence's language I am
aware that this is a claim which has been made many times. Diane
2Bonds, for instance, says that her study 'began as an effort to
understand D. H. Lawrence's conception of language' (Bonds, p.1), and
with a view to metaphor, but her terms signal an approach which I wish
to challenge: in addressing the question of language in Lawrence we
cannot speak of a conscious 'conception' of it as such, but of a
partly conscious or subliminal alertness in Lawrence to the
metaphorical levels in language, and what the fact of metaphoricity
itself signifies about how we 'mean' and 'know' anything. In the
introduction to her book Bonds explains that in seeking Lawrence's
'implied theory of language', she 'inevitably encountered the self-
deconstructive or self-interrogative forces in his own writing'
specifically in 'the play of his heterogeneous metaphors for human
utterance' (Bonds, p.2). The tone of these remarks records the
surprise of someone who does not really expect to find in Lawrence a
sophisticated intelligence regarding language, although a certain
linguistic ambivalence in the fiction, in particular Sons and Lovers,
The Rainbow and Women in Love, leads Bonds as she says to seek an
'implied theory of language' (my italics). She goes on to talk in
intentionalist terms of Lawrence's 'linguistic system' (Bonds, p.5).
This is despite Lawrence's own claim in the Foreword to Women in Love,
to which she properly draws attention, that verbal consciousness is
nothing to do with the superimposition of a theory.
I cite this approach to Lawrence at the outset in order both to
underline an unhelpful tendency in contemporary Lawrence studies and
to distinguish my own approach from it. As if to legitimize her
insistence on a linguistic programme Bonds aligns Lawrence
3unproblematically with the principal American theoreticians of
deconstruction. In short, Lawrence's sense of language, which is not
yet fully understood as a 'sense', is reckoned to be of value, or
acquires value, only inasmuch as it can be measured against the
recognitions of these contemporary theoreticians of language. This in
Itself is not the problem but in its present state Bonds' reading
falls between two stools: she is refusing to respond to Lawrence as
Lawrence; she is equally distorting the positive insights of
deconstruction by turning it clumsily into a methodology, which it
does not claim to be. Lawrence is therefore approached from the wrong
direction and at the same time an injustice is done, in my view, to
contemporary thought about language because its value, which is
considerable, is also obscured. The upshot is that in the course of
her book there is a reliance on disingenuous readings of Lawrence's
fiction in order to satisfy a personal conception of a deconstructive
principle. Consequently, and lamentably, the book is ultimately not a
convincing demonstration that Lawrence scholarship can benefit, which
I believe it can, from current post-structuralist thinking about
language. The principal reason, however, for the limitations of Bonds'
book as a contribution to Lawrence studies resides in the refusal to
attribute to Lawrence any but a purely negative relation to language.
The assumption underlying her argument is that Lawrence is in conflict
with language, not that he is in control as far as he can be, or more
significantly, as far as it is appropriate for him to be. It is
profoundly unsatisfactory to argue that Lawrence is sensitive to the
abstract qualities of language and at the same time that he resists
them.
4Without making the sort of claims made by this critic Michael Black
in his latest book, a commentary on the language of the early
philosophical essays, does acknowledge Lawrence's pervasive
metaphoricity. 2 Apart from the interesting and valuable introductory
essays this study can be taken as a thorough concordance of Lawrence's
metaphors and metaphorical shifts -- the capacity one 'image' has of
becoming another as the 'metaphysic' or personal philosophy unfolds.
In parts this responsible study bears the traces of an exchange and
meeting of ideas with Michael Bell whose book D. H. Lawrence: Language
and Being is the first to examine in depth the ontological theme in
Lawrence's language. An oeuvre based study which concentrates on a
core of the longer fictions, Michael Bell's book shows how 'the
thematised struggle with language continues to provide the significant
focus for his [Lawrence's] representation of being in the world'
(Bell, p.10, my italics and brackets). In the course of his book he
rightly develops the philosophical similarities between Lawrence and
Martin Heidegger: the present thesis would hope to build on this sense
of the shared recognitions of these two contemporary thinkers, at
least in the domain of language, although I am not here pursuing an
ontological theme. My appropriation of Heidegger is via Nietzsche.
It is important to stress from the outset that I differ from the
critics represented here in that I do not share the traditional view
of Lawrence as a writer who experiences problems with language. My
emphasis does not fall on Lawrence as struggling with problems of
expression but on his understanding of the limit--etions, as well as
the potentialities, of language. 	 Women in Love is
5traditionally the focus for the debate on Lawrence and language, often
with an eye to his problems in this domain: F. R. Leavis famously
commented on the novel's 'iargon'. 4 Michael Ragussis has written very
perceptively on the language of Women in Love keeping a very tight
focus on Lawrence and his genuine philosophical forerunners. However,
the level of attention to language in his book is different from that
in the present study. Where Ragussis focuses on language he does so
with the novel's principal themes and events in mind, with the result
that his reading is highly localized. Ultimately, therefore, although
his theme is language, his book is less linguistically concerned than
is this study which is partly motivated by the light which Lawrence
throws on language in general. In my third chapter, on the levels of
metaphor in Women in Love, I argue why I do not regard it in
particular as characterized by the difficulties which are usually
Identified. The problems of expression there are not Lawrence's own:
unlike Rupert Birkin he is not a man who hates his own metaphors.
Nevertheless, the resurgence of interest in Lawrence's language
indicated by these approaches is positive. I take it that the dangers
lie principally in refusing to read Lawrence because of the perceived
need to enclose his texts within an alien frame-work. Diane Bonds'
study in particular falls prey to this danger while Michael Black,
Michael Bell and Michael Ragussis interact more subtly with Lawrence's
language. To appropriate some common Heideggerean metaphors, I hope to
show, in the course of the present study, that a 'listening' to the
'speaking' of the language is the appropriate way to it. Such a
'listening' provides access to an authentic language, to what
6Heidegger calls 'the poetic character of thinking' (my italics). s This
study should also reveal if and when certain contemporary perspectives
are appropriate and helpful in drawing nearer to Lawrence. This is not
to argue that Lawrence and contemporary thought are incompatible. One
example of a positive recognition and reappropriation of Lawrence is
evinced in Deleuze and Guattari's Anti-Oedipus's here Lawrence himself
is not the subject, but his cultural criticism and responses to the
dominant ideology, and his thinking through the implications of
influential perceptions like those of Freud, for instance, are
productively and intelligently worked into the larger argument. There
is a strong point to be made in the fact of this intelligent return to
Lawrence; a return not just to his 'thought' but to his language.
These introductory remarks help to explain the structure of the
thesis. In starting my examination with two nominally discursive
essays, Psychoanalysis and the Unconscious and Fantasia of the
Unconscious, I am deliberately stepping back from the fiction. This is
because critics writing about Lawrence's language, in addressing the
fiction as they normally do, constantly get drawn into the narrative
larger
reality and thereby lose grip on theLquestion of language.
Good though his study is, Ragussis could be a candidate here. With
this in mind my strategy in reading Lawrence has been to distance
myself, in the first place, from narrative language, to step outside
of it, the better to return to the two major novels. In doing so I am,
nevertheless, staying within a corpus of language and a corpus of
thought. In his essays on the unconscious, for instance, Lawrence is
not simply taking issue with Freud but, more crucially, is underlining
7his own understanding of the fundamental relation between language and
the unconscious. Subsequent psychoanalytical thought, such as Lacan's,
has seen the question of the unconscious as inextricable from
language. I propose to show that Lawrence's essays on the unconscious
clearly demonstrate his sense of this, indeed constitute his own
version of it. I will also be showing why this profound recognition in
Lawrence has hitherto gone unnoticed.
So it is that in the following chapters the focus is consistently
on language: the value and purpose of the particular structure of the
argument is to keep language constantly in view as language. Without
the discipline of the discursive essays behind a study of this kind,
with their own surprising and specific metaphoricity demanding to be
apprehended, there would always be the danger of being seduced onto
the different paths towards which the language of the fiction might
beckon.
Chapters 3 and 4, respectively entitled 'The oxymoronic mode of
Women in Love' and 'Undulating styles: The Rainbow', examine the
different linguistic modes of the two mature novels, with a view to
the actual handling of the language in each instance. The question of
language in Women in Love, and its special relation to the
'metaphysic' of that novel, is brought into fresh focus because of the
pressure which has been placed on metaphor in the essays on the
unconscious. In both instances Lawrence has challenged the merely
rhetorical function of metaphor, and opened us up to 'metaphoricity'
as a non-analytical mode of thinking. This is also a feature of The
8Rainbow but its metaphorical specificity is best seen in contrast to
the more philosophical 'sister' novel.
In the penultimate chapter called 'Lawrence and Language' I am in a
position to address more directly the philosophical questions which
have been signalled all the way through as the study progresses. It is
important that the philosophical recognitions be seen to grow out of
the preceding discussion rather than appearing as a set of criteria
imposed on Lawrence from the outset. In this fifth chapter I deal in
part with the problems of imposing any external model on a work,
particularly as a 'frame' in which to read Lawrence, which leads to a
brief consideration of how he himself reads a literary work. This
thesis is involved with how the body of Lawrence's work 'works': that
Is to say it attempts to read Lawrence from within Lawrence. Its
structure and mode serve this end. Indeed, I will talk of 'frames' but
to bring out a very different, more open and exploratory,
significance.
The 'philosophical recognitions' suggested here are Lawrence's own.
My assertion is that they can be seen to centre on the question of
metaphor. Yet this question is only half-consciously posed in
Lawrence. That is why we can properly speak of Lawrence as 'thinking
metaphorically'. But what does it mean to argue that his work
constitutes a 'thinking metaphorically'? That he does so, and that
this is fundamental to his handling of language, is the preoccupation
which underlies this study of works which in a special way bring us
9closer to the importance and significance of metaphor in Lawrence's
writing.
The most traditional conception of metaphor is articulated and
authorized by Aristotle in Book III of the Rhetoric and in the
Poetics. It is there delineated, as Paul Ricoeur rightly says, as a
trope of resemblance; a single-word figure of speech predicated on a
substitution theory, or the act of transference. 7 The domain is
semantics. Metaphor enables us to make comparisons using other, but as
Aristotle insists, related terms: he himself uses the metaphor of
'kinship' in his thesis to describe the similarity between the
substituting and substituted word or conception.° More recent
commentators on metaphor, like Max Black° and Paul Ricoeur, have
addressed the Aristotelean conception. Ricoeur in particular has tried
to expand and deepen metaphor, with a concentration on living
metaphor, and has tried to articulate it in broader terms as the whole
of language. To do so involves a shift away from the Aristotelian
conception although in my view, as I will argue, Ricoeur ultimately
does not free metaphor from its rhetorical moorings. For him metaphor
is itself ultimately a rhetorical mode. We must therefore ask whether
we are in fact any closer to understanding the nature of language if
we simply substitute one word for another? It is this question, and
its profound implications, which these thinkers neglect to address,
but which Lawrence himself has half-consciously apprehended. It could
be the case that the question cannot really be handled conceptually,
hence Lawrence's importance to the general issue,
10
The Aristotelean view does not accommodate this question because in
the Rhetoric and the Poetics Aristotle's concerns are with style,
taste and linguistic propriety. He relies on certain binary
oppositions to reinforce his thesis, hence he distinguishes between
'regular' and metaphorical terms, and implicitly, therefore, between
the literal and the metaphorical (Rhetoric, Bk.III, 1401b1). The
appropriate representation of the world in language is therefore
grounded in these oppositions. In fact, this distinction between the
literal and the metaphorical is highly problematic if we adhere to a
more modern conception of language, specifically that proposed by
Friedrich Nietzsche and endorsed by Martin Heidegger.
In classical terms a conception of metaphor is only possible
because of a conception of the literal: metaphoricity implies
literalness. In which case 'metaphor' might be said to be a domain
which exists within language. It could be conceived, and probably
generally is conceived, as a body of language within language, and
separate from what is ordinarily called 'language'. The process of
substitution, the Aristotelean conception, involves the transference
of a word from this domain to the other. However, as Nietzsche argues,
and Heidegger agrees with him, all language is in fact metaphor. '°
This recognition underpins the present study. The naivety lies in
unprobiemalica lly in a nokion of
believing/	 the literal at all; in holding up the notion of the
metaphorical as somehow different from the rest of language. The
literal simply means our normal conception of language (which is
already metaphorical). In fact there is no 'literal', because even to
11
say 'literal' is to make a metaphor. In short, the pervasive
metaphoricity of language is inescapable.
In this thesis, then, the focus is not on metaphor as a trope or
figure of speech, a figure of resemblance, but on metaphoricity as a
quality of language which is always at work." To refer to a thing by
means of a metaphor (the classical conception) is to refuse to allow
the thing to be itself. The 'thing' or Idea can never be apprehended
as such (as it really is) if it is interpreted by another term, even
though the other term exerts itself to embody the idea or essence of
the thing. This is the disadvantage of metaphor as substitution even
if the motivation is resemblance. Metaphoricity, however, in the
broader Nietzschean sense, dismantles this problematic dualism of
word/substituted word. Lawrence is one of the best examples of a
writer who fundamentally desires to apprehend the thing as it is, and
the extensive metaphoricity of his writing partly answers this desire.
What the present discussion highlights is the fact of two ways of
understanding 'metaphor'. Put crudely, these are the Aristotelean and
Nietzschean ways, although this rigidity of classification is
ultimately limiting. I am proposing, in the light of Nietzschean and
Heideggerean insights about language, a metaphoricity which pulls away
from the purely rhetorical conception and which therefore constitutes
a 'thinking' in language. I am, therefore, instituting a radically
different way of viewing Lawrence's language than is usually proposed.
Lawrence does not explicitly address the question of metaphor, just
as he does not overtly address the problem of language. Like Heidegger
12
he generally avoids the term 'metaphor' -- Psychoanalysis and the
Uhconsclous (1921) is an important exception -- as a term on which
little can productively be built. But Lawrence is alert to the fact
that to have access to anything it is imperative to use metaphor: the
metaphoricity of language makes 'knowing' possible; all conceiving is
the making of metaphors. The unknown must be articulated in ways which
are sometimes surprising in order to become known. Yet paradoxically
we are largely unconscious of the metaphoricity of the language we
use. As Nietzsche says, a metaphor does not stop being a metaphor, but
a 'forgetting' takes place in us so that we no longer recognize its
metaphoricity, unless it is revived or rejuvenated (puns may have this
effect).
If metaphor is as pervasive as all this, then the question 'Why
Lawrence?' is begged. After all, all users of language are users of
metaphor. The specificity of Lawrence's language must then come into
view, as well as his particular alertness to language in general as a
medium of understanding. His highly metaphorical styles demand
attention because of the sense, outlined here, of a thinking which is
at home in language. Metaphor in Lawrence is evidently not simply
decorative or 'expressive'. It is not a purely functional linguistic
category or structure but Language itself: this underlines the double-
focus of this thesis which not only looks at Lawrence's language, but
also at what is communicated about language in general. Lawrence
Interestingly does not write about language as if it were simply the
writer's medium, in which something particular must be achieved.
Instead we are confronted with his understanding of language as a
13
sense, like the other senses rooted in and not separable from the
human being. What Heidegger calls human Dasein is grounded in
language. Such a recognition, if not its terminology, would be
meaningful to Lawrence. It is one which he, half-consciously, works
through in his writing, in the discursive essays as in the fiction.
We now confront the question of how something is articulated. In a
narrowly or overtly philosophical context Heidegger stands out as
someone whose radical language embodies a critique of the established
way of saying anything. His etymologies, for instance, are highly
personal and speculative. Like his metaphors, his etymologies are an
attempt to pull away from a purely conceptual language. Traditional
language, or metaphysical language, is the only language we possess.
It therefore delimits and determines the way we think, establishing
the boundaries and problems of thought; but life goes beyond these
limits. Heidegger's highly personal etymologies and metaphors get away
from this language the better to think, or to think differently. His
recognition is that traditional language, engrained ways of saying
anything, overlooks the essence of language. This is evidently related
to Nietzschean insights: Nietzsche's own style, metaphorical,
aphoristic, is engaged in the same radical questioning pursuit.
To put this spatially and in relation to the main thinkers cited in
the present study, Heidegger and Nietzsche are situated midway between
Paul Ricoeur on the one hand, and Lawrence himself on the other.
Ricoeur recognizes that metaphor should be apprehended in terms of
language at large, even as language at large. What he does with this
14
recognition is the underlying thesis of The Rule of Metaphor. The
paradox is his investment, perhaps an unconscious investment, in the
conceptual language which has engendered his own thought. His style
which is hardly metaphorical, except in the everyday inevitable way,
situates him right at the other end of the spectrum, furthest away
from Lawrence than either Heidegger or Nietzsche. However, Lawrence
himself does not occupy the same ground as these two. Indeed, whatever
the similarities in their thought, we can speculate about what
Lawrence's response would have been to Heidegger's mode of expression.
Very probably he would not have wanted to read Heidegger. He might
have felt impatience at Heidegger's style, indeed he might have held
the view that Heidegger's language does not reveal the essence of
language, or life, enough. His view would conceivably have been that
Heidegger's language is itself too conceptual. This underlines the
importance of Lawrence's own language, and his own subliminal
recognitions.
As I have begun to argue, the language of Lawrence's fiction, as of
the discursive essays, is profoundly philosophical, perhaps more
philosophical than Lawrence knew -- in the sense of being conscious of
something -- when he lamented the general separation of philosophy and
fiction (STHOE p.154). The fiction does not deal overtly with
philosophical questions: it rarely proposes a philosophical problem or•
theme. Whatever we make of Rupert Birkin there are no characters which
engender an explicitly or self-consciously recognizable philosophical
discourse. But in the language itself, and specifically in the deep
levels of metaphor, the question of language also asked by Nietzsche,
15
Heidegger and Ricoeur, is itself posed. Heidegger's understanding that
there is no such thing as a purely philosophical language led him to
the Poetic as an authentic language in which one thinks. This takes us
to Lawrence but not necessarily, in the first place, to his fiction.
16
NOTES.
Chapter One. Introduction: Thinking Metaphorically
1. Full length studies published in the last five years which
represent an interest in language include Diane S. Bonds Language and
the Self in D. ht Lawrence (Ann Arbor, Michigan: UMT Research Press,
1987); Allan Ingram, The Language of D. ht Lawrence (London:
Macmillan, 1990); Michael Black, D. At Lawrence: The Early
Philosophical Works. A Commentary (London: Macmillan, 1991); Michael
Bell, D. ht Lawrence: Language and Being (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1992). Prior to these Michael Ragussis's reading of
Women in Love in The Subterfuge of Art: Language and the Romantic
Tradition (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978)
, deserves special notice. See also Colin Milton, Lawrence and
Nietzsche: A Study in Influence (Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press,
1987), especially chapter 4, 'Consciousness, Language and the
Unconscious Self', pp.93-128. Further references to these studies are
given after quotations in the text.
2. Black, 1991. See n. 1. In his final chapter on 'The Reality of
Peace' Michael Black briefly touches on the metaphorical/literal
dichotomy, and how to 'read' Lawrence's metaphors. Black is concerned
to identify what Lawrence was thinking of at the time of writing, both
In terms of metaphors and ideas. An unpublished essay by Michael
Black, 'A Kind of Bristling in the Darkness: Memory and Metaphor in
Lawrence', to be published in a memorial volume to Sam Goldberg,
contributes further to the debate on Lawrence's use of metaphor. In
staying with Lawrence's language Black does not pursue the
philosophical dimensions of Lawrence's understanding, which is the
subject of the present study, but his paper is nevertheless
interesting and useful.
3. Bell, 1992. See n. 1.
4. F. R. Leavis, D. Pt Lawrence: Novelist (Harmondsworth: Penguin, in
association with Chatto & Windus, 1955) p.177. See also: Derek
Bickerton, 'The Language of Women in Love', Review of English
Literature (Leeds), 8, no.2 (1967), 56-67, and Laurence Lerner, The
Truthtellers: lane Austen, George Eliot, D. At Lawrence (London:
Chatto & Windus, 1967). Lerner considers Lawrence's failures with
language as well as his successes.
5. Martin Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought, Martin Heidegger
Works, General Editor, J. Glenn Gray, trans. and introduction by
Albert Hoffstadter (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), p.12. Further
references to this book are given after quotations in the text.
Hereafter cited as PLT.
6. Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and
Schizophrenia, trans. by Robert Hurley, Mark Seem and Helen R. Lane,
preface by Michel Foucault (1972, London: The Athlone Press, 1984).
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Further references to this study are given after quotations in the
text.
7. Paul Ricoeur, The Rule of Metaphor: Multi-disciplinary Studies of
the Creation of Meaning in Language, trans. by Robert Czerny, with
Kathleen McLaughlin and John Costello S. J. (1975, London: Routledge &
Kegan Paul, 1978), p.3. Further references to this study are given
after quotations in the text. Hereafter cited as RM.
8. See The Complete Works of Aristotle, the revised Oxford
translation, edited by Jonathan Barnes, Bolingen Series LXXI 2 vole
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), Rhetoric Bk III 140581,
37. Further references to Aristotle are given after quotations in the
text.
9. Max Black, Models and Metaphors, Studies in Language and
Philosophy (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1962).
10. See 'On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense', in Philosophy and
Truth: Selections from Nietzsche's Notebooks of the Early 1870s, ed.
and trans. by Daniel Breazeale (New Jersey & London: Humanities Press,
1979), pp.79-97. Further references to this essay are given after
quotations in the text. Hereafter cited as PT.
11. Most of the studies on metaphor, and the recent literature which
takes up the metaphor debate, continue to concentrate on metaphor as
rhetorical figure. Seminal studies of the rhetorical and linguistic
dimensions of metaphor include: Max Black, Models and Metaphors,
Studies in Language and Philosophy (Ithaca, New York: Cornell
University Press, 1962); Christine Brooke-Rose, A Grammar of Metaphor,
Mercury Books no. 65, General Editors, Alan Hill and Freddie Warburg
(London: Mercury Books, 1965); George Lakoff and Mark Johnson,
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CHAPTER TWO
LANGUAGE AND THE UNCONSCIOUS: THE RADICAL METAPHORICITY OF
PSYCHOANALYSIS AND THE UNCONSCIOUS AND FANTASIA OF THE UNCONSCIOUS
Any serious examination of Lawrence's language should reserve a
special place for his essays on the unconscious. On the face of it
these essays are discursive, a forum where Lawrence can rehearse a
number of his immediate preoccupations away from the discipline of the
fictional narratives. Yet the extensive metaphoricity of
Psychoanalysis and the Unconscious and Fantasia of the Unconscious,
which is wholly unexpected, alerts us to the distinctive relation
between language and thought in Lawrence. This relation is the basis
of the present chapter. Indeed, this chapter, in addressing these
essays and the issues which are sharply focused by their language,
sets up the principal terms, the principal areas of discussion, for
the whole thesis.
'Language' is not identified explicitly as one of Lawrence's themes
in these essays, even while metaphor is so evidently the starting
point for saying anything. My strategy in this chapter, therefore, is
to distinguish a number of other levels at work in these books, the
better to engage with language. The following discussion consequently
takes the form of a multi-layered debate with the reader reading
dialectically, paying attention to the different levels of language in
Lawrence and, through language, to the levels of unconscious
creativity. Broadly speaking, these principal themes, or levels, are
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what I propose to call Lawrence's 'poetics of presence'; the relation
in his work between metaphor and 'metaphysic', which is very much
Lawrence's word; the body/psyche polarity which he perceives to lie at
the centre of modern thought and which he attempts to dismantle;
vision, and its importance as a metaphor for knowing; the
metaphoricity of dream; the unconscious. Because this chapter
constitutes a working through these levels a significant degree of
cross-referencing is necessary. Consequently vision, for example, will
be addressed at one point only to re-surface in a different but
related context later on. However, the argument always returns from
theme to discourse and the larger question of language: everything in
Lawrence has its own metaphoricity, or is articulated metaphorically,
and for this reason, whether the critical focus is on presence, vision
or knowledge, for instance, the real subject of this chapter is
language.
Lawrence's essays on the unconscious are not marginal although they
are typically relegated to that status. Often critical approaches to
them are unsatisfactory, perhaps because of the problematically
'literal' status of Lawrence's 'metapsychology'.' Nominally about the
unconscious, they firsL confronE the reader	 with Freud, or at any
rate with Lawrence's Freud. Lawrence 'reads' Freud dialectically,
interacting with certain levels of his thought and by-passing others,
but with his own 'metaphysic' clearly in view. I shall argue that, in
assessing the significance of Freud in Lawrence's thought, the
emphasis should be less on doctrinal questions and more on discourse.
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Lawrence's sensitivity to Freud was in the first place a sensitivity
to Freud's metaphors, particularly as they, in Lawrence's view,
constitute an unacceptably rigid model of the psyche. It is largely
the fixed term which Lawrence finds inadmissable.
Evidently Freud's ideas do not provide a structure which sustains
Lawrence's essays. Such a structure would be a 'framework' and the
basis of the essays which is not the case. Because my emphasis is on
Lawrence interacting with Freud, responding to a certain level of
language within his thought, I do not see Lawrence's essays on the
unconscious as merely a response, a repudiation or a commentary. There
is not simply Lawrence's text lying passively beside Freud's, but a
circuit of thought which Lawrence sets up and which 'flows' between
them: this 'flow', to refer to Lawrence's recurrent metaphor, cuts
across any simple inside/outside relation between them. Freud's
metaphors, his conceptions, might have given rise to Lawrence's essays
but by the same token these essays also give rise to (Lawrence's)
Freud. Psychoanalysis and the Unconscious and Fantasia of the
Unconscious are a 'frame' or more particularly, given the pictorial
metaphors at work here, a passe-partout, which allow Lawrence's Freud
to appear through the medium, as it were, of Lawrence. 2 Lawrence's
essays are the frame which is there and then dissolves. Lawrence is
not merely, then, framing his argument around Freud, but is creatively
working in part with Freud's terminology, his discourse. There is a
sense in which he is throwing a frame around some of Freud's central
ideas and partly, therefore, framing Freud within them. But there is
another sense in which Lawrence himself is framed by Freud, which I
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will come to presently. For my purposes the 'frame' is not literal,
but a notional concept across which things (concepts, arguments,
words) 'flow'.
These preliminary remarks reveal a particular appropriation of
Freud in relation to Lawrence. There is no attempt here to give a
psychoanalytical reading of Lawrence's texts: such an approach would
be far from the point, although Freud is a useful point of reference,
for instance, where Lawrence engages with dreams, as well as with the
unconscious in a broader sense. The focus is more especially on how
Freud articulates his science and on the use of metaphorical
structures like Oedipus (from which we can stand back), in contrast to
Lawrence's radically metaphorical language (in which we are immersed).
I propose to refer to the fiction only when critical awareness of
Lawrence's metaphoricity begins to deepen, which it must do through a
reading of these essays.
2.1 Framing Freud
Freud's work, translated and edited by James Strachey in the Standard
Edition which remains the definitive English language text, was made
readily available in Britain by the Hogarth Press in association with
the Institute of Psycho-Analysis, thereby establishing Freud and
Bloomsbury as perhaps improbable bedfellows. As a result of this
publishing venture begun in 1924 it became possible to associate Freud
with a specific locus, that of Bloomsbury and Tavistock Square and,
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therefore, with its incumbent intellectual coterie. James Strachey
was, perhaps alone among his contemporaries, adept at addressing the
complexities and multi-layeredness of Freud's work because as Freud's
translator he confronted head on the difficulties of communicating
these 'new' concepts. Any translator knows that the transference of
ideas from one language and culture to another is a particularly
complex process. Not only that, but as Frederick Hoffman notes in his
book Freudianism and the Literary Mind, 3 Freud himself habitually re-
shaped his own language, giving new inflections to established terms
as his ideas advanced. 4. Other psychoanalysts, like Jung, would adapt
Freud's terms to suit their own intellectual needs and theories. The
terms themselves reflected a variety of positions. Hoffman describes
the initial lay-reponse to Freud:
It is not at all surprising that the writers, of the
twenties at least, should have been a bit confused about the
exact meaning of Freudianism. The writer brought to the
confusion his own preconceptions and prejudices. Many of the
young intellectuals of the twenties confused the issue
further by accepting Freudian terms immediately upon hearing
them, or by attaching at the most a summary sketch of their
meaning. Thus repression as Freud defined it lost much of
its original meaning in a discussion; but it gained new
cultural ingredients from the particular area in which it
found an audience. (Hoffman, p.88)
At the heart of the problem was the elusive nature of the psyche. The
terms required to define it have to be descriptive and metaphorical:
the concepts themselves are dynamic and difficult to express. It is a
commonplace that Freud, resistant to a technical vocabulary, had no
choice but to use metaphor, principally that of the Unconscious which
made it possible to speak about that 'territory' which is not
available for direct examination. Lawrence's language of 'flows',
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'circuits' and 'vibrations' to which I shall return, and Freud's
metaphors of economic exchange from one agency to another, and his
sense of 'reservoirs' of energy, indicate the prevalence of a certain
kind of metaphoric language for expressing the individual's psychic
profile. But with Freud the emphasis is on analogy, as it is not with
Lawrence. Lawrence was sensitive to Freud's need for a metaphorical
standpoint but he was also critical of what might be called Freud's
'models', what have come to be thought of as his conceptual apparatus.
But by the same token words like 'ego', 'super-ego' and 'id' have
ceased to be seen as metaphors: we no longer notice their original
meanings because of what they have come to stand for. There are many
words in Lawrence that function like this, words like 'blood-
consciousness', for instance, by which Lawrence intends to describe an
undeliberate functioning, something which eludes conscious awareness.
Such words belong to a specifically Lawrencean lexicon and the focus
will increasingly be on his metaphoricity as the only way to describe,
or re-describe, unconscious functioning.
There is no doubt that in the 1920s it became very fashionable to
read Freud -- a state of affairs to which Lawrence satirically refers
In the Foreword to Fantasia and the Unconscious The fact that Freud's
work was suddenly made available in Britain to a wider public should
have heralded a profound and critical confrontation with his ideas
developed and re-formulated as they were throughout his life in his
manifold publications. In fact the appearance of his work in Britain
can be seen in retrospect as something of a false dawn. In the years
after the 1920s perhaps up to the 1960s the evidence points to a
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resistance not only to his work but, broadly speaking, to
psychological theory in general. In the context of psychoanalysis
Melanie Klein and Anna Freud are chief among the figures after Freud
who maintain some sort of a continuum s That this is the case arguably
signifies a deep seated resistance to theory in general, unless within
clearly defined 'scientific' parameters.
In his fiction and specifically in his essays on the unconscious
Lawrence at least reflects the importance of Freud; and Lawrence
himself was in possession of a related interest in the instinctual
life, in human relationships, in the development of child
consciousness -- the projected theme of the essays -- and in the
unconscious. His refusal to defend Freud's formulations might in a
different intellectual and literary environment have presaged a more
satisfying dialogue than actually occurred. Even given Lawrence's
interest and the initial enthusiasm in some quarters for reading Freud
and for bringing his ideas to bear in some degree on art, the wider
relevance of Freud does not appear to have been understood, or if it
was understood it never emerged convincingly in discussion of the
arts. The implication is that the key Modernists had a sense of Freud
on the horizon, and on occasion reference was made to this horizon,
but on the whole a gulf persisted which today can be read as a deep-
lying, if not to say unconscious, resistance to his theories.
Lawrence's refusal to conceptualize the unconscious, to reduce it to a
number of fixed metaphors, makes him more genuinely post-Freudian in
his perceptions than many, if not all, of the British writers of the
time. In 1977 one critic wrote 'When I look back at Psychoanalysis and
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the Unconscious from the perspective of contemporary theory and
practice, I see how close Lawrence was in 1921 to aspects of theory
that are central for interpreters now.' 6 The theorists cited in this
context, as in an important sense prefigured by Lawrence, include
Marion Milner, D. W. Winnicot and J.-B. Pontalis. In my view
Lawrence's insights have more in common with those of Gilles Deleuze
and Felix Guattari, as I explain more fully as this chapter
progresses. Certainly Lawrence's essays on the unconscious in some
part articulate his own resistance to Freudian concepts and are
important for that reason. More specifically, in their discursive mode
and consciously metaphorical language, they allow us to focus tightly
on the whole question of metaphor in Lawrence.
Lawrence's essays allow us to focus on metaphor, it is true, and it
Is just as true that Freud in some important respects motivates
Lawrence to write in the way he does in these essays. The pressing
question now is how to assess the role of metaphor in these works, and
Lawrence's alertness to this role. This brings me necessarily to an
argumentative chiasmus which will structure the immediate discussion:
my line of reasoning is through Freud's theory to his language and,
via Lawrence's response, to his language and ultimately to
'metaphysic'. Consequently, I propose to continue the exposition of
Freud already embarked upon, but with language now particularly to the
front. The movement is through theory to language, the better to move
through Lawrence's language to his 'metaphysic', the former being the
medium of the latter.
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A survey of the reception of Freud generally in Britain might
reveal, as a legacy of the partial interest described, a weak popular
grasp of his ideas. One can speculate that such a survey would reveal
the unconscious as a familiar enough term although one which is easily
and uncritically interchangeable with the subconscious. In our own
period the Freudian 'slip', and to a lesser extent the 'Oedipus
complex' have inserted themselves into popular parlance; and most
people have a sense of Freud unearthing the unpalatable in the context
of sexual relations within the family -- Lawrence's terms rightly or
wrongly are 'incest-craving' and the 'incest motive'. Beyond this
there is a silence which indicates a resistance generally to Freud's
theories. Typically in university departments of psychology Freud, and
the whole question of psychoanalysis, are considered marginal. A
significant number of clinical practitioners provide an exception to
this, upholding the importance of Freud at least in a practical
context. The other notable exception is provided by departments of
literature where there is generally speaking a place for
psychoanalysis as a critical discourse although few would describe
themselves as Freudians. Even so, Freud in all likelihood would have
thought it absurd that his work should find champions in what might
well appear to him an unlikely and 'unscientific' context.
This marginality in an academic scientific context, and current
centrality in various arts faculties is conceivably in part the result
of the way Freud chose to express his 'science'. It is important not
to obscure the fact that Freud's texts are grounded in clinical
practice, that there is in his work a body of propositions which have
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to be tested empirically. So, on the one hand we have a sense of
Freud's work as a practical science and, on the other, we have a clear
sense of the metaphorical texture of his writing. His language is a
medium which has as many gaps, or lacunae, 'vanishing points',
contradictions, deferred meanings and general turbulence as one
expects to encounter in a literary text. The Interpretation of Dreams
in particular institutes a self-examining and self-critical dialogue;
and it is also a text in which Freud himself is present and can be
overheard debating the degree of self-censorship to be practised with
respect to his own dreams. The constant revision and notes added at
later dates partially reveal the extent to which Die Traumdeutung is
an open-ended structure, like its subject matter: dream. His works are
among those which best illustrate, therefore, that a theoretical text
Is no more a closed structure than is a fiction or a poem. Malcolm
Bowie highlights the importance of Freud's language when he remarks
that,
Freud's own technical language, as is now well known, was
the product of a daring syncretistic verbal imagination, and
it was a triumph of rhetorical ingenuity. Similarly, the
underlying mechanisms that he sought to delineate as a basis
for his explanations of both normal and pathological mental
processes were assembled from a variety of conceptual
components; they were schematic and parsimonious despite
these varied origins; and they always needed to be made
malleable again if they were to handle successfully the
shifting complexity of actual clinical cases. Freud as
clinician brought a new rhetoric into play, one that spoke
not of systems, mechanisms, apparatus or modes of
functioning but of autobiographical human speech seized on
the wing and in the density of its affective life.7
Bowie's concluding statement here also points to Lawrence's interest
In language, at least in certain dimensions. Lawrence, consciously or
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unconsciously, recognized the inadequacy of a 'technical' or
conceptual (theoretical) language: it established a gulf between the
individual and the emotional life. His own language is undeliberate,
arising from an unconscious, or partly conscious, functioning: the
result of the writer's intuitive awareness of its appropriateness (as
the vehicle of his 'metaphysic' or personal philosophy) rather than
through conscious design. But Bowie's statement returns us to the
fundamental recognition shared by Freud and Lawrence (and Heidegger),
and which makes the work of these figures distinctive: each recognizes
the need to think metaphorically, but which of them can transform
metaphor unconsciously into a radical 'thinking further'?
Freud's 'new rhetoric' develops, as I suggest earlier, because of
the urgency of his recognition of the use of metaphor combined with
the sense that verbal correspondences for psychic states can never be
final. As he says in 'The Question of Lay Analysis', 'In psychology we
can only describe things by the help of analogies. There is nothing
peculiar in this; it is the case elsewhere as well. But we have
constantly to keep changing these analogies, for none of them lasts
long enough.' (SE, XX, p.195). This is a very simple statement of the
special dependency of psychoanalysis on language. It is a dependency
which underpins the work of Freud and his most prominent
reinterpreter, Jacques Lacan, the two major psychoanalytical thinkers
to date, but it also alerts us to the fact that for a psychoanalyst
language is, as Bowie succinctly (and'equipmentall0 puts it
elsewhere, 'the main source of clinical data' and the analyst's chief
'therapeutic instrument' .e
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Lawrence does not explicitly acknowledge the importance of Freud's
conjoining of language and the unconscious. Pervading his essays on
the unconscious is his outrage that Freud's authority is based on a
set of rigid and repressive structures (like oedipalization) to which
individual feeling is subsumed. In a letter written to Hoffman and
quoted by Hoffman, for instance, Frieda Lawrence states that
'Lawrence's conclusion', about Freud, 'was more or less that Freud
looked on sex too much from the doctor's point of view, that Freud's
'sex' and 'libido' were too limited and mechanical and that the root
was deeper' (Hoffman, p.154).
I propose to stay with Hoffman for the time being because of his
insistence on the theoretical differences between Freud and Lawrence
despite the fact that the essays on the unconscious are not an
unproblematic commentary on Freud's ideas. They do not simply
circumscribe Freud's writings: Freud is a part of their content, of
course, but is far from being Lawrence's only preoccupation. Hoffman's
book, one of the seminal discussions of the relation between Lawrence
and Freud and published six years after the death of Freud, was among
the first books to examine seriously the bearing of psychoanalysis on
literature. But the title of Hoffman's chapter on Lawrence,
'Lawrence's Quarrel with Freud' (my italics), suggests that Lawrence's
criticisms of Freud were essentially, if not purely, doctrinal: he
does not examine critically, as I intend to, the role of language in
Lawrence's thought about Freud. Hoffman properly underscores
Lawrence's preference for Trigant Burrow who as a psychologist had
moved away from Freud's thinking. Lawrence's review of The Social
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Basis of Consciousness by Burrow is a further statement of his own
ideas, or more precisely a re-articulation of his suspicion of theory.
He highlights the universal striving for consciousness so that all
experiences are 'in the head' as he famously puts it elsewhere, and of
the 'ideal' which prevents the 'flow' of consciousness 'from within
outwards' (Phoenix, p.380). This 'flow' is a crucial metaphor to which
I shall return as it embodies Lawrence's fundamental disagreement with
Freud and challenges Freud's metaphors as unconsciously repressive
structures. Burrow's privileging of the social group and his emphasis
on group analysis rather than the one-to-one relation of analyst and
patient appealed to Lawrence because of its closeness to his own
conception of a sympathetic community: 'what must be broken is the
egocentric absolute of the individual' (Phoenix; p.379). In contrast
Freud stands out as a single and singular figure of authority,
dependent upon the hierarchy which Burrow, and Lawrence, wanted to
dismantle and thereby disempower.
Hoffman persists in interpreting the differences between Freud and
Lawrence as doctrinal: he only briefly focuses on Lawrence's response
to Freud's language as negative:
His [Lawrence's] critical, philosophical works all refer at
one time or another to psychoanalytic terms -- the
unconscious, the oedipus complex, repression, sublimation
etc. But his chief reason for reading psychoanalysis was to
refute it; or, rather, to find his own explanations for the
terms which psychoanalysis had offered him. (Hoffman, p.161,
my brackets)
Whilst Lawrence does challenge psychoanalytic terms it is not merely
In order to substitute his own language. Freud is, in his view, a
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symptom of a universal malaise in human consciousness, but Lawrence's
response is not simply to re-invest Freudian terms with new meaning.
Hoffman proceeds by enumerating the points on which Lawrence disagreed
with Freud -- making the unconscious conscious, and Freud's assessment
of the mother-son relationship chief among them. In his essays on the
unconscious Lawrence does reject Freud's concept of infantile
sexuality. He does not criticize Freud for construing as fantasy
events which might actually have occurred, but argues that the
identification of sexuality in children is at best misguided and at
worst dangerous. After that he does not pursue this theme, effectively
ignoring or avoiding this aspect of Freud. Critics are familiar with
the idea that Lawrence's resistance to this notion has been construed
as a repression of something he recognizes in his own relations with
his mother. Quite apart from psychoanalytic interpretations of Sons
and Lovers, the recently discovered poem entitled 'Death-Paean of a
Mother' will reinforce such speculations. 9 Given his own criticism of
appropriately
Freud's opinions it is/paradoxical	 that
Lawrence's fiction is so frequently the subject of psychoanalytic
criticism. Lawrence's response to the reading of his third, and most
overtly autobiographical, novel as an Oedipal drama is something which
I will address presently.
In assessing Lawrence's response to Freud Hoffman's theme is the
familiar one that Lawrence rejected intellectualism especially when it
obstructed and denied the unconscious life of the individual, but that
he owed Freud a debt inasmuch as the latter recognized the importance
of the unconscious at all:
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For the metaphor of the unconscious, which Lawrence
substituted for the notion of the soul, he was grateful to
the psychologist. The incest-motive and its associate, the
oedipus complex, puzzled Lawrence, and forced him to re-
explain, in terms of a highly original version of biology.
(Hoffman, p.167 )
This is perhaps to lend too much weight to the sense of Freud as an
intellectual adversary of Lawrence: clearly everything which Lawrence
achieved after the publication of Sons and Lovers was not in response
to Freud, even though in the novels he was, half-unconsciously,
developing his views on human consciousness through his language. And
Lawrence's 'metaphysic' was not developed as a rejoinder to Freud. In
regarding Freud as the major, indeed the only, point of reference in
the essays on the unconscious, to which he has frequent recourse,
Hoffman fails to pay sufficient attention to this 'metaphysic'. That
the Oedipal theory put Lawrence in a vulnerable position because of
the character of his relationship with his mother is a separate issue,
to be examined in brief later. Neither is Lawrence re-explaining Freud
in terms of biology, which is Hoffman's assessment of Lawrence's
discussion of the body in the essays on the unconscious. Freud was to
some extent rescuing psychic phenomena from purely physical
explanations: very early on he felt that Charcot had been misled by
visual symptoms believing them to have an organic origin, whereas
Freud himself believed the origin to be mental and he famously
challenged the womb's culpability for a variety of pathological
conditions including insanity. Lawrence's attempts to renew a sense of
the intrinsic relation of body and mind are not a retrograde step, a
reversal of Freud' s insights, but a sign of his holism which is in our
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period gaining more and more credence. I deal more fully with
Lawrence's dismantling of the polarity of body and psyche in modern
thought later on in this chapter.
The fact is that in assessing Lawrence's response to psychoanalysis
the focus properly returns to discourse. This is the arena which he
sets up in his essays on the unconscious by writing them in such a
self-consciously metaphorical mode: what is needed is a 'fantasia of'
the unconscious rather than a 'discourse on' it. Freud's discourse,
metaphorical as it needs to be, falls short because in Lawrence's view
it attempts to circumscribe that which ultimately refuses to be
circumscribed. Hoffman's discourse is even less metaphorical than
Freud's. Certainly in contrast with Lawrence's essays on the
unconscious we are able to perceive a certain critical 'blindness' on
the part of Hoffman despite his assertions about metaphor. The
fundamental difference must be that Hoffman (like Freud) regards
metaphor as rhetorical, as a figure, whereas for Lawrence it is the
flow of consciousness itself (not to be confused with the Modernist
'stream'). Hoffman's praise for the 'series of metaphors' devised by
Freud for the 'definition, description and analysis of the psychic
economy' (Hoffman, p.317) would draw Lawrence's fire because it
realizes metaphor only as a descriptive or discursive instrument.
Indeed Hoffman (in an Aristotelian gesture) posits a language which is
the 'norm' distinct from the verbal aberrations and ambiguities which
reveal the speaker's unconscious preoccupations. The central argument
of Lawrence's essays on the unconscious is that the unconscious is
simply not quantifiable in such a way. The productive focus in
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Lawrence is on metaphor and not on 'metaphorical equivalents' as
Hoffman calls them (Hoffman, p.320). Freud's discourse is, for
Lawrence, already repressed, the 'flow' is obstructed.
The fluid metaphoricity of Lawrence's own essays on the unconscious
must thus be seen as cutting across the 'mechanistic' theory contained
in Freud's metaphors. Freud's error, Lawrence asserts, lies in
constructing a theory at all, and sustaining it with 'static' plain
metaphors like Oedipus. Criticising this reliance on the purely
conceptual metaphor, Freud's 'model' of an unconscious drive, Lawrence
argues that:
All theory that has to be applied to life proves at last
just another of these unconscious images which the repressed
psyche uses as a substitute for life, and against which the
psychoanalyst is fighting. The analyst wants to break all
this image business, so that life can flow freely. But it is
useless to try to do so by replacing in the unconscious
another image -- this time, the image, the fixed motive of
the incest-complex. (Phoenix; p.378)
Nevertheless Lawrence cannot help -- as he implicitly acknowledges --
but to use Freud's basic terms even whilst challenging the status of
Freud's central theory as a theory. So it is that the works of
Lawrence and Freud have a supplementary or parergonal relation to each
other. To say so is to take up, with a view to developing, my initial
'frame' metaphor. As I said at the opening of this chapter this is not
'frame' in the sense of an enclosing border, but a notional category
across which things 'flow': there is no inside and no outside. In this
context Jacques Derrida's understanding of parerge and parergonal
logic is useful. Robert Young's headnotes to Barbara Johnson's essay
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'The Frame of Reference: Poe, Lacan, Derrida s i o provide an accessible
explanation of what has come to be seen more often than not as a
Derridean concept:
The parergon, a word that Derrida finds in Kant, is the
supplement to the 'ergon' (work) -- against, beside, above
and beyond it. In the visual arts, the parergon will be the
frame, or drapery, or enclosing column. The parergon could
also be a (critical) text, which 'encloses' another text.
But what it precisely is not, is a simple inside/outside
dichotomy. (Young, p.226)
This last in part summarizes the relation, which I have begun to
establish, of Lawrence's essays on the unconscious to Freud, if we
understand by Freud the body of his work. It shows the relation
between them to be more complex than that of text and commentary,
argument and response. Lawrence's essays are paradoxically both frame
to Freud's work and framed by it, the character of the relation of
parergon to ergon. As Derrida remarks, 'Frames are always framed:
thus, by part of their content'.11
In the light of these comments we can say that Lawrence's remarks
on Freud are inscribed in the margins, as it were, of Freud's texts
and, more often than not, in the margins of The Interpretation of
Dreams. In this work Freud not unexpectedly refers to other
authorities as part of the scientific frame of reference for The
Interpretation of Dreams. Lawrence makes a gesture of following the
convention. In the Foreword to Fantasia of the Unconscious he writes:
I am no 'scholar' of any sort. But I am very grateful to
scholars for their sound work. I have found hints,
suggestions for what I say here in all kinds of scholarly
books, from the Yoga and Plato and St. John the Evangel and
the early Greek philosophers like Herakleitos down to Frazer
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and his 'Golden Bough', and even Freud and Frobenius.
(Fantasia of the Unconscious, F&P, pp. 11-12)
The casualness with which Freud is remembered at the end is itself
significant. By listing the figures and body of work which must figure
in Fantasia of the Unconscious even if they do so imperceptibly,
Lawrence is ostensibly discounting a fixed starting place for his
'account'. If Fantasia of the Unconscious has its origin in these
writings then its beginning is a perpetual drift between diverse co-
ordinates (which would include the first shorter essay, Psychoanalysis
and the Unconscious), Lawrence's own travels are interesting in this
regard. Travel itself is quite a literal dimension and for Lawrence it
both governed and interacted significantly with his reading -- his
correspondence frequently shows that on his travels Lawrence's
priorities invariably included a library, or some other form of access
to literature, with his friends frequently sending books and other
reading matter poste restanta Geographical co-ordinates -- Lawrence's
place in the world on any given journey -- have, therefore, a
significant relation to the ones he here proposes in the Foreword. At
these times Lawrence's reading matter was determined by a selection of
texts from a diminished, at best limited, resource, with chance
playing an important part, although Rose Marie Burwell's research
confirms our sense of Lawrence reading profusely. 12 In the travel-
writing Lawrence of course starts with the literal journey, but the
experiences and landscapes he describes are meaningful at a level
other than the purely empirical one.
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In this context a single point of origin as such cannot be
identified -- forewords are traditionally written last, after the body
of the text is completed, and first words are rarely that. 13 It is
this insight which unmasks the fragmented boundaries of Fantasia of
the Unconscious itself -- part Plato, part Freud, part Jung and others
-- and shows the incomplete nature of borders, or frames, generally.
In as much as the ever receding references identified in the Foreword
actually defer a beginning, they also postpone the identification of a
single subject of the essay. In Fantasia of the Unconscious Lawrence
ostensibly has so many potential subjects that one dominant theme is
difficult to identify. Within the text then he has also plotted
another apparently infinite set of co-ordinates which he pursues in a
multi-layered operation, continually resisting a traditional linear,
traditionally logical, structure for his work; this resistance, as
will be seen, is also a feature of Women in Love It is also the
method of organization employed in this study for the reading of
Lawrence's major fiction.
This is to place Fantasia of the Unconscious in particular as a
frame for Freud's writing into a clearer perspective. The casual
reference to Freud, yoked together with Frobenius, at the end of
Lawrence's list simply shows Lawrence denying him the central place
which the titles of these essays, particularly the first, imply.
Lawrence 'writes in the margins' of Freud's texts in order to
'marginalize' him. Inevitably we observe the tone which Lawrence
adopts when he does refer explicitly to Freud. The opening pages of
Psychoanalysis and the Unconscious are declamatory. Freud is the
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'psychiatric quack'; the 'psychoanalytic gentleman' (in other words
the perfect bourgeois); Lawrence identifies an unmistakeable 'Freud
look' (clearly not an insightful gaze); psychoanalysts are accused of
subversively establishing themselves as healers -- which smacks of
mysticism -- physicians, which implies the authority of science, and
finally apostles; their 'doctrine' has been subtly 'inoculated into
us'; 'Psychoanalysis is out, under a therapeutic disguise, to do away
entirely with the moral faculty in man.' (F&P pp.201-2). It sounds
like a conspiracy theory. In Fantasia of the Unconscious Lawrence
recants a little, opening with an apology to psychoanalysis and
qualifying his opinions. After this Freud is a presence in the essay,
but is infrequently named.
The conspicuous omission of Freud's name in an essay which is
nominally a response to his ideas is juxtaposed with Lawrence's quasi-
biological description of the plexuses and eight dynamic centres of
feeling. This 'fantasy' is proposed implicitly as a substitute for
Freud's theories. The anatomical plan provided by Lawrence is an
Instance of framing occurring in a more literal sense, in the sense of
an internal order, proposed as a literal structure, which defines the
emotional and instinctual shape of the individual. The body and the
emotions hang upon this frame. The description of cell division forces
us to be aware of boundaries -- we all recognize primitive cell
structure as a nucleus inside a space defined by a boundary. The
diaphragm, our organs including skin, are further divisions. In their
study, Lakoff and Johnson show how 'container metaphors', which these
are, are the way we culturally construct ourselves in our world:
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We are physical beings, bounded and set off from the rest of
the world by the surface of our skins, and we experience the
rest of the world as outside us. Each of us is a container,
with a bounding surface and an in-out orientation. We
project our own in-out orientation onto other physical
objects that are bounded by surfaces. Thus we also view them
as containers with an inside and an outside. 1*
These concepts are so extensively entrenched in our thought and
language that we tend to be unaware of articulating them. Lawrence
naturally uses them but at the same time he is absorbed in questioning
the in-out dichotomy, a questioning which is the basis of his holism.
He can insist that the individual is separate from the world by
repeating his formula 'I am I', but he also emphasizes the
Individual's integral relation or connection with the sensible world
(a theme of the travel writing).
The pseudo-biological model described in Lawrence's essays
functions both literally and metaphorically: indeed this is its force.
It cannot and should not be taken as analogous to Freud's early
concentration on the chemical-biological foundation of 'hysteria', for
Instance. The origin of Lawrence's anatomical plan is fragmented and
imprecise: 'Authorized science tells you that this first great plexus,
this all-potent nerve-centre of consciousness and dynamic life-
activity, is a sympathetic centre.' (F&P p.28). The authors of this
science are not named but the implication is that they are many and
various, so once again origin is defined in terms of a drift between
co-ordinates. This is also to omit Freud in particular from the
gallery of authors, or authorizers, and this ellipsis becomes a
legitimate subject of Fantasia of the Unconscious. Paradoxically
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Lawrence is both constructing a frame around Freud's theory of the
unconscious -- inasmuch as Freud's, and Lawrence's, lasting interest
In psychoanalysis apparently provide the motivation for writing the
essay -- and omitting that theory, and in doing so gainsaying it,
almost altogether.
The 'frame' has a further application, perhaps the most obvious. It
is almost impossible, given Lawrence's personal history or given the
attention paid to the details of his family relations, not to
speculate how far his dismissal of psychoanalysis is anchored in the
fear of being himself unmasked and that Fantasia of the Unconscious in
particular constitutes an unconsciously constructed rhetoric of fear.
In The Interpretation of Dreams, for example, there are many occasions
when Freud protects himself from presumably moral censure by omitting
details either of his own dreams or his interpretation. The
Interpretation of his own dream of 'Irma's injection' is a case in
point where he qualifies his statement 'I have now completed the
Interpretation of the dream' with ,a note added later in 1909
confirming that 'I have not reported everything that occurred to me
during the process of interpretation' (SE, IV, p.118). His concluding
remarks to the chapter in question return to the theme of self-
protection bearing in mind the force of public opinion. Elsewhere he
reflects on the wisdom of not relying on the discretion even of his
friends.
This dream
	
deals with Freud's own professional competence and
it is egoistic, even narcissistic. In an essay which begins by
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considering the contradiction between Freud's intentionalism in
interpreting 'Irma's injection', his quest to find a single 'meaning',
and his assertion that such a reductive programme constitutes a
'psychoanalytic error', one critic has forcefully shown that 'Irma's
injection' reveals both a repressing and a repressed wish, ls The
dream-work itself attempts to disrupt the narcissistic autonomy of
Freud's ego which aggressively asserts its own mastery over the
patient. Mehlman consequently identifies a polemical dimension to
'Irma's injection' not stated by Freud which destabilizes its value as
a 'truth' unmasked by the analyst. The underlying fear is of the
interpretation's capacity to 'frame' the dreamer, therefore Freud
keeps silent on certain themes, or embellishments of themes already
revealed. In the context of an essay which posits all interpretations
as repressions, 16 and which confirms the desire of each interpretation
to be ultimately authoritative, the interpretation provides a frame
for the dream which is itself paradoxically framed by the dream's
contents to the point where it is difficult to state categorically
what lies inside the dream and what lies outside it. The
dreamer/interpreter runs the risk of being exposed as participating in
some unpalatable drama, that is to say, of being framed. This is
Freud's position and to some extent may be Lawrence's, particularly
when the text in view is Sons and Lovers.
Lawrence was dismissive of Alfred Kuttner's psychoanalytic reading
of Sons and Lovers in 1916." This lack of enthusiasm on Lawrence's
part combined with the tone of the essays on the unconscious is
grounded in a dismissal of the Oedipus complex as a psychic structure.
42
In the tenth chapter of Fantasia of the Unconscious, 'Parent Love',
Lawrence's initial strategy is to hit at the idealism of love between
the parents and the child, and particularly the love of mother and
child. The striking thing about Lawrence's 'fantasy' of biology -- to
which he resorts here as elsewhere -- is that as a frame it seems to
be intact, even rigid. As Lawrence locates real issues like parent-
child relationships within his 'anatomical' model it takes on the role
he discounts
of a censor. In resorting to it'all other possibilities
tliewl,
in effect eliminatinji particularly those offered up by 'authorized
science'. In particular Lawrence's sense of the wilful 'spiritual'
love of the mother causes in the child 'an exaggerated sensitiveness
alternating with a sort of helpless fury; and we have delicate frail
children with nerves or with strange whims.' (F&P p.118).
Inevitably one wonders how much this is a portrait of the artist
himself, feeling singled out and exposed by Freud's Oedipal theory and
its implications. In as much as Freud has provided the terms by which
Lawrence's fiction, and by implication Lawrence himself, can be judged
Lawrence might well feel that even if the Oedipal theory does not
apply to him Freud has somehow made it look as though it does and the
response of Alfred Booth Kuttner, who might well be representive of a
substantial body of opinion given the popularity of Freud in some
quarters at that time, is proof of this. It is in this highly personal
context that Lawrence himself is in danger of being framed and the
essays on the unconscious are in part an attempt to resist this
framing. Mabel Dodge Luhan, familiar with Freud's theories although
not as familiar perhaps as Frieda Lawrence, subscribed to the view
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that Lawrence had a i mother-complex'.' 9 Frieda Lawrence imprecisely
described Lawrence's love for his mother as 'sort of Oedipus'
(Letters, I, p.449), and critics have plundered the sources to show
Lawrence's resistance to Freud despite the fact that the Oedipus
complex is, or was, frequently identified as the 'sickness' being shed
in Sons and Lovers, Lawrence later finding it necessary to resist
Freud's terms. In Fantasia of the Unconscious in fact Lawrence can be
seen trying to reclaim certain terms, specifically 'unconscious', from
the Freudians. This theme of resistance is clearly written in to the
novels: Rupert Birkin could be seen, in his defensive relations with
Ursula Brangwen, as a resisting device for the author. Birkin's
resistance to Ursula recalls Lawrence's opposition to Frieda in the
early stages of their marriage, during the writing of 'The Sisters'
and as it became two novels. 19
Without wishing to exaggerate Kuttner's importance it is worth
noting that in his concluding remarks to the essay on Sons and Lovers
he writes of the 'cure' which the artist effects in himself in
writing:
For Mr. Lawrence has escaped the destructive fate that dogs
the hapless Paul by the grace of expression: out of the dark
struggles of his own soul he has emerged as a triumphant
artist. In every epoch the soul of the artist is sick with
the problems of his generation. He cures himself by
expression in his art. (Kuttner, in SalgEtdo ed. (1969),
p.94)
Kuttner could not have known of Lawrence's now famous statement about
the artist shedding his sicknesses in art (Letters, II, p.90) but his
remark is an interesting trace of Lawrence's deeper idea, even if the
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reviewer appears to give the artist a social consciousness, 'In every
epoch the soul of the artist is sick with the problems of his
generation' (emphasis added). Kuttner at any rate focuses on
literature as a privileged order of talking-cure. His position is that
Lawrence has, independently of Freud, shown Freud's conclusions to be
true. This stance is almost a convention as philosophers commonly find
in literature some forceful echo of their own theory: this is not the
same as constructing a 'system' and finding a text which is in
agreement with it, but is more a case of recognizing in a text one's
own system at work. Husserl's Phenomenology offers an example of this
-- Husserl being one of the most famous recent constructors of a
'system' -- with its veiled and unveiled references to literature, and
we can appositely refer to Lacan in this context. Freud himself does
not ransack literature in order to see his own models and theories
acted out, such a concept is too crude, but instead he finds in
literature his own theory or 'system' in place as it were and,
therefore, giving an unsuspected power to his own idea. As he says,
'It sometimes happens that the sharp eye of a creative writer has an
analytic realization of the process of transformation of which he is
habitually no more than the tool.' (SE, IV, p.246).2°
2.2 Anti-Oedipal
Kuttner is perhaps too close to Freud or too unfamiliar with Lawrence,
judging him on the basis of his third novel as autobiographical, to
know how to read him, believing Lawrence to have had such an 'analytic
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realization' of a Freudian theme. Convinced by Freud's reconstruction
of human relations, Kuttner is unable to recognize the anti-Oedipal in
Lawrence.
So far I have drawn attention to the complex 'framing' relation
which Lawrence's writing on the unconscious has to Freud's
conceptions. I have also underlined Lawrence's rejection, or
repudiation, of Freud and have qualified this by drawing attention to
his possible fear of being 'framed'. The problem lies both in how
sexuality is evaluated by each, and how Lawrence perceives Freud's
evaluation of human relations in contrast to his own more
'instinctive' sense of them. It is time to see exactly how radical
Lawrence's objections to Freud are, quite apart from how Freudian
conceptions might apply to him. This involves a move from the
'content' of Freud's thought to the central question of 'discourse'.
In my view philosopher Gilles Deleuze and psychoanalyst Felix
Guattari have a point when they argue that Freud's conception of
sexuality appals Lawrence exactly because it is just that, a
conception, an Idea (Anti-Oedipus, p.323). In a study which, although
written from within the domain of psychoanalysis, challenges the
status of Freud in our culture, reassessing him as one of the 'poor
technicians of desire -- psychoanalysts and semiologists of every sign
and symptom -- who would subjugate the multiplicity of desire to the
twofold law of structure and lack' (Michel Foucault in the preface to
Anti-Oedipus, xiii), Lawrence is rightly cited as a radical and
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innovative thinker and one of the first to identify the Oedipal
mother-father-infant relation as both limited and censorious.
Of the two conceptions which Lawrence is seen to challenge the
first is the Oedipal triangle, 'the holy family' as he ironically
calls it in Fantasia of the Unconscious (Fantasia of the Unconscious,
chapter 2), a description which Deleuze and Guattari revive for one of
their chapter-headings (Anti-Oedipus, pp.51-137). The second is the
idea of the Phallus as 'the despotic signifier prompting the most
miserable struggle.' (Anti-Oedipus, p.351). It is precisely this
conception which is the basis of what Lawrence calls sex-hatred. His
essays on the unconscious force us to confront the fact that for
Lawrence sexual orientation and sexual identity are not bound up
either with the possession of the Phallus (and the subsequent anxiety
about its loss), or conversely with its absence.
Deleuze and Guattari are with Lawrence inasmuch as they agree that
Freud's conception of sexuality is predicated on the unearthing of
something unpalatable; the 'dirty' secret of sex which inhabits the
unconscious. Objecting to the 'sovreignization' of Oedipus in Freudian
psychoanalysis, seeing it as a moral extension of nineteenth-century
psychology, and eager to dismantle this bourgeois structure, they
respond as much to Lawrence's language as to the challenge which it
embodies. In the following passage they alight on Lawrence's metaphor
of the 'flow' of human relations, and proceed to quote extensively
from the essay 'We Need One Another' (in Phoenix, pp. 188-95):
47
Lawrence shows in a profound way that sexuality, including
chastity, is a matter of flows, an infinity of different and
even contrary flows.... Lawrence attacks the poverty of the
immutable identical images, the figurative roles that are so
many tourniquets cutting off the flows of sexuality:
"fiancée, mistress, wife, mother" -- one could just as
easily add "homosexuals, heterosexuals," etc. -- all these
roles are distributed by the Oedipal triangle, father-
mother-me, a representative ego thought to be defined in
terms of the father-mother representations, by fixation,
regression, assumption, sublimation -- and all of that
according to what rule? The law of the great Phallus that no
one possesses, the despotic signifier prompting the most
miserable struggle, a common absence for all the reciprocal
exclusions where the flows dry up, drained by bad conscience
and ressentiment. "... sticking a woman on a pedestal, or
the reverse, sticking her beneath notice; or making a
'model' housewife of her, or a 'model' mother, or a 'model'
help-meet. All mere devices for avoiding any contact with
her. A woman is not a 'model' anything. She is not even a
distinct and definite personality.... A woman is a strange
soft vibration on the air, going forth unknown and
unconscious, and seeking a vibration of response. Or else
she is a discordant, jarring, painful vibration, going forth
and hurting everyone within range. And a man the same"
Let's not be too quick to make light of the pantheism of
flows present in such texts as this: it is not easy to de-
oedipalize even nature, even landscapes, to the extent that
Lawrence could. (Anti-Oedipus, p.351)
Lawrence's characters do not finish up being merely these
'representative egos' -- 'wife', 'husband' and so on -- and to many
readers who want something more reductive than Lawrence offers this is
a considerable problem. The aspect of the 'metaphysic' being
identified here is that which evaluates sexuality as something other
than the simple dichotomies, the binary oppositions, which more
usually represent it: male/female; man/wife; heterosexual/homosexual.
The metaphor of 'flow', which is fundamental to Lawrence and has an
Important status in the lexicon of his 'metaphysic', challenges the
sense of the isolated individual, his psyche determined by the Oedipal
drama, having meaning only in a psycho-sexual configuration based on
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the family. Sexuality for Lawrence is rightly identified as a matter
of notional 'flows'. Where there is a distinct physical object sexual
exchange is described metaphorically to underline Lawrence's view that
the act is not merely mechanical. Individuals become 'vibrations',
unpredictably contrary or harmonious, or different. Devising
psychological types or consigning individuals to certain sex roles
goes against this understanding. The individual, for Lawrence, is
principally responsive as s/he inhabits the present moment, rather
than determined by oedipalization. Rather than constructing a
framework as he perceives Freud to be doing, in the words of Deleuze
and Guattari 'the framework of the "dirty little secret" (Anti-
Oedipus, p.350), Lawrence has placed the emphasis metaphorically on
'tides' of feeling and their interaction in the present. The point
about Lawrence's 'flows and vibrations' is that they do not constitute
a rigid explanatory model: in fact as I will argue they cut across and
through any such models. Nothing can be 'hung' on them as it can be,
in Lawrence's view, on the Oedipal example which is imposed on the
susceptible individual: Lawrence's 'flows', not a model or rigid
psychic structure, are interactive. In his mature work Lawrence's
language, and this is the real point, carries the weight of this
metaphysical recognition.
Deleuze and Guattari understand much better than Hoffman, who stays
at the doctrinal level, the importance of Lawrence's language in his
disagreement with Freud. If it were otherwise they would not have
responded with such immediacy to his metaphors of 'tides' and 'flows'.
This concentration on Lawrence's metaphors and on the alertness of his
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insights about Freudian models and their cultural implications carries
this discussion to its next stage; to the penetrating metaphoricity of
Lawrence's essays on the unconscious.
2.3 Metaphor and 'metaphysic' in the essays on the unconscious.
Psychoanalysis and the Unconscious (1921) and Fantasia of the
Unconscious (1922) are among the least discussed of Lawrence's prose
works. Fantasia of the Unconscious, written second, is commonly
printed first because of the publisher's view that it 'represents
Lawrence's developed views on the subject, which are more tentatively
outlined in Psychoanalysis and the Unconscious' 21 In actual fact
Psychoanalysis and the Unconscious is not as provisional as this
suggests. Before addressing its particular importance a more general
description of the two essays is necessary. 22 I will then be in a
position to move into a more detailed examination of their language.
The evidence is that Lawrence found the longer essay, Fantasia of
the Unconscious, 'interesting' to write, that it was of considerable
Importance to him (Letters, IV, p.132) and that it progressed quite
quickly in comparison with the novels most of which were radically re-
drafted either in their entirety, or in large part, until the
appropriate form emerged. The fact that the text is called a
'fantasia' throws the form, as well as the contents, into relief.
'Fantasia' is an old word reappropriated by Lawrence. Like
'unconscious' it has its origins in the eighteenth century although
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largely because of Freud 'unconscious' has come to sound peculiarly
modern whereas 'fantasia' retains its anachronistic air: 23 both
'fantasia' and 'unconscious' resonate strangely when coupled in
Lawrence's title.
Quite apart from its musical implication, which I shall come to,
'fantasia' recalls words like 'fancy', 'fantasy' and 'phantasmagoria'
with their senses of 'capricious preferment', 'individual taste',
'imagination' and dream. Although 'fancy' was eventually distinguished
from 'imagination', 'fantasy' retained its Greek meaning, phantasid
signifying the imaginative faculty. Both 'fantasy' and 'fantastic'
retain their senses of the extraordinary made visible, and 'phantasm'
and 'phantasmagoria' can be heard echoing in the modern word. 422
these meanings exert a linguistic pressure on Lawrence's book.
Certainly the sense which some of them bear of mental images, dream
images, as 'fanciful', hallucinatory, chance phenomena, stimulated by
external factors and less than serious as such, refer satirically to
Freud's analyses of dreams as part of his scientific project, and to
his plotting of the unconscious. This said, one can speculate whether
Lawrence in a self-critical, or ironic, mood, found it appealing that
'fantasia' gave a name to a literary project which demonstrates his
arguably 'capricious' preference for his own 'fantastic' projection
given the cosmology, a pseudo-biology and so on.
More specifically, since the eighteenth century a fantasia has come
to signify a musical composition, particularly one with an impromptu,
improvised form. Fantasia, therefore, refers to a form where form
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itself is subsidiary to caprice, desire and fantasy. The musical usage
does have implications for the form of Fantasia of the Unconscious
with its multiple points of entry and false starts, and the sense from
Lawrence himself, describing the act of writing it, that it is an
impromptu and largely spontaneous composition. Obviously there are
many Modernist instances of texts which explore the interface between
music and language without being fantasias: Mallarmê's Un coup de des
is one example. Lawrence's The Trespasser could also be cited as a
text which makes structural and thematic uses of musical allusions
although again this is clearly not a fantasia. Lawrence is familiar
with a Romantic tradition which asserts a profound relation between
music, like dream, and the representation of the unconscious, but he
would resist the tendency, evident in Schopenhauer for instance, to
establish a hierarchy which accords music a particular value, and the
word another. Lawrence's word 'fantasia' also implicates 'fantasy' and
connects very obviously with Freud's usage of 'phantasy' (Phantasie).
Whilst it is not a fixed term in Freud who persistently gives it
different and distinctive inflections, Lawrence would respond to the
broad conception negatively, as he did to the Freudian notion of dream
particularly given the emphasis on desire and WunschphantaslA because
of what Freud does with the underpinning premises of prohibition and
repression.
The title of the longer essay presents us with two contradictory
terms, 'fantasia' with its emphasis on the impromptu and free-form,
and 'unconscious' defined by psychoanalysis as something determined by
infantile experience. Lawrence's book occurs in the space opened up by
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this contradiction. This alignment of unexpected terms in such a
privileged place as the title is significant not least because it is
linked to the important question of oxymoron in Lawrence which will be
examined in detail in the next chapter. For the time being it is
enough to note how the juxtaposition of 'fantasia' and 'unconscious'
in the title represents a challenge to the determinism of Freud, as
Lawrence saw it, in the former's assertion that the 'unconscious'
could be known in the same way that the physical body is knowable. In
using the word 'fantasia' Lawrence is suggesting the impossibility of
containing the unconscious within what he regards from the first as
repressive structures. The promise of the title is that Lawrence will
draw attention back to the creative edge of language rather than to
the return of the repressed.
Structurally, it is to be seen whether or not 'fantasia' is an
appropriate description of the form which Lawrence's longer essay
takes. Like Women in Love, Fantasia of the Unconscious is more spatial
than temporal in structure. Even so, it is less inclined than the
novel to progress by degrees towards a conclusion, and in fact ends
abruptly giving no real sense of an argument completed. The chapter
sequence also seems quite arbitrary. More important than the
structure, however, is the language of the essay which is the proper
subject of this chapter. Two groups of chapters out of the entire
fifteen seem to be more closely related thematically than others:
'First Glimmerings of Mind' and 'First Steps in Education' in which
Lawrence elaborates on his account of child development and education;
'Parent Love', 'The Vicious Circle', 'Litany of Exhortations', on
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love. There are two acknowledged digressions, early on in 'Trees and
Babies and Papas and Mamas' -- where the focus is on 'presence', a
central question, if not to say quality, in Lawrence's writing -- and
the entire chapter called 'Education and Sex in Man, Woman and Child'.
To all intents and purposes Fantasia of the Unconscious is a
collection of essays on a few related themes, the principal one being
that referred to as 'child consciousness', with Lawrence concentrating
broadly on the biological development of the child and beyond that on
family relations. 'The holy family', title of the second chapter as
well as of one of Lawrence's paintings, is the trinity of mother,
father and child which comprises the basic point of reference
throughout the essays, but is also the focus for his critique of
Freud. Orthodox psychology and conventional social mores provide only
rudimentary frames of reference since Lawrence is highly critical of
both. 'Love' and 'knowledge' are familiar themes generally for
Lawrence. In both essays he returns to first things in order to
explain what he regards as the perversion of these qualities in modern
life. Orthodox psychology and Freudian psychoanalysis are implicated
in that perversion. Tightly focused on the developing individual,
Lawrence constructs his own systems -- which come to be seen as highly
personal metaphors continually unfolding in the course of the essays
-- to explain this development, plotting a middle way between the body
and the psyche, polarized by Freud.
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Regarding its style Fantasia of the Unconscious is one of several
extended works where Lawrence continually makes use of direct address,
referring to 'dear reader', 'gentle reader' and so on.
In the Foreword he sets about dissuading the
'generality' of readers and critics from reading any further. This, in
accord with a rhetorical tradition, encourages the reader to stay with
the book. Such gestures make us, if we are already alert to Lawrence's
subtle intelligence regarding language, think whether his devices are
In fact merely 'rhetorical' and ornamental or whether they are not
really intrinsic to his thought.
The shorter and earlier essay, Psychoanalysis and the Unconscious,
is divided into six relatively concise chapters which rehearse the
principal themes of Fantasia of the Unconscious although it is
erroneous to regard the former merely as an adumbration of the latter.
The first two chapters represent a direct attack on Freud's ideas but
thereafter, as I have said, Freud disappears. The content of the essay
is essentially the same as that of Fantasia of the Unconscious but is
dealt with much more economically: the expansion in the second essay
actually adds very little. Certainly for my purposes Psychoanalysis
and the Unconscious is much more tightly focused than Fantasia of the
Unconscious, and much richer in what it communicates about Lawrence's
thought on language. Fantasia of the Unconscious is, in contrast,
subject to genuine repetitions and narrative looseness. In terms of
language and content Psychoanalysis and the Unconscious would seem to
be the more conventional essay but its significance lies in the fact
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that a close reading shows it to be the more radically unconventional
of the two. Crucially, the central statements which come from Lawrence
on metaphor are to be found, although they can be, and have been,
overlooked, in Psychoanalysis and the Unconscious.
I now propose to move from this general account of the essays to a
closer examination of their mode and language. Critics are
Increasingly showing how Lawrence challenges logocentric modes in his
writing and my reading of Lawrence partly contributes to that
recognition. Essentially this is a response to the linguistic mobility
of Lawrence's texts whilst recognizing that there are certain
appointed themes which direct his thought. in the discussion to folJow
the post-structuralist concept of the 'frame', which I proposed at the
beginning of this chapter, again comes into view. This drawing on
certain post-structuralist notions where appropriate is in keeping
with my generally Nietzschean perspective on Lawrence: Nietzsche's
status is typically high among many contemporary French thinkers, some
of whom have formulated what are to me extremely useful critical
terms, 24
This raises the question, briefly posed in my introduction, as to
the usefulness of post-structuralist perspectives at all with regard
to Lawrence. It is a question which critics writing about Lawrence's
language increasingly find themselves confronting. In a recent article
which focuses on this issue, Gerald Doherty, directing his comments at
Women in Love, which is the obvious text in this context given its
overt language theme, is content to regard Lawrence as intrinsically
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Derridean calling him 'an ardent deconstructor of logocentric modes of
completion and closure'. 25 However, Doherty, like Diane Bonds, runs
the risk of pushing the comparison with Jacques Derrida so far that
much of what is important about Lawrence is lost. Obviously for
Lawrence there is no Derrida even remotely on the horizon. Allan
Ingram, possibly with this in mind, writes that 'For Lawrence,
language is there to convey what needs to be conveyed, not to be
contemplated and enjoyed as a field of play.' (Ingram, p.17). But
those critics who find Derridean parallels with Lawrence useful are in
fairness responding to the philosophical quality of Lawrence's
language, just as others have underlined, and continue to underline,
the relation of Lawrence and Nietzsche, for instance, and more
recently the kinship between Lawrence and Heidegger.26
Michael Bell has noted that up to a point Lawrence and Derrida
share a vocabulary if not a conception of language, and he implicitly
raises the question whether the concepts 'logocentric' and 'the
metaphysics of presence' would have interested Lawrence had he heard
them. As Michael Bell has pointed out, the fact that the words
'metaphysics' and 'presence' are absolutely central to the thought of
each makes a comparison alluring (Bell, pp.53-4). It is a coincidence
which motivates Doherty's reading of Lawrence, for instance. In her
preface to Derrida's Of Grammatology Gayatri Spivak writes, 'Derrida
uses the word "metaphysics" very simply as shorthand for any science
of presence'. 27 Such a shorthand is unthinkable in Lawrence. Whilst he
and Derrida are engaged in the deconstruction of Western metaphysics
(as is Heidegger), both lean very differently on the key word
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'presence'. This is something which I will come back to in my chapter
on The Rainbom There is a sense in which this kind of coincidence,
given that 'metaphysics' and 'presence' are central to both thinkers,
is potentially fruitful, but if Lawrence and Derrida are to be grafted
together in some fashion the end must be a deeper understanding of
Lawrence rather than a demonstration of the suitability of a
deconstructive consciousness in yet another writer. Doherty warns that
'one must guard against transforming Lawrence into a Derridean avant
la lettre' (Doherty, p.484) but throughout his article Derrida is the
yard-stick against which Lawrence is judged. So although Doherty's
article raises important questions it does not significantly advance
our understanding of Lawrence's language.
The fact is that both Lawrence and Derrida celebrate a 'living' and
highly metaphorical language, but for each the terms 'metaphysic' and
'presence' signify very differently. For Derrida, who insists on
diffÉrance, an indispensable neologism because Derrida's thesis
requires a word which does not have an orthodox etymology, the
emphasis is always on the deferred term, something which effectively
erases, or problematizes, the here and now. The sense is of something
which is continually out of reach, evading capture as it were,
something which is known by the play of difference which is the trace
it leaves behind. A hostile critic might ask whether the present, the
here and now, is inconceivable to Derrida who, or so it could be
argued, seems to deal with the Other more effectively than with the
thing itself. It is not my view that Derrida is locked unproductively
into the warring of signifiers and the continual free-play of
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language, but to the hostile critic his seeming so suggests that there
is no authentic philosophical project in his activity. I would prefer
to argue that Derrida's particular brand of self-conscious
metaphoricity results in a language which despite itself is still
fundamentally analytic and conceptual, and that this is its
fundamental weakness. Freud was an older contemporary of Lawrence (he
died nine years after Lawrence), and most critics agree that his views
on the unconscious inevitably drew the writer: Lawrence was, of
course, in a position to comment on Freud's thought. One can
speculate, however, that had he and Derrida been contemporaries --
Derrida was born in 1930 -- Lawrence would have been similarly
compelled to remark not only on the conceptual nature of his language,
but also on Derrida's negative view of presence.
It is not within the purview of the present study to enter more
deeply into the debate on the value or otherwise of deconstruction,
other than to state that, with respect to the comparison with
Lawrence, Derrida is concentrating principally on dWd'e-anceand
Lawrence on presence, 	 in particular the
possibility of inhabiting (for once, he would argue) the 'immediate
present' which is not in his view characterized by closure but is
'nothing finished' (CP p.182). In this, at least, he and Derrida are
not talking about the same thing at all. They have been Juxtaposed
here, and elsewhere, because of the apparent co-incidence of some of
their key terms: it is that co-incidence, and what each writer does
with or means by those terms which is useful in throwing Lawrence's
'metaphysic' as well as his language into relief. The intention is not
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to Justify Lawrence to Derrida but to treat sensitively the current
notion of their ideas overlapping. For instance, despite the
differences highlighted above, Lawrence might conceivably have agreed
with Derrida's description of the unconscious in terms of language.
Derrida: 'The unconscious text is already a weave of pure traces 	 a
text nowhere present, consisting of archives which are always already
transcriptions.' 2° Metaphor is a way of reconstructing the text which
is 'nowhere present', which is also Freud's task, which brings me
closer to the central question of metaphor in Lawrence's essays on the
unconscious.
The value of post-structuralism in the present context lies in the
richness of the metaphors which continually surface as modern thinkers
turn their attention to the problem of language and meaning. For
example, in the translator's introduction to Dissemination, which is
itself quite self-consciously a border or adjunct to Derrida's text,
Barbara Johnson writes that 'Derrida's writing, indeed, is always
explicitly inscribed in the margins of some preexisting text'. 2"3 In
The Truth in Painting; for example, the pre-existing text is Kant's
Critique of Judgement and shorter works on related subjects, like
Heidegger's essay 'The Origin of the Work of Art'. This provides us
with one way of thinking about texts and commentaries, the latter as
positive adjuncts with a vital connection to the body of the chosen
text, written as it were at a later date between the lines of that
text. Johnson's words also serve to make a distinction between active
readers (or transformers: readers who read dialectically) and,
although the phrase is not used explicitly, passive consumers.
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Derrida, as he reads, relies on immense metaphorical leaps resulting
In the mobile, often impenetrable texture of his own essays with their
available blank margins also awaiting inscription and, in The Truth in
Painting; framed spaces extended between the blocks of text which
silently invite inscription.30
In the light of these comments it becomes possible to reread
Fantasia of the Unconscious as inscribed in the margins and between
the lines of the shorter, tighter essay, Psychoanalysis and the
Unconscious. Indeed, its opening lines indicate its supplementary
nature, Lawrence writing that 'The present book is a continuation from
Psychoanalysis and the Unconscious.' (F&& p.11). To this could be
added Barbara Johnson's words 'In French, the word supplement has two
meanings: it means both "an addition" and "a substitute", 31
 as both
senses can be brought to Lawrence's longer essay. In fact, the flaws
of Fantasia of the Unconscious are entrenched in its supplementary
nature. We can say that in it Lawrence has 'over-written':
figuratively speaking he has saturated the margins of the first essay,
Psychoanalysis of the Unconscious, in his insistence on presence.
In the fourth chapter of Fantasia of the Unconscious, 'Trees and
Babies and Papas and Mamas', Lawrence refers to his own physical
presence, his environment and the act of writing the text which we are
reading. Far from being simply an act of will, writing is described as
a 'forgetting' (F&P p.43). This can be compared to his comments on his
hand as it writes 'Why the Novel Matters', apparently without the
intrusion of consciousness. It is a passage which recalls Nietzsche's
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remark that '. we lack any sensitive organs' by which to perceive the
'inner world':°2
Why should I look at my hand, as it so cleverly writes these
words, and decide that it is a mere nothing compared to the
mind that directs it? Is there really any huge difference
between my hand and my brain? -- or my mind? My hand is
alive, it flickers with a life of its own. It meets all the
strange universe, in touch, and learns a vast number of
things, and knows a vast number of things. My hand, as it
writes these words, slips gaily along, jumps like a
grasshopper to dot an i, feels the table rather cold, gets a
little bored if I write too long, has its own rudiments of
thought, and is Just as much me as is my brain, my mind or
my soul. Why should I imagine that there is a me which is
more me than my hand is? Since my hand is absolutely alive,
me alive.
('Why the Novel Matters', in Study of Thomas Hardy and Other
Essays, p.193)
The orthodox duality of mind and body is here rejected completely. We
are being asked to regard the physical hand which writes as more than
a mere appendage to the mind which thinks: 'The whole is greater than
the part' (STHOE p.195). The hand, a sentient 'organ' as is the eye,
knows, a word which Lawrence sometimes italicizes because all the
meanings which meet in the word give it special significance to him
beyond day-to-day usage, but it learns and knows in a different way
from the eye. Lawrence, looking down, can see his hand in front of him
as physical, as flesh, but additionally regards it as having more than
a simply mechanical function. After all, hands are 'in touch' both
with the world of things and, in writing, with the creative levels
within the writer. The 'flow' of writing and language is the 'flow' of
thought. Lawrence is after a kind of physicality which is not simply
or solely fleshly, corporeal. Hands figure in Lawrence: the longer
passage contrasts, for instance, with a passing remark about Clara
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Dawes, watched by Paul Morel, as she makes lace in 'Clara' (Sons and
Lovers, chapter X): 'And her arm moved mechanically, that should never
have been subdued to a mechanism' (SL p.304); or the reference to
Gudrun's 'perfectly subtle and intelligent hands' which, 'greedy for
knowledge', feel Gerald's face in 'Death and Love' (WI, p.332, my
italics). This both mirrors and contrasts with the touch of Ursula on
Birkin in the previous chapter, 'Excurse' OIL p.314, p.316). Hands
reach out to the unknown as language does. Lawrence's meditation
underlines the percipient and intuitive quality of composition. The
hand that writes, whilst not autonomous, is not simply the instrument
of the will, or purely a collection of nerves and cells. 33 The focus
is sharply on the subliminal dimenson of composition: the novels,
coming s unwatched', are not formally constructed in accordance with a
theory, and in the act of creation the body is not separable from the
mind. In this example, presence, that entirely positive quality for
Lawrence, is given a fundamentally positive connection with writing
and language.
The passage quoted above embodies Lawrence's 'metaphysics of
presence'. Regarding presence, living for Lawrence is evidently the
richness, specialness or realness of the present moment, like the
moment of writing. Effectively, for him, if what one is looking for is
not present in the present then it is unlikely to be elsewhere, in the
future for example, or inhabiting some other dimension. Presence, for
Lawrence, is the quality of being dynamically present, present-at-
hand, and so the word 'presence' is invested with a particular
philosophical significance in his writing. In 'Trees and Babies and
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Papas and Mamas' the trees of the Black Forest, where Lawrence sits
writing the book, are characterized by their presentness. He describes
them as 'so much bigger than me, so much stronger in life, prowling
silent around. ... Today only trees, and leaves, and vegetable
presences.' (F&P p.42, emphasis added). He adds 'They have no faces,
no minds and bowels: only deep lustful roots stretching in earth, and
vast, lissome life in air, and primeval individuality.' (F&P pp.45-6).
If this is the living tree then the dead tree, in the familiar
equipmental form of pencil and paper, is no less present, and is
implicated early on in the writing both of the passage and the book.
Lawrence describes himself writing as 'a fool, sitting by a grassy
wood-road with a pencil and a book, hoping to write more about that
baby. ... so am I usually stroked into forgetfulness, and into
scribbling this book. My tree-book, really.' (F&P pp. 42-3).
This is a passage in which priority is clearly given once again to
writing and presence. For Lawrence human consciousness, that is to say
verbal consciousness and consciousness at the deepest non-verbal
levels, is a matter of being purely present. The fact that Lawrence
places such emphasis on presence, that it motivates a great deal of
possibly
his writing, is/a sign of his consciousness of its slippery and
elusive quality. Implicit in his 'poetics of presence' must be the
sense that the present moment can only, paradoxically, be conceived of
because the human being inhabits only the past and future moments.
Speech passes into the past as it is spoken. The present moment may
therefore be most present to the individual at a non-verbal level: in
feeling, for instance. But language must communicate the experience.
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The English tradition, literary or philosophical, does not give
Lawrence the articulation he needs. His uniqueness very largely hangs
on this: the language which we can call 'Lawrencean', and which I am
in the course of examining, constitutes a radically different poetics
of presence than any he might find in his own culture. Wordsworth
might be a comparable figure, but essentially Lawrence's difference
underpins the present study. Lawrence is certainly the only Modernist
writer in English to have a 'metaphysic' that even comes close to
being articulated (I. e. in full). The question of metaphor is so
central in reading Lawrence precisely because his 'metaphysic' is
rooted in language.
In Lawrence especially we can see that metaphor and 'metaphysic'
are inextricable. 'Metaphysic' is a word which, in relation to
Lawrence, I usually write in inverted commas. In talking about
Lawrence's 'metaphysic' we usually, and rightly, keep them. The
inverted commas, written or 'spoken', show that the word has its own
parergonal logic; that is to say it is distinguished by these marks
from the body of the text in which it appears and as such -- as both
an adjunct to the text and simultaneously something that lies within
it -- it has an important framing relation, as described earlier, to
that body of text. Indeed, Lawrence' s 'metaphysic' both frames and is
framed by the language of his texts, to the point where the
inside/outside polarity of metaphor/metaphysic can be dismantled.
Remarks in the Foreword to Fantasia of the Unconscious suggest that
the philosophy comes after the fiction: 'This pseudo-philosophy of
mine -- ' pollyanalytics' , as one of my respected critics might say --
is deduced from the novels and poems, not the reverse.' (F&P p. 15).
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Yet there is also the argument that without it the fiction could not
be:
And finally, it seems to me that even art is utterly
dependent on philosophy: or if you prefer it, on a
metaphysic. The metaphysic or philosophy may not be anywhere
very accurately stated and may be quite unconscious, in the
artist, yet it is a metaphysic that governs men at the time,
and is by all men more or less comprehended, and lived. Men
live and see according to some gradually developing and
gradually withering vision. This vision exists also as a
dynamic idea or metaphysics -- exists first as such. Then it
is unfolded into life and art.
(Foreword to Fantasia of the Unconscious, F&P, p.15)
Stating the case, and this dictum famously underpins Lawrence's best
literary criticism notably in Studies in Classic American Literature,
Lawrence himself is unable to pull away from the fundamental and
complex interaction between the two domains of 'art' and 'metaphysic'.
Lawrence is a writer who has recognized the inappropriateness of
the literal/metaphorical opposition and shifted the emphasis instead
to the potentially more interesting duality of dead metaphor and
living metaphor. The general assumption is that 'literal' refers to
something which is not metaphorical, although the very etymology of
the word tells us that literal ultimately 'means' letter, that it
pertains to language. The word 'literal' is itself therefore a
metaphor, as is all language. This is a fundamental point which I
rehearsed in my introductory chapter. With any number of words in a
language the etymology suggests the deep-lying problems of the
familiar distinction. Living metaphor is something which we can easily
identify, something which we notice whenever it happens in any
context, either written or spoken. In contrast dead metaphor is
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'transparent', that is to say we barely notice it; it is the language
that passes through us all the time. But living metaphor and dead
metaphor are traditional distinctions to which can be added a third:
language which is no longer recognized as metaphor at all.
Metaphoricity is conventionally described in terms of wear and
tear, of effacement, to exercise the familiar coin metaphor for this
operation. 34 In fact there are grounds for turning away from this
metaphor of effacement and erosion, at least in the context of
Lawrence, and for substituting a metaphor of Journeying, because what
are typically considered to be Lawrence's key words at the heart of
his philosophical enterprise, words like 'presence', 'reality' and
'knowledge', are taken on different Journeys in the course of his
work. as These Journeys are a part of the larger life of language as
words are metaphorized in the course of history. Metaphor itself has
been through many transformations since Aristotle consigned a
classical theory of metaphor to writing thereby establishing it as
authoritative. I do not suggest that Lawrence has a theory of
metaphor, but his collapsing of the boundaries between metaphor and
'metaphysic' is the single most important key to an understanding of
his language and hence his 'metaphysic'. The fact is that Lawrence's
essays on the unconscious spring their first surprise by being so
unexpectedly and self-consciously metaphorical. Without adopting Allan
Ingram's pejorative sense of the word 'play' it can be argued that
what we have in Lawrence is a continual 'play of language', one which
displays a kind of Jouissance, a Joy in metaphor. 36
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These observations on dead and living metaphor may be of use in
confronting and dismantling the claim made by Daniel Albright that the
essays on the unconscious constitute 'the last, rather shrivelled
attempt of an author to imitate a grand romantic system of
metaphors.' 37 That this simply is not so is evinced in the first
instance by what I consider to be a very important essay,
Psychoanalysis and the Unconscious. There are two passages in
Psychoanalysis and the Unconscious which lie at the very heart of my
thesis and which, given that they are not obviously awarded any
special status within the text, are easily overlooked. Both, however,
potentially transform our understanding of the relation between
metaphor and 'metaphysic' in Lawrence and suggest the importance of
the language and mode of the essays on the unconscious. The broad
theme of the fifth chapter of Psychoanalysis and the Unconscious,
called 'The Lover and the Beloved', is the developing consciousness.
Within this context Lawrence writes:
It is not merely a metaphor, to call the cardiac plexus the
sun, the Light. It is a metaphor in the first place, because
the conscious effluence which proceeds from this first upper
centre in the breast goes forth and plays upon its external
object, as phosphorescent waves might break upon a ship and
reveal its form. The transferring of the objective knowledge
to the psyche is almost the same as vision. It is root-
vision. It happens before the eyes open. It is the first
tremendous mode of apprehension, still dark, but moving
towards light. It is the eye in the breast. Psychically, it
is basic objective apprehension. Dynamically, it is love,
devotional, administering love.
(Psychoanalysis and the Unconscious, P&P, p.236)
If it is not merely metaphor to call the cardiac plexus the sun or
'Light' then is it in some way literal, and is Lawrence in some way
distinguishing the metaphorical from the literal? The capitalization
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of 'Light' suggests that some distinction is being made between them.
Also when he is talking about metaphor 'in the first place' can we say
whether Lawrence has a logical order or an evolutionary order in mind?
It is, by virtue of the questions it raises, a passage which focuses
some of the most central issues addressed by Lawrence.
We are being asked in this passage to distinguish between the
knowable and the unknowable. In our 'mind's eye' we can imagine
without any difficulty a phosphorescent wave breaking over a ship and
in doing so revealing the ship's form. The wave, by its engulfing
movement, reveals the ship as present: without the wave we might have
missed it altogether. The ship as an object, that is to say, is
knowable -- we can know what a ship is without difficulty. It is
knowable in the way one's body is knowable: a tangible material thing,
physically present. We feel the presentness of our own body and
others'. Regarding Lawrence's meditation on his own hand in 'Why the
Novel Matters', referred to earlier, the hand as a part of Lawrence's
body was knowable, but that meditation also refers to something
happening which is inconceivable, that is to say, the relation between
the mind, brain and hand is difficult to conceive, although we know
the hand as a physical thing, and know it to function in conjunction
with the brain. 'Knowing' can thus be contrasted with 'conceiving': if.
the body is knowable, 'life' is inconceivable -- Lawrence's point is
that we only know or perceive life in the living. Seeing it in the
living we are aware that it is a continually deferred term -- we pass
from living thing to living thing recognizing that each is living but
with no fixed sense of what life is. It evades definition in a way
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which 'body', for example, does not. The body is present, it bleeds:
'if I cut it [my hand] it will bleed' ('Why the Novel Matters' in
STHOE p.193, my brackets). In another sense, however, the body, like
the writing hand, is also inconceivable. Lawrence's oceanic metaphor
gives rise to a sense of language as a sea of the conceivable, or
knowable, flowing around reality which is 'knowable' yet not
'conceivable'. The problem is that people generally take that which is
known for reality, an illusion which is created by our habituation of
seeing language as the limit. Lawrence's view, on the other hand, is
that language gives us a sign or a 'shape', some form, but not the
thing that essentially is that shape, or form. The important
distinction here is between a 'referential' conception of language and
the flow of a medium around an object: central to an understanding of
Lawrence's idiom, it is a distinction which will emerge elsewhere in
the present study.
To call the cardiac plexus the sun is to make a metaphor: the
cardiac plexus, or network of nerves around the heart, is not the sun.
However, as Lawrence writes a little earlier in the second of the two
central passages to be extracted from Psychoanalysis and the
Unconscious, 'When the ancients located the first seat of
consciousness in the heart, they were neither misguided nor playing
with metaphor' (F&P p.231, my italics). The heart is not merely
mechanical, a valve for pumping blood: it is commonplace to feel
physical sensations in the region of the heart -- it can be felt to
race with excitement, or to pound with fear for example. It is not
accidental that it is traditionally associated with the emotions,
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specifically love and sexual feelings. Similarly the individual feels
fear, panic and misery in the 'pit' of the stomach, in the region of
the solar plexus, which is so central to Lawrence. His preoccupation
with the physiological dimension of emotional experience arises from
its centrality to his 'metaphysic', which is why he constructs what
comes to be seen as a peculiarly Lawrencean physiology in the course
of the essays on the unconscious. This preoccupation is part of his
dismantling, in these essays, of the body/psyche polarity, which I
shall examine more fully in my next section. So to call the cardiac
plexus, associated with the heart (and traditional seat of the
emotions), the sun is not merely metaphor -- it is because of the sun
and the light (capitalised by Lawrence) that we see at all, and the
heart 'sees feelingly'.
Here Lawrence turns his attention to vision. His sense of language,
imaged as a phosphorescent wave, has been described as revealing the
form_of something that is, without language, inexpressible. Here,
rather than 'inexpressible' the adjective 'invisible' could be
substituted. In the first and longer passage the transference of
'objective knowledge' to the psyche is called 'root-vision'. This is
'almost the same as' (my italics) ordinary vision but there is an
important difference. Lawrence, in agreement with classical thought,
writes that 'Vision is perhaps our highest form of dynamic upper
consciousness', but he adds 'But our deepest lower consciousness is
'blood-consciousness.' (P&P p.173). At the risk of piling metaphor
upon metaphor it is sufficient to say here that 'root-vision' is a
form of 'blood-consciousness'. 'Root-vision' is a way which Lawrence
71
has found of describing a special kind of vision, or knowledge,
different from mere ocular perception. It is a characteristically
Lawrencean compound noun and as such it helps us to focus tightly on
the life and function not only of vision but of metaphor in his
thought. For joining together so graphically with a hyphen two terms
from such diverse realms is itself a kind of metaphor and Lawrence is
undoubtedly conscious of the status of this and his other
constructions, of which 'root-vision' and 'blood-consciousness' are
important examples. To be sure there is some difference between these:
with a phrase like 'blood-consciousness' one is not always aware of
having two unrelated terms yoked together such is the extent that the
'consciousness' part of the construction is subsumed to 'blood'. Hence
for a great many people the immediate sense is that this is simply
another term relating to Lawrence's emphasis on the blood, an
assumption which diminishes the force of the word 'consciousness' as
part of the construction. However, these two terms in particular seem
to be more closely related than those which comprise 'root-vision'
where the difference between the two words seems greater. The semantic
difference between the separate elements makes us aware of the unique
standing of the construction. 'Root-vision' depends on the meaningful
proximity of unlike terms and as such recalls the principle of
oxymoron. Significantly, with oxymoron expressivity is derived from
the difference between the terms involved rather than resemblance.
Traditionally, of course, metaphor is a trope of resemblance, but with
the emphasis placed too much on resemblance metaphor is in danger of
becoming glorified simile. In Lawrence, as will be seen particularly
in Women in Love, the potent end of metaphor is in fact oxymoron with
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its emphasis on semantic difference. I will examine this more fully as
the study progresses. Suffice it to say that, as examples like 'blood-
consciousness' and 'root-vision' show, an oxymoronic consciousness is
at the heart of metaphor in Lawrence, at the heart, that is to say, of
a style which is both vital and subliminal, subliminal because the
oxymoronic implication gets subsumed to metaphor so that its full
impact is not conscious. It is a common recognition that experience is
already understood through metaphor -- this is how the world is
perceived (Lakoff and Johnson deal with this form of conceptualizing).
In 'root-vision' and 'blood-consciousness', however, new metaphors are
being coined for the 'old' familiar experiences which ordinary
language generally bypasses, or conceptualizes.
The attention which he pays to sight, and the way in which vision
is addressed in his work, highlights Lawrence's awareness of a
philosophical tradition with its roots in Platonic thought. He shares
the historical moment with Heidegger who writes in Being and Time
about the primacy of sight as a sense in the Western philosophical
tradition. But, as in Lawrence, his recognition of the origins of an
idea involves a critique of it. Heidegger labours to articulate what
the passages from Psychoanalysis and the Unconscious reveal Lawrence
intuitively knows and metaphorically, poetically, expresses. This
passage from Being and Time could serve as Heidegger's conceptualizing
definition of Lawrence's understanding:
'Seeing' does not mean just perceiving with the bodily eyes,
but neither does it mean pure non-sensory awareness of
something present-at-hand in its presence-at-hand. In giving
an existential signification to "sight", we have merely
drawn upon the peculiar feature of seeing, that it lets
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entities which are accessible to it be encountered
unconcealedly in themselves. °e
The everyday tendency, he argues, is only to see, or to apprehend,
things which are present as such. This everyday tendency represents a
desire to see what is new, therefore it runs ahead to seek newness,
but this is a desire which is not fulfilled because others have
already been there. The philosophical tendency, in contrast, attends
to the possibility of this desire because it wants to see the truth:
it wants to have seen something new, not yet 'seen', that is to say,
not yet known or apprehended. This is a version of the Lawrencean
preoccupation and is expressed by the 'phosphorescent wave' metaphor.
The emphasis which Heidegger places on the eye and on the sense of
sight in his writing is bound up with his thought on 'otherness' (as
in the debate on animality, and the animal as Other, and whether or
not the human being has access to this 'otherness'), and ultimately
with his conception of Being. Whilst these questions are meaningful in
relation to Lawrence I propose to concentrate here on the question of
vision as a form of knowing in his work, in the context of the
insights offered by the essays on the unconscious, but informed by
Heideggerian perceptions on the 'eye'.
In the mature novels Lawrence makes dramatic use of his sense that
there are different kinds of vision. In fact 'seeing' is a recurrent
theme in his fiction. When Tom Brangwen first sees Lydia Lensky,
seeing her from different distances means he experiences her
differently. Espying her from a long way away he is almost
indifferent, 'he saw a woman approaching. But he was thinking of the
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horse.' (R p.29). As she passes, 'unseeing', his vision of her
changes: 'He saw her face clearly, as if by a light in the air. He saw
her face so distinctly, that he ceased to coil on himself, and was
suspended. / "That's her," he said involuntarily.' (R p.29). Until his
proposal of marriage Brangwen sees her on occasions from different
distances: from far off, at a relative closeness in the church, in the
farm kitchen, with Anna on visits to the farm and 'Gradually, even
without seeing her, he came to know her.' (R p.39). This 'knowing' is
'root-vision'. In the baby, about which Lawrence writes so much, the
capacity to know like this characterizes its specialness. The baby
'knows' things at a very deep level and certainly prior to speech.
Such knowledge is instinctive rather than reasoned. In Psychoanalysis
and the Unconscious Lawrence describes the baby's 'pre-visual
discerning	 pre-visual apprehension' (HIP p.238, my italics).
On the evening of his proposal Brangwen finds Lydia and the baby
Anna 'framed' for him in the vicarage window. He sees a vision which,
although he does not formulate it in these terms, is Rembrandtesque in
its stillness and in the play of light on the child's face.:
The fair head with its wild, fierce hair was drooping
towards the fire-warmth, which reflected on the bright
cheeks and clear skin of the child, who seemed to be musing,
almost like a grown-up person. The mother's face was dark
and still, and he saw, with a pang, that she was away back
in the life that had been. The child's hair gleamed like
spun glass, her face was illuminated till it seemed like wax
lit up from the inside.
(The Rainbow, p.42)
This 'Dutch' stillness is not a visual style which characterizes the
novel as a whole. One critic has assessed its significance as the
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first of five iconographical moments in the novel which arrest the
reader's attention and which, when considered in relation to each
other, demonstrate the novel's changing, or accelerating, rhythm. He
refers to this scene as the novel's 'first icon' which 'in itself and
in its social and cultural implications, represents virtually a
complete stasis 1 . 39 This stasis emphasizes the scene's presentness to
Tom, the onlooker. Anna, framed in this way, and in contrast to the
external turmoil which is seen as representing Tom's state of
consciousness, represents the 'stabilising relationship' of the
marriage and in Tom's attraction we witness the inclination of the
(early) Brangwens 'to refer and assign to woman' (Alldritt, p.134). .40
Whilst the configuration of mother-and-child is retained from a long
tradition Lawrence is also working against its conventional
significance. Tom's gaze is not devotional. Neither is he looking at a
painting but at a 'real' social grouping. In this Lawrence may well be
anticipating Will Brangwen's dependence on the visual arts as a means
of achieving intensity of feeling and will therefore be comparing Will
negatively to Tom's propensity to attend to presence. The question is
to what extent this vision is a 'medium' or means to a dimension of
feeling which is otherwise inaccessible to the character. Describing
Will Brangwen's experience Alldritt rightly says: 'art for Will
Brangwen is not a means for better understanding or appreciating
reality but rather a means of experiencing the heightened
consciousness that life does not ordinarily allow' (Alldritt, p.86).
For Tom Brangwen, however, the vision through the window is a sign
that his reality will change. His world will shrink to encompass the
lives, and life, represented within the frame which is not, however,
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to be understood in terms of either a sentimental 'ideal or a
narrowly reductive domestic routine. On the contrary, Tom has an
interactive parergonal relation to the framed 'picture'. He is not
unproblematically 'outside' it. In the act of looking he is also
participating in it, unconsciously creating the life it represents.
Consequently he is both outside it and a part of it. As I will
indicate more fully in a later chapter, it is a relation which the
reader (never separate from language) has with Lawrence's texts: the
reader, like Tom Brangwen here, reads parergonally.
A second passage shows Lydia's significance not as a madonna figure
but as a 'presence', a word which occurs in the description and which
asserts the central problem of the difference between the 'knowable'
and the 'conceivable'. Whatever the vision through the window might
suggest, even in terms of visual cliché, Lydia is fundamentally and
always mysterious to Tom quite apart from the cultural and social
differences between them:
She turned into the kitchen, startled out of herself by this
invasion from the night. He took off his hat, and came
towards her. Then he stood in the light, in his black
clothes and his black stock, hat in one hand and yellow
flowers in the other. She stood away, at his mercy, snatched
out of herself. She did not know him, only she knew he was a-
men come for her. She could only see the dark-clad man's
figure standing there upon her, and the gripped fist of
flowers. She could not see the face and the living eyes.'
He was watching her, without knowing her, only aware
underneath of her presence.
(The Rainbow, p.43, emphases added)
The stillness in which both mother and child were unconscious of
Brangwen observing them has been dispersed by the emotions caused by
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his 'presence'. In the last sentence Brangwen's vision of Lydia has
altered by virtue of proximity and a tacit commitment to 'know' her.
Whilst both these scenes have visual properties, the quality of each
vision is different. The neatly framed Dutch painting effect has been
replaced by a more expressionistic way of seeing, and once again the
metaphor of the frame is pertinent. In the first passage the frame was
literal, provided by the window. Its more literal function was to
single out and isolate the object. In the second passage the
featureless figure of Tom is 'framed' by the light which minutes
before had an illuminating function. But on the whole in this passage
the 'frame' has dissolved and the essential relationship has been
problematized beyond the simple pictorial configuration. In the plays,
where the only language is dialogue, it is possible to communicate
these essential relationships visually (the openings of The Daughter-
in-Law and The Widowing of Mrs. Holroyd; for instance, do so very
effectively), but in these novels the metalanguage bears the weight of
the 'metaphysic'.
In this section I have concentrated on what I call Lawrence's
poetics of presence, and proposed the essays on the unconscious as a
radical instance of Lawrence thinking metaphorically. Whilst the focus
is on his linguistic configurations Lawrence's preoccupation can never
be simply with language, because language is always already busy in
the event of saying or describing something other. Consequently, it is
impossible (or at least inappropriate) to isolate language in Lawrence
without also addressing 'metaphysic' and perennial themes like vision,
knowledge and presence, and their interaction in his thought. In my
78
next section I attend further to Lawrence's sense of 'bodily' seeing,
that is to say, of the whole body being implicated in the act of
seeing, feeling and knowing. The focus is on what becomes in Lawrence
a lengthy meditation on the knowable and, conversely, the
inconceivable dimensions of physical existence. In debating the
interaction between these two 'felt' domains, Lawrence's highly
metaphorical language becomes for the reader the 'phosphorescent
wave'.
2.4 Dismantling the body/psyche polarity
The word 'hysteria' entered the language at an early stage to describe
the culpable womb. When King Lear, furious at the implicit insult
directed at him in Cornwall's action of putting Kent in the stocks,
declares
0! how this mother swells up toward my heart;
Hysterics passiof down, thou climbing sorrow!
Thy element's below.
(King Lear, II. iv. 54-6)
he is trying to repress the feminine in himself, the chaos, madness
and abnormality that hysterics was until relatively recently perceived
as signifying. This attitude persisted largely until Freud rescued
psychic phenomena from purely physical explanations. Without taking
retrograde steps, Lawrence is implicating the psyche and the body in
his representation of emotional experience and human consciousness.
The planes, plexuses and centres of feeling initially set out in
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Psychoanalysis and the Unconscious are ambivalently present in the
body, and this is very much the point. Lawrence's own grounding of the
instinctual life in the configuration of planes, plexuses and ganglia
-- the upper and lower centres of psychic activity -- insists on being
taken both literally and metaphorically. The 'biology' is an elaborate
metaphor gradually unfolding. Although we are asked to treat it
literally, as we now expect, it ultimately works as a 'metaphor'.
Crucially, Lawrence's insistence on the literal dissolves the very
distinction on which it rests. The 'solar' plexus, for instance,
exists and gets its name from its resemblance to the sun inasmuch as
it is a structure of nerves and ganglia radiating from a central
network of nerves, but as a metaphor it has a special status of which
Lawrence is particularly conscious.
In his introduction to volume four of the Standard Edition Tames
Strachey briefly summarizes Freud's early, largely speculative,
theoretical writing on neuro-physiology and outlines what he calls
'the anatomical doctrine of the neurone' (SE, IV, xvii) in Freud's
'Project for a Scientific Psychology' (1895). This is principally
interesting with regard to Lawrence only inasmuch as a single cell is
identified as 'the functional unit of the central nervous system' (SE,
IV, xvii). Lawrence derives the organization of his 'sympathetic' and
'voluntary' centres from the principle of cell-division. Of interest
is the apparent co-incidence of certain fundamental ideas. Lawrence
describes concepts which have something in common with excitation and
cathexis although these are not named as such, and the exchange of
psychic energy between centres in Lawrence's scheme very roughly
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corresponds to Freud's notion of neurones being subject to cathexis
and the resulting nervous excitation. 41 However, Lawrence's interest
is not primarily in the biology of feeling but in pre-conceptual modes
of understanding.
In the first instance Lawrence is not working without a precedent.
Freud's teacher BrUcke, for example, was trained in physiology. It is
commonly known that Freud's early interests included neuro-physiology
and he was concerned early on that psychology should be governed by
physical principles. But, whatever the origins of Lawrence's
proposition, 42 with its decidedly neuro-physiological basis, it
becomes pointedly anti-Freudian given the direction of Freud's thought
after The Interpretation of Dreams. Not, of course, a 'Freudian',
Lawrence is focused enough discursively to disagree with Freud, even
given that Freud is largely unnamed throughout these essays.
Far from being anachronistic and eccentric Lawrence's 'physiology'
as a stage in his metaphorical thought can be seen as a form that has
its own truth and discipline. In Psychoanalysis and the Unconscious he
refers to the 'great sympathetic centre of the breast' as the 'heart's
mind' (F&P p.230, my italics) and to the solar plexus as 'the active
human first-mind (F&P p.225, my italics). He talks of a knowledge .
metaphorically called 'the treasure of the heart' (F&P p.231). This
knowledge is formulated as 'objective knowledge, sightless,
unspeakably direct' (F&P p.231, my italics). These are descriptions
which emphasize the non-verbal nature of knowing. As we shall see,
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they also substantiate Lawrence's sense, which I outlined in my last
section, of there being different kinds of vision.
In Lady Chatterley's Lover one of Lawrence's themes is the
difference between 'mechanical' vision and vision through desire.
Seeing Mellors at his ablutions Connie's response is ambivalent as
'shock' turns into a 'visionary experience':
In spite of herself she had had a shock. After all, merely a
man washing himself; commonplace enough, Heaven knows!
Yet in some curious way it was a visionary experience: it
had hit her in the middle of the body.
(Lady Chatterley's Lover, p.61, my italics)
The point is made unequivocally a few lines later: 'Connie had
received the shock of vision in her womb, and she knew it; it lay
inside her. But with her mind she was inclined to ridicule.' (LCL
p.61). The birth metaphor looks ahead to the conception of their child
and in that sense is perfectly consistent with the events and the
relationship that will develop. However, there is also an important
philosophical point being made about the differing kinds of vision
here represented. Seeing is returned, in this brief passage, to the
physical centre of the human being, not to the eye as the 'natural'
organ of sight, but to the body and in particular the womb. In the
discursive essays, notably the essays on the unconscious, the breast
is more usually given this value. In pinpointing the womb Lawrence may
be feeling towards a conception of the woman as Other, that is to say,
formulating the 'otherness' of one human being to another in terms of
a gendered 'seeing'. Importantly, the character is not simply gazing,
but is 'seeing' with her whole body. The common view is that
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subjectivity lies behind the eyes, but here it is not only Connie's
eyes which do the seeing, but the whole body of the woman.
The breast and the mind, solar plexus and cardiac plexus, these
rather than simply the eye are posited by Lawrence as the physical
centres of knowing and vision. In Psychoanalysis and the Unconscious,
looking ahead to the key passage from 'The Lover and the Beloved'
discussed earlier, he writes:
The breasts themselves are as two eyes. We do not know how
much the nipples of the breast, both in man and woman, serve
primarily as poles of vital conscious effluence and
connection. We do not know how the nipples of the breast are
as fountains leaping into the universe, or as little lamps
irradiating the contiguous world, to the soul in quest.
(Psychoanalysis and the Unconscious, F&P, p.231)
This breast/eye metaphor encapsulates the visual theme which is at the
centre of Lawrence's personal philosophy. It recurs in The First Lady
Chat terley. Connie veils her face, not her eyes, and looks at herself
naked in a mirror:
Her breasts were also eyes, and her navel was sad, closed,
waiting lips. It all spoke in another, silent language,
without the cheapness of words.
(The First Lady Chatterley, p.15)
Lawrence omits this idea of the body as a face in the next two
versions of the novel but this does not lessen the significance of the
perceived similarity between the eye and the nipple as sentient
organs, and as sentient in the same way. The nipple is posited as a
primal, or primordial, eye. There is a mode of seeing, argues
Lawrence, 'before the eyes open' TV p.236). The metaphor recalls the
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observations of anthropologist and philosopher Susanne Langer who has
considered the development of the eye as, in its first stages, a
purely sentient organ reaching out to something external. Her view is
that 'The recognition of an image as something connected with the
external world is intuitive, as the response to external things in
direct visual perception, which all seeing animals exhibit, is
instinctive.' 43 In the same discussion the quality of 'openness to
influence' describes the process of external stimili, like a familiar
smell, evoking an image or a (visual) memory in the subject. Image
making in this sense is free from its initial association or
attachment to a percept. If the eye, in the first place, does indeed
reach out to something external then it is like the nipple which can
also be said to do so under some sensory stimulus.
It is not, therefore, a perversity, or a far-fetched metaphor, in
Lawrence to insist on the similarity between the eye and nipple. Both
are organs which are integrated into the organism (the human being)
which has a unique capacity to see/know/feel. And it could be argued
further that these organs are present in the human being because the
human being possesses this faculty. Do we see/feel because we possess
these organs, or do we possess these organs because we can see/feel?4.4
Lawrence's recognition, like Heidegger's, is that the sense-organs
themselves do not perceive, but that perception is through them (and
for Lawrence from the breast). In his quite extensive description of
sight in 'The Five Senses' (Fantasia of the Unconscious, chapter 5),
the phrase 'I go forth' (in the act of seeing) occurs several times.
This going forth to meet something, a reaching out for something, is
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'from the centre of the glad breast, through the eyes.' (F&P p.63).
Conflating the eye and the breast, here the eyes (and nipples) are
clearly channels or instruments. This is the force of the passage
quoted where Lawrence talks of the breasts as eyes. Interestingly, he
says we 'do not know' how they function but we have a sense of them as
'gates' or more aptly 'lamps' shining from the soul into the external
world. He is also concerned with the fact that vision and feeling
both, like consciousness, come into being at some point. Identifying
the moment at which they come into being is not in itself important,
but the fact that vision and feeling have a common origin is part of
Lawrence's point.
Langer describes the eye as an organ, or organon, as an instrument
for seeing: 'The eye is the end organ of the visual apparatus; what
goes on behind the retina, and especially, perhaps, beyond the
chiasma, is the rest of our seeing, with all its reverberations and
complications and their astounding effects.' (Langer, pp. 45-6). Rather
than interpreting biology in a philosophical way, and entering the
debate about the value of 'seeing' in our culture as a metaphor for
'knowing', which is where Lawrence's interest lies, Langer is bound,
as I have suggested, by certain biological imperatives. In contrast,
when Lawrence discusses the eye in 'The Five Senses' he continues to
dwell metaphorically on the concept 'vision', returning to the
position taken up in Psychoanalysis and the Unconscious represented by
the key passages discussed in my last section. The now familiar thesis
Is that 'the root of conscious vision (not literal vision] is almost
entirely in the breast' (F&P p.63, my italics and brackets). Even
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cognition in Lawrence is 'thought' metaphorically: Noah's use of the
dove to find land as the flood-waters draw back from the earth becomes
a metaphor for the cognitive aspect of sight as knowing, or as finding
something out that was previously concealed: 'The eyes are the third
great gateway of the psyche. Here the soul goes in and out of the
body, as a bird flying forth and coming home.' (F&P p.63). In our
culture the bird which is sent out and returns home represents the
eyes of Noah. The bird goes forth, and is the source of knowledge. The
very metaphoricity of this as a description of perception is
significant.
The word 'sensual' is also one which is subject to different
semantic pressures in this text. Talking of our faulty human vision
Lawrence argues that 'sight is the least sensual of all the senses'
(F&P p.65). This is because, in our cerebral, inquisitive mode 'we
strain ourselves to see, see, see -- everything, everything through
the eye, in one mode of objective curiosity.' (F&P p.65). This
describes the everyday tendency of the human being to see what is new,
when sight runs ahead merely to apprehend what is external, Yet
Lawrence also argues that 'The eyes have, however, their sensual root
as well. But this is hard to transfer into language, as all our
vision, our modern Northern vision, is in the upper mode of actual
seeing.' (F&P p.64). Here the word 'sensual' means something more than
the sense of sight as the faculty of perception. It refers to the
sensation in the breast (or womb) which is not separable from a
'knowing' which is non-verbal, being 'hard to transfer into language'.
The whole body, not just the eye, 'sees'. It is quite clear, then,
86
that in Lawrence 'seeing' and 'seeing' are two different things, an
insight which resonates with Heideggerean significance, which is my
next point.
In the course of his discussion Lawrence, like Heidegger, finds
himself confronting the animal, and, in Lawrence's now outdated
parlance, the 'savage'. Heidegger confronts animality, or the animal
as Other and different from human beings, by focusing on the eye and
questioning the assumption that the organ is merely an instrument. His
argument that the animal cannot 'see' as we can would have interested
Lawrence who effectively pursues a related idea, although Heidegger
argues that 'you' the subject, rather than the 'eye', does the seeing
whereas Lawrence re-states it in bodily terms. Heidegger makes some
problematic assumptions with some profound ethical implications, but
the important philosophical question is nevertheless one which also
preoccupies Lawrence. Heidegger's project is an analysis of animality.
His thesis presupposes that this question, the question of the
animal's essence, is valid, but his analysis is, as he admits,
incomplete. The role of vision in his analysis is, however, central as
Heidegger finds himself forced to ask whether human seeing and animal
seeing are identical although humans and animals possess eyes with a
related anatomical structure. 4.6' Such biologism is, I would suggest,.
inadequate. To 'see', meaning to know what is new, or to know afresh
-- that is, to have knowledge which is in Lawrence's words 'sightless,
unspeakably direct' -- is posited by Heidegger as a purely human
capacity.
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Lawrence has in effect internalized the thesis that Heidegger was
later to articulate, that the animal is poorer in world than the human
being because it does not have the same faculty of gaining access to
whatever is available to it. 46 However, with his gaze still fixed on
the question of vision, Lawrence, who hierarchizes more than
Heidegger, turns this thesis around by means of his negative
interpretation of the human being's purely, or merely, 'objective
curiosity' (in an 'advanced' culture). Talking of the 'savage'
Lawrence states that 'What we call vision, that he has not.' (RIP
p.64), with the implication that the 'savage' possesses a mode of
seeing which goes beyond mere circumspection, and is of course
different: the 'savage' possesses 'the eye which is not wide open to
study, to learn, but which powerfully, proudly or cautiously glances,
and knows the terror or the pure desirability of strangeness in the
object it beholds.' (F&P p.64). By extension, argues Lawrence,
although this would not be Heidegger's view, this is also true of the
animal, fundamentally unlimited by the singular mode of 'objective
curiosity'. In distinguishing between the 'savage' and the modern
human being Lawrence is asking us to understand world-forming as
Itself a process characterized by difference. It is a recognition
which underpins his thesis on the eye and vision. Because the 'savage'
and the 'advanced' individual mean something different by sight, and
'see' differently, each forms and experiences world differently.
Vision is not, therefore, simply seeing. Lawrence has already written
about 'the ancients' locating consciousness in the heart, and has
himself found a way of expressing and describing 'root-vision'.
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Regarding Lawrence's formulation of the vision of the 'savage', is
knowing the terror or desirability of the strangeness of a beheld
object the same as curiosity? The word 'curiosity' is awarded a
positive meaning in Lawrence when it describes the gaze of the cow,
for instance, as different from that of the human being. Lawrence's
argument recalls the cattle staring at Gudrun dancing in Women in
Love: 'The eye of the cow is soft, velvety, receptive. She stands and
gazes with the strangest intent curiosity. She goes forth from herself
in wonder.' (F&P p.64). 4 Lawrence seems to be saying that the
curiosity of the human being is practical and circumspect, and
therefore limited, even whilst the human being's world is less
circumscribed than that of the animal. To Lawrence the 'intent
curiosity' of the cow is freer and constitutes a different kind of
being present from that experienced by the 'civilized' human. This
underlines the ontological force of Lawrence's conception of the
animal as Other (a question addressed in his poetry). Despite
appearances, the animal is not Other in simple terms (that is to say,
it is not an 'otherness' to which we easily have access). This is
because our inevitable tendency to anthropomorphize makes gaining
access to the animal's difference impossible. Additionally, when it
comes to the particular, each animal embodies its own special and
specific 'otherness': the horse differs from the cow, both differ from
the bull and so on, but this difference is posited by Lawrence as a
difference in the way each sees/knows (F&P pp.64-5), that is, the way
each has access to world. The 'sensitive' animals in Women in Love
embody this positive 'otherness' in contrast to many of the human
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beings who, we are asked to assume, are de-sensitized and de-
sensualized by their disintegrating culture.
By the same token the 'primitive' and 'sensual' carving in the
novel which fixes the gaze of Birkin and, against his will, Gerald
Crich, embodies the 'keen quick vision' of the 'savage'. Furthermore,
the introduction of these pieces of sculpture and the considerable
attention paid to them in the narrative raises the possibility of an
additional category of 'seeing': the outward image of the work of art
must be 'sighted' in advance, in the soul Lawrence might say, by the
craftsman/artist before the product is made. This is a seeing which is
not bound to sense-perception: the object cannot be perceived before
It is made, but it is imaged (perhaps as a feeling, an impression, a
hunch) in the mind of the maker before it has substance. The work of
art, therefore, does not have its origins in the realm of the sensible
(except that its medium exists as substance): it is not bound to
sense-perception. It has an a priori 'existence'. It is this existence
which Lawrence refers to when, discussing the dependency of art on a
'metaphysic' in the Foreword to Fantasia of the Unconscious, as quoted
earlier, he talks of the 'vision' which exists 'first as such'.
This emphasis on the metaphor of vision in Lawrence brings the
importance placed on presence into clearer focus than before. The
Greeks -- and Lawrence's thought is partly a continuation and partly a
critique of the traditional debate on the sight metaphor -- understood
being, or existence, as presence, that is to say, as something which
is in sight. Lawrence says 'when I go forth in the wonder of vision to
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dwell upon the beloved, or upon the wonder of the world, I go from the
centre of the glad breast, through the eyes, and who will may look
into the full soft darkness of me, rich with my undiscovered
presence.' (F&P p.63, my italics). This is in part an articulation of
the middle way which Lawrence plots through the body/psyche polarity
which in his view limits modern understanding, forcing it into the
isolated and circumscribed realms of psychology, biology, philosophy
and other singular domains. We cannot say in Lawrence what is purely
physical and what is purely unconscious because these extremes are
interrelated and partly dissolved in his language and 'metaphysic'.
The very interconnectedness of the physical and non-physical
dimensions of human existence is articulated by, and in, the radical
metaphoricity of these essays.
The discussion of the poverty of human vision, and the inability of
the modern human being to penetrate his/her world, is supplemented by
other observations on bodily presence and the human being. In the
course of the essays on the unconscious Lawrence writes a great deal,
for instance, about physical gesture. As the baby strives for its own
singularity away from the mother Lawrence describes its physical
movements in the act of what Julia Kristeva calls 'abjection', her
word for the symbolic rupture of the infant from the mother: 49 'The
child is screaming itself rid of the old womb, kicking itself into a
blind paroxysm into freedom, into separate, negative independence.'
(F&P p.222). Having achieved a degree of singularity the baby enters a
new stage: 'The warm rosy abdomen, tender with chuckling unison, and
the little back strengthening itself. The child kicks away, into
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independence. It stiffens its spine in the strength of its own private
and separate, inviolable existence.' (F&P p.223).
The references to kicking recall Gerald Crich in 'Diver' Women in
Love, chapter IV) kicking against the water, asserting his own
singularity. This sense of a vital connection between the individual's
physical bearing and emotional life is a theme to which Lawrence
returns in Fantasia of the Unconscious 'Above all things encourage a
straight backbone and proud shoulders. Above all things despise a
slovenly movement, an ugly bearing and unpleasing manner.' (F&P p.79).
The baby's back, he notes in the first essay, 'has an amazing power
once it stiffens itself.' (P&P p.223). A derangement of the internal
energies, a starving of the emotions or any emotional disorder results
in physical weakness: 'How weary in the back is the nursing mother
whose great centre of repudiation is suppressed or weak; how a child
droops if only the sympathetic unison is established.' (P&P p.224). A
strong back is a sign of the perfect correspondence between self and
world according to the terms of Lawrence's vitalistic philosophy.49
In Aaron's Rod, contemporaneous with Psychoanalysis and the
Unconscious, psycho-physical explanations for emotional disturbance
are also in evidence. Asking how we know of the importance of the
solar plexus in this context Lawrence replies 'We feel it, as we feel
hunger or love or hate.' (F&P p.219). This recalls Jim Bricknell in 'A
Punch in the Wind' (Aaron's Rod, chapter VIII). Bricknell is subject
to an insatiable hunger and, in response to Lilly's question as to why
he eats so much bread, replies that it 'gives the stomach something to
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work at, and prevents it grinding on the nerves.' (AR p.77). Unable to
feel at the place which Lawrence identifies as the primal and primary
centre of consciousness Bricknell tells Lilly 'I'm losing life if I
don't [eat]. I tell you I'm losing life. Let me put something inside
me.' (AR p.77, my brackets). Unable to love he crams food into his
stomach as a substitute, in order to feel some sensation in the region
of his solar plexus. Starved of the right kind of feeling he declares
that,
"I shall die. I only live when I can fall in love. Otherwise
I'm dying by inches. Why, man, you don't know what it was
like. I used to get the most grand feelings -- like a great
rush of force, or light -- a great rush -- right here, as
I've said, at the solar plexus. And it would come any time
-- any where -- no matter where I was. And then I was all
right."
(Aaron's Rod, p.80)
Like Lawrence in Psychoanalysis and the Unconscious, Bricknell is not
merely making a metaphor. The 'light' is not literal, of course, but
the force or feeling, the sensation, is real enough. His experience
connects the physical with the emotional and unconscious life of the
individual (in quite a crude way), distinct from the mechanical
aspects of sex. It is Lilly who further recalls the terms of
Psychoanalysis and the Unconscious with his suggestion to Bricknell
that an improvement in his posture might dispel the arrest in feeling
which he experiences. 'Body language' is not a phrase used by Lawrence
but both 'body' and 'language' are important and related concepts in
his mature work. Bricknell's 'body language' communicates an arrest in
some 'vital' centre. Lilly says, '"Then you should stiffen your
backbone. Its your backbone that matters." (AR p.81). Finding
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Bricknell impossible to walk with -- 'Tim staggered and stumbled like
a drunken man: or worse, like a man with locomotor ataxia: as if he
had no power in his lower limbs.' (AR p.81) -- Lilly's words
eventually engender the violent response which gives the chapter its
name. He has told Bricknell that it is '"A maudlin crying to be loved,
which makes your knees all go rickety." ... "you stagger and stumble
down a road, out of sheer sloppy relaxation of your will" (AR p.82).
In Bricknell Lawrence dramatizes that part of his 'metaphysic' which
stresses the essential relation between the body and the mind.
If Darwin and Freud, in identifying love and hunger as primal
instincts, shifted the nineteenth-century perspective away from
metaphysics to biology, in the character of Bricknell Lawrence
implicates love and hunger in the context of a very different
'metaphysic'. In Anne Fernihough's view 'Modernism' in general
constitutes an attempt to heal the mind/body division. s° Even if this
is in general true, it is a perspective which threatens to smooth over
the issue of Lawrence's particular importance in offering his own
critique of the separation of the psychic and the physical in modern
thought. It also understates the importance of Lawrence's unique
thinking on the unconscious, in line with contemporary views but also
distinct from them, and in particular the sense in his essays of the
inseparability of language and the unconscious, Lawrence's thought is
not, as Fernihough seems to suggest, unproblematically a response to
Freud as a symptom of a society which polarizes mind and body, or body
and psyche, and more needs to be done to further an understanding of
Lawrence's own 'metaphysic' which approaches the body/psyche polarity
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more critically than the movement loosely referred to as Modernism,
anyway a highly diverse phenomenon.
In this discussion I have concentrated on the centrality of vision
and on Lawrence's sense that vision is 'effluence' (his word). It is a
quality of understanding which flows through the eyes rather than from
them: it is not merely the subjective ego which possesses a faculty
for sight, but the whole body which 'sees'. The source of this 'flow'
is either the breast or the solar plexus. It is a 'flow' which cuts
across and through the conventional division between the body and the
psyche (the non-physical body), dissolving the distinctions between
them. We possess a language for articulating the biological functions,
the psychological faculty and its operations. Lawrence, in these
essays, strives to find a way of saying what is not said (and
therefore entertained) by such scientific and exclusive discourses. To
date, the metaphoricity of the essays on the unconscious has been
ignored, and yet in that metaphoricity is grounded Lawrence's sense of
the unconscious (how we 'know' and 'see' anything, and how we 'feel')
articulated as, in part, a 'bodily' facility in an argument which
relieves the body of its duller, more mechanical character. Rather
than finding the unconscious structured 'like' a language, Lawrence
regards it as dependent on a certain level of metaphoricity for its
articulation. So whilst I have here concentrated on sight it has been
with metaphor consistently in view. I now propose to move from these
observations to another way of 'seeing' or visualizing which is rooted
in the unconscious: that is to the domain of dream which can itself
only be reported in language and metaphor.
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2.5 Dream
Dream is, like language, a radically metaphorical form of expression.
I suspect that this is the basis of its interest for Lawrence, and the
reason why he devotes a good deal of attention to dreams and dreaming
in Fantasia of the Unconscious. I propose to examine the use in
Lawrence of dream and non-dream. The connection between these two
domains is provided in Fantasia of the Unconscious where Lawrence
discusses common dream images. However, these images, the raging
horses and the bull for instance, occur very effectively in the
fiction not as dreams but as actual phenomena, yet charged with
psychic meaning. We have to contrast Lawrence's use of dream in
fiction with his use of these powerful symbols. The question which
therefore underpins the following argument is why is dream, which is
not so effectively used in his fiction, such a flat quality for
Lawrence?
The Interpretation of Dreams is Freud's definitive work on the
aetiology and nature of dreams as manifestations of the unconscious.
Lawrence's most extended response to it occurs in the fourteenth
chapter of Fantasia of the Unconscious called 'Sleep and Dreams'.
Although his resistance to Freudian determinism and aetiology is
manifest in that chapter the disagreement with Freud is not, as I have
stressed throughout, the primary purpose of the argument. The genuine
importance of the chapter on dreams -- although Lawrence analyzes
hypothetical rather than actual dreams -- is that, in their
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'otherness', dreams provide an occasion for Lawrence to think about
metaphor as the expression of what cannot otherwise be said.
Lawrence divides dreams into two main categories. The first of
these deals with dreams as the result of somatic stimuli while the
other is a uniquely Lawrencean category, that of 'true soul-dreams'
(F&P p.166). While he pays more than lip service to Freud's main
contention that wish-fulfilment is the origin of dreams, Lawrence
lends more support to the argument that dreams are chiefly the result
of somatic stimuli. Underpinning the disagreement with Freud is
Lawrence's rejection of the Freudian unconscious in favour of the body
Itself, and his own biology of feeling. To emphasize somatic sources
for dreams is to reject the Freudian conception:
The image of falling, of flying, of trying to run and not
being able to lift the feet, of having to creep through
terribly small passages, these are direct transcripts from
the physical phenomena of circulation and digestion. It is
the directly transcribed image of the heart which, impeded
in its action by the gases of indigestion, is switched out
of its established circuit of earth-polarity, and is as if
suspended over a void, or plunging into a void: step by
step, falling downstairs, maybe, according to the
strangulation of the heart-beats. The same paralytic
inability to lift the feet when one needs to run, in a
dream, comes directly from the same impeded action of the
heart, which is thrown off its balance by some material
obstruction. Now the heart swings left and right in the pure
circuit of the earth's polarity. Hinder this swing, force
the heart over to the left, by inflation of gas from the
stomach or by dead pressure upon the blood and nerves from
any obstruction, and you get the sensation of being unable
to lift the feet from earth: a gasping sensation.
(Fantasia of the Unconscious, F&P, pp. 165-6)
Here physical sensations engender a response which is emotional.
Lawrence's is clearly not a scientific account: internal organic
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stimuli are important inasmuch as they effect the heart, but Lawrence
has no intention of extending his discussion to external sensory
stimuli, like noise or strong light for example, as prompting dreams.
He also ignores internal subjective sensory excitations which might
result in hypnagogic visions or hallucinations before the deeper sleep
takes over. His interest is in the commerce between body and psyche.
'Most dreams' he argues, 'are stimulated from the blood into the
nerves and the nerve-centres. And the heart is the transmission
station. For the blood has a unity and a consciousness of its own. It
has a deeper, elemental consciousness of the mechanical or material
world.' (F&P p.166). Dreams then, are rooted in the blood and 'blood-
consciousness' and the heart transmits the signals to the psyche --
'in sleep the transfer is made through the dream-images which are
mechanical phenomena like mirages.' (F&P p.166).
Lawrence's two categories are dreams which affect the soul and
dreams which do not. 'Soul dreams' are mechanical up to a point, as
those already described; connected to the emotions but not a cipher
for them as Freud suggests. Characteristically, Lawrence describes
dreams as the product of the exchange and resistance between the
centres of feeling in the individual, and the tension between
automatism and 'the living, wakeful psyche' which is here conflated
with 'the living soul' (F&P p.169). Although Freud is not here named,
the following is a direct criticism of psychoanalytical practice: 'We
have to be very wary of giving way to dreams. It is really a sin
against ourselves to prostitute the living spontaneous soul to the
tyranny of dreams, or of chance, or fortune or luck, or any of the
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processes of the automatic sphere.' (F&P p.170). Lawrence's interest
then is not in the return of the repressed as indirectly represented
in the dream-event, but in dreaming as another aspect of vision. To
dream is in part to 'em-present' something.
The following passage offers Lawrence's account of the aetiology of
dreams:
As we sleep the current sweeps its own way through us, as
the streets of the city are swept and flushed at night. It
sweeps through our nerves and our blood, sweeping away the
ash of our day's spent consciousness towards one form or
other of excretion. This earth-current actively sweeping
through us is really the death-activity busy in the service
of life. It behoves us to know nothing of it. And as it
sweeps it stimulates in the primary centres of consciousness
vibrations which flash images upon the mind. Usually, in
deep sleep, these images pass unrecorded; but as we pass
towards the twilight of dawn and wakefulness, we begin to
retain some impression, some record of dream-images.
(Fantasia of the Unconscious, F&P, p.163)
In this description dreams are the product of a purging activity which
is essential to mental and physical health. His principal interest is
not, like Freud's, in the dreaming but in the sleep as his chapter
heading testifies. This passage, in keeping with the whole, is highly
metaphorical, reminiscent of the novels rather than a discursive
essay. Street sweeping as a metaphor for mental and physical purgation
predominates here, but the language is also that of the central water
image which I discussed earlier. It reminds us how fundamental the
concept of the 'flow' is to Lawrence and how it invests all his
thought on the psyche. It is the 'flushing' and 'sweeping' current
which results in the visual dimension of sleep. It has already been
possible to identify a 'sea' of language in Lawrence flowing around
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the object. Here it is a deep-lying metaphor in his description of the
activity of sleeping. The street sweeping metaphor continues into the
next passage, with the repetition of 'sweeping' and variations of
tense as Lawrence finds rhymes and alliterative instances to make this
a self-conscious point of style. The deliberate repetition of sweep,
swept, sweeping, sweeps, in quite a lengthy passage recalls the style
of echo and restatement for which Lawrence was criticized in The
Rainbow and which he himself identifies in the Foreword to Women in
Love as 'natural' to the writer, but is it here 'frictional'?
The metaphorical language of the passage communicates the force of
real experience. Oxymoronic constructions are very much a part of this
consciously metaphorical style: we have the watery 'earth-current' and
'death-activity' which is 'busy in the service of life'. As before,
the hyphenated constructions acquire a special significance.
Considered separately the words 'earth' and 'current', 'death' and
'activity' have no special or particular charge different from their
familiar meaning. Yet the 'earth-current'/'death-activity' sweeping
through the body and stimulating 'vibrations which flash images upon
the mind' looks back to the phosphorescent wave metaphor of
Psychoanalysis and the Unconscious. The sense is once again of some
force (language) illuminating/defining the object: language is a
trace, like a clot of light on a radar screen, revealing the presence
of something hitherto undetected and not directly 'visible'. The word
is not the thing, just as the spot of light is not the thing, but it
shows that the thing is present. The hyphens galvanize ordinary words
Into some special relation because, as Lawrence is aware, language is
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ordinarily limited. The hyphens are an attempt to mould ordinary
language into new forms which institute a new way of knowing (and,
here, a new way of 'representing' the creative unconscious). There is
also an effect of reification, in which the words, whilst not being
the thing, are seeking to form a 'thing'. The same can be said of
dream.
As the passage continues Lawrence, writing about dream, manages a
discrete critique of mainstream Modernism about which he is so
disparaging in 'The Future of the Novel'. The unselective content of
the dream serves implicitly as a model for what is to Lawrence bad
fiction:
Usually also the images that are accidentally swept into the
mind in sleep are as disconnected and as unmeaning as the
pieces of paper which the street-cleaners sweep into a bin
from the city gutters at night. We should not think of
taking all these papers, piecing them together, and making a
marvellous book of them, prophetic of the future and
pregnant with the past. We should not do so, although every
rag of printed paper swept from the gutter would have some
connection with the past day's event. But its significance,
the significance of the words printed upon it, is so small
that we relegate it into the limbo of the accidental and
meaningless. There is no vital connection between the many
torn bits of paper -- only an accidental connection. Each
bit of paper has reference to some actual event: a bus-
ticket, an envelope, a tract, a pastry-shop bag, a
newspaper, a handbill. But take them all together, bus-
ticket, torn envelope, tract, paper-bag, piece of newspaper,
and hand-bill, and they have no individual sequence, they
belong more to the mechanical arrangements than to the vital
consequence of our existence. And the same with most dreams.
They are the heterogeneous odds and ends of images swept
together accidentally by the besom of the night-current, and
it is beneath our dignity to attach any real importance to
them.
(Fantasia of the Unconscious, F&P, pp. 163-4)
This expertly constructed central metaphor also speaks volumes about
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Lawrence's suspicions that Freud in particular labours in the gutter
of human activity, that his interests are gutter-interests. But the
passage is most revealing in the bearing it has on Lawrence's use of
dream in his fiction.
In the final chapter of Aaron's Rod; called 'Words', a considerable
amount of the narrative is given over to Aaron's dream. It is too long
to quote in full but a summary of its principal elements is adequate
for my purposes. Continuity between diverse scenes is provided by the
figure of Aaron, here a split subject. In part the dream foreshadows
the words of Lilly to follow, on the self, the 'dream-Aaron' having a
'second self', an 'invisible, conscious self' (AR p.287); there being
a 'flesh-and-blood Aaron' which is 'palpable and visible' (AR p.187),
to which the 'second self' is Other. In the dream Aaron is in a
strange country from which he passes into a labyrinthine realm of
rooms and corridors populated with tin-miners and their wives. With a
dreamer's knowledge Aaron knows that they are to eat a man, realized
as 'a man's skin stuffed tight with prepared meat' (AR p.286), whom
the dreamer sees receding into the distance, down a dream corridor.
Then Aaron is in a boat in a scene which has elements of a classical
journey in Hades:
The next thing he could recall was, that he was in a boat.
And now he was most definitely two people. His invisible,
conscious self, what we have called his second self, hovered
as it were before the prow of the boat, seeing and knowing,
but unseen. His other self, the palpable Aaron, sat as a
passenger in the boat, which was being rowed by the unknown
people of this underworld. They stood up as they thrust the
boat along. Other passengers were in the boat too, women as
well, but all of them unknown people, and not noticeable.
(Aaron' s Rod; p. 287)
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The ambivalence of a dream-ego is communicated using the split self:
in a dream the dreamer is both present and not present (because there
is in reality no spatial dream-world to inhabit); s/he sees and knows
things about the dream and dream-world which are not there in the
phenomenal world to see and know. The 'corporeal' Aaron fails to
notice his naked elbow being struck hard as the boat passes stakes
standing erect in the water. The 'invisible' Aaron wills him to
notice, and the boatmen cry warnings in a language which neither Aaron
understands. This is the second instance of an incomprehensible
language in the dream, the first having been spoken by the people of
the room-country. The boat reaches a city, 'A lake-city, like Mexico'
(the reference is to Mexico City and looks ahead to The Plumed
Serpent) where the dream Aaron sees a figure of Astarte. At this point
the dreamer wakes up. The major elements are a series of alien
locations, unknown languages, a chthonic community, a journey over
water to a city, a stuffed but animate man (representing Aaron) to be
consumed and a Phoenician fertility goddess, with the split self of
Aaron presiding. Whilst Aaron 'hears' language he fails to heed
warnings, but feels no physical pain: he is 'unfeeling'.
It is quite unexpected of Lawrence to employ dream and the
catalogue of dream motifs in this way given his remarks that dream-
images are accidental and 'as unmeaning as the pieces of paper which
the street-cleaners sweep into a bin from the city gutters at night.'
(P&P p.164). In Aaron's Rod he does seem to be 'taking all these
papers, piecing them together, and making a marvellous book of them,
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prophetic of the future and pregnant with the past.' GAP p.164).
Whatever Lawrence's motives, the dream in Aaron's Rod is one of the
novel's flaws. Whichever way one looks at it, it is an inadequate
'frame' for the novel's serious concerns. It is neither an insightful
commentary on the novel nor an extension of Lawrence's consideration
of non-verbal modes of understanding, or metaphor. In my view it is an
unwieldy narrative within a narrative. It provides one clear instance
of a failed frame and consequently points up the skill of Lawrence's
interactiveness (whether with Freud, or the Greeks) elsewhere. As a
symptom, Aaron's symptom, it accords with Lawrence's views in 'Sleep
and Dreams' that only those dreams which are genuinely rooted in the
individual's deepest levels of consciousness are significant. Lawrence
asserts that:
Only occasionally they [dreams] matter. And this is only
when something threatens us from the outer mechanical or
accidental death-world. When anything threatens us from the
world of death, then a dream may become so vivid that it
arouses the actual soul. And when a dream is so intense that
it arouses the soul -- then we must attend to it.
(Fantasia of the Unconscious, F&P, pp. 164-5, my brackets).
Aaron's dream occurs in the night following the destruction of his
flute. At the end of 'The Broken Rod' (Aaron's Rod; chapter XX)
Lawrence describes Aaron as 'quite dumbfounded by the night's event:
the loss of his flute. Here was a blow he had not expected. And the
loss was for him symbolistic. It chimed with something in his soul:
the bomb, the smashed flute, the end.' (AR p.285). In this context it
is quite fitting that Aaron dreams although Lawrence never quite
succeeds in overcoming the artificiality of the dream within his
narrative. It fails to throw events into relief in any significant
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sense, existing at the edge of the narrative and separate from it. It
also fails to raise questions about the framing function of dreams,
and is closer to being a narrative than a representation of a dream.
Aaron himself wakes from the dream, tries to assign meaning to the
fragments he recalls and, failing, dismisses it in order to assess the
new phase of his life into which he has been projected by the loss of
the flute. In ordinary language and in dreams the words and dream-
images respectively are like shadows cast by the essential thing that
needs expressing. There is no lasting sense in Aaron's dream that the
images are authentic, although the weakness of the dream in Aaron's
Rod proves Lawrence's point earlier. Aaron's dream-images are too much
of a literalized language under a merely notional heading of dream.
There are other instances in Lawrence's fiction where this is the
case. Ellen March's dreams in The Fox; for example, are actually
unnecessary. They are surplus to requirements, an act of crude
symbolism because the moment March actually sees the 'fox' she is
'unconscious' and, therefore, does not need to dream. Like Aaron's
dream these instances are inauthentic as dream-language: at once bad
metaphor and weak frame.
So the dream at the end of Aaron's Rod is flat, merely two-
dimensional, leaving us to confront a meaningful paradox in Lawrence.
When he uses dream, as here, the structure which is meant to be
meaningful (the dream) actually loses its force. This is in sharp
contrast, however, to those scenes in Lawrence which are charged with
meaning and, whilst being in important respects dream-like, are not in
fact dreams. Instances include the horses at the end of The Rainbow
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and the bull scenes in The Plumed Serpent, which I shall address
shortly. We have to consider why these are effective where the
description of a dream is not, or is less so, and the answer would
seem to be that, in fact, a dream cannot be written down. What is
written down as representing or imitating dream is always already
interpreted by the writer. It therefore has no authentic latent
content. In the 'dream-like' scenes, however, like the horses in The
Rainbow, there is an Unconscious genuinely at work which is always
slippery, always elusive. This is why critics continually feel the
need to interpret such scenes, in effect to fix a meaning, and why
they can never genuinely succeed. The horse-scene, for instance, like
a real dream, is infinite, that is to say, its possible meanings
continually unfold and are, therefore, infinite. A text which purports
to contain a dream is not rigorously or critically coming to terms
with this infinity, which is why Aaron's 'dream' is 'flat', or two-
dimensional. It is not coming to terms with a real dream's radical
metaphoricity. Lawrence's failure, in the sequence from Aaron's Rod,
is that, for once, he does not recognize this. The horse scene in The
Rainbow, however, is uncanny (unheimlich) in the way a real dream is
uncanny: a transcription of a 'dream' in a fiction, and Lawrence's
descriptions in Fantasia of the Unconscious of horses and bulls as
dream-motifs, are not.1
In 'Sleep and Dreams' Lawrence makes reference to a number of these
possible dream images or motifs. The figure of the mother is one of
these, privileged by Lawrence in his description of her as 'the first
great emotional image to be introduced in the psyche. The dream-
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process mechanically reproduces its stock image the moment the intense
sympathy-emotion is aroused.' (F&P p.168). In Kleinian terms this is
the 'good' mother: Lawrence's exclusion of the alternative, the 'bad'
mother, is interesting and suggests a degree of resistance persisting
even as he re-thought his own relation with his mother. Here,
crucially, Lawrence is dealing with symbols and his examples are
neither grounded in personal experience nor derived, as far as we can
tell, from other people's dreams. I propose in the next few pages to
consider some of Lawrence's examples and his explanations. First is
the 'dream' of raging horses:
For example, a man has a persistent passionate fear-dream
about horses. He suddenly finds himself among great,
physical horses, which may suddenly go wild. Their great
bodies surge madly round him, they rear above him,
threatening to destroy him. At any minute he may be trampled
down.
Now a psychoanalyst will probably tell you off-hand that
this is a father-complex dream. Certain symbols seem to be
put into complex catalogues. But it is all too arbitrary.
Examining the emotional reference we find that the feeling
Is sensual, there is a great impression of the powerful,
almost beautiful physical bodies of the horses, the
nearness, the rounded haunches, the rearing. Is the dynamic
passion in a horse the danger-passion? It is a great sensual
reaction at the sacral ganglion, a reaction of intense,
sensual, dominant volition. The horse which rears and kicks
and neighs madly acts from the intensely powerful sacral
ganglion. But this intense activity from the sacral ganglion
is male: the sacral ganglion is at its highest intensity in
the male. So that the horse-dream refers to some arrest in
the deepest sensual activity in the male. The horse is
presented as an object of terror, which means that to the
man's automatic dream-soul, which loves automatism, the
great sensual male activity is the greatest menace. The
automatic pseudo-soul, which has got the sensual nature
repressed, would like to keep it repressed. Whereas the
greatest desire of the living spontaneous soul is that this
very male sensual nature, represented as a menace, shall be
actually accomplished in life. The spontaneous self is
secretly yearning for the liberation and fulfilment of the
deepest and most powerful sensual nature. There may be an
element of father-complex. The horse may also refer to the
powerful sensual being in the father. The dream may be a
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love of the dreamer for the sensual male who is his father.
But it has nothing to do with incest. The love is probably a
Just love.
(Fantasia of the Unconscious, FM', pp. 170-1)
Lawrence's terms, 'danger-passion', 'automatic dream-soul', 'automatic
pseudo-soul' and its Other, the 'living spontaneous soul', invariably
demand attention. Once again the implicit challenge to Freud, and in
particular the Oedipal drama, is linguistic and involves the conscious
setting up of quite different terms. Here the unconscious, or what
passes in Lawrence for the unconscious, is 'framed' in a new set of
metaphors. Where Freud's terms are derived from commonly understood
words, Lawrence has developed in his work Justification for terms that
are positively idiosyncratic and imaginative, and of course
metaphorical. The theme in this description is the tension and
interplay of the mechanical and automatic with the living spontaneous
self; the interplay of death-modes and life-modes in the individual.
Lawrence's certainty as to what the horses signify here, a repressed
male sexuality, does not alter the ambiguity of the horses that
frighten Ursula towards the end of The Rainbow. The real point of
interest is that the horses do not appear to Ursula in a dream. As one
of the strongest 'animal' scenes in the fiction we know that the
horses are charged with psychic meaning but the reader has to labour
hard to extract that meaning. This is a good strategy on Lawrence's
part: a dream would have the effect of closing off the significant
substance from the narrative. Indeed, this is conventionally how
dreams function in fiction. In making the horses at the end of The
Rainbow 'real' their significance is pervasive rather than
circumscribed. It is always difficult to say exactly what the horses
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signify and this is very much the point. If they appeared in a dream
the expectation would be the possibility of extracting and attaching
to them a specific meaning. This is why the dream as a narrative
strategy appears flat to Lawrence, and why it fails in Aaron's Rod
Lawrence himself falls prey to a reductiveness. His interpretation,
In Fantasia of the Unconscious, of the horses as a dream-image (not a
symbol in a work of fiction) refers only to a male drive and in
particular to an 'arrest in the deepest sensual activity in the male'.
In this context the horses in The Rainbow could be interpreted as
representing an arrested male sensual nature which menaces Ursula who
has throughout emphasized her fundamental singularity to the point of
crisis in her relationship with Skrebensky. But the finality of such
an interpretation is prevented by the ambiguous quality of the
experience. We can think of 'St. Mawr' particularly as discussed by
David Cavitch. His interpretation accords with Lawrence's statement
that 'the great sensual male activity is the greatest menace':
Lou's responses to St. Mawr overtly express her unconscious
sexual anxieties, and that is why the horse is like a
revelation to her. She lives in the thrall of male
aggression -- her aversion to what she believes is real sex
is the only explanation of the "spell" of "nonentity" over
her life -- and St. Mawr expresses symbolically the intense
ambivalence of her fear and her anticipation of violation by
a man. The horse is not a figure of simple sexual potency
but of dangerously overwrought sexual inhibition.s2
Furthermore, Cavitch argues, the sexual fear which is thematized in
the story is Lawrence's own, and the conclusion is a lie because
Lawrence is battling with his own notion of male power: 'The story is
Inadequate intellectually to its complex materials, because Lawrence
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does not rationally understand what his story reveals.' (Cavitch,
p.163). This last assertion represents an attempt to psychoanalyze
Lawrence rather than to 'read' him and consequently the real point is
lost. If St. Mawr is a symbol, he works better as a 'real' horse than
as a dream element, for instance: the story makes us work at
understanding his complex significance. If St. Mawr simply appeared in
a dream, like the 'dream' at the conclusion of Aaron's Rod, the weak
dream-frame would transform him into that literalized language and his
force would be lost.
The second dream-image which Lawrence isolates in the essay is that
of the bull:
The bull-dream is a curious reversal. In the bull the
centres of power are in the breast and the shoulders. The
horns of the head are symbols of this vast power in the
upper self. The woman's fear of the bull is a great terror
of the dynamic upper centres in man. The bull's horns,
instead of being phallic, represent the enormous potency of
the upper centres. A woman whose most positive dynamism is
In the breast and shoulders is fascinated by the bull. Her
dream-fear of the bull and his horns which may run into her
may be reversed to a significance of desire for connection,
not from the centres of the lower, sensual self, but from
the intense physical centres of the upper body: the phallus
polarized from the upper centres, and directed towards the
great breast centre of the woman. Her wakeful fear is terror
of the great breast-and-shoulder, upper rage and power of
man, which may pierce her defenceless lower self. The terror
and the desire are near together -- and go with an
admiration of the slender, abstracted bull loins.'
(Fantasia of the Unconscious, RIP, p.171)
Characteristically, Lawrence decodes a traditional symbol in his own
terms rather than showing any real interest in the dream as dream. The
breast of the bull is identified elsewhere in Fantasia of the
Unconscious as the site of a strength which is not only physical: the
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'root' of vision is also located there (P&P pp.64-5). In this passage,
as in the former, the decoding operation is underpinned by a highly
personal formulation of a masculine principle, a masculine sexuality,
and the underlying theme is the relation between 'the woman' and this
principle. Here, as in Aaron's Rod; Lawrence deals with dreams in an
unsatisfactory way. In Fantasia of the Unconscious he runs the risk of
being too defensive and too dogmatic, and in the fiction the
delimitation of dream as something separate and symbolic runs against
the grain of the 'metaphysic'. The source of Lawrence's
dissatisfaction with dream as a narrative mode arguably rests in its
literalness and indeed, in his hands, dream becomes once again too
much a literalized language.
Bulls and visions come together in The Plumed Serpent but not, and
this is very much the point, as dream. Towards the end of the novel
Kate Leslie watches a bull and a cow being loaded onto a boat. The men
and the animals form a 'silhouette frieze' (PS p.431, my italics)
against the background of the water, and the entire scene, seen, has a
distinctive visual quality which is summed up in the lines 'It was
near, yet seemed strange and remote' (PS p.431) and, later, 'All so
still and soft and remote' (PS p.433). Indeed, these sentences, and
the whole narrative, impose on the 'real' scene the quality of dream.
The loading of the cow and bull onto the boat seems to take place at a
remove from the world inhabited by Kate who looks on but is not, of
course, dreaming. If she were the scene would have to bear an extra
and specific significance. As it is, the reader responds to it by
recognizing that it is forceful and charged with meaning but without
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being directed to regard it as significant in a special way. Compared
with the long dream in Aaron's Rod this scene is not flat, indeed it
is beautifully observed in a way the other cannot be: it is both part
of the world occupied by Kate and invested with a specialness which,
In part, derives from its being 'real' rather than 'imagined'.
In this episode the narrative requires the reader to participate in
Kate's attentiveness in a way that dream would not. The significance,
then, is not so much in the event itself as in the quality of
attention to the paradoxically near but distant scene. This accords,
and contrasts, with the first chapter of the novel where bulls are
again associated with the idea of 'spectacle': at the bull-fight a
bull, here a pathetic victim, is again at the centre of a vision as
something watched. The different responses of the Euro-Americans in
the audience point up the difference between seeing as a
dispassionate, merely optical, function which deludes the watcher that
he is having an authentic experience (the 'frantic effort to see --
just to see' (FS p.28)), and 'seeing' as 'knowing' or more accurately
as the 'dark feeling' (FS p.7) which alerts Kate to the fact that she
would rather not attend the bull-fight any longer.
Just as in the episode where Tom Brangwen's gaze is focused on the
framed 'picture' of Lydia Lensky and the baby Anna, so the scene of
the cow and bull being loaded onto the boat has implications for us in
the way we read Lawrence. The reading process is never a simple
standing back from the language as it might be in a more realistic
tradition. Neither is it a conscious engagement with a language which
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self-consciously makes the point about the reader participating in a
text which resists easy consumption, as Finnegans Wake does for
example. With Lawrence the level of interaction and creativity is more
subtle. The reader is both at a remove from the action, as is Kate in
the bull scenes, and busy in the creation of its meaning. Much in
Lawrence is both 'strange and remote' and yet 'near'. Surely this is
also a quality of 'vision' and dream?
Lawrence's discourse on dreams thus cuts across and into his more
profound thought on vision and representation. In the first place
dreaming is the result of 'flows' of activity in the body; the
'sweeping' current, the 'earth-current' (FM' p.163) referred to above.
Lawrence's refusal to 'attach any real importance' (F&P p.164) to
dreams highlights his deep-seated resistance to any tendency,
Including Freud's, to regard dreams as representation. When, in spite
of himself, Lawrence does so, the result is the weak narrative of
Aaron's dream. It is unthinkable to Lawrence that the vigorous
unconscious, should manifest itself in neat fables. As such they
Invite a hermeneutic exercise which transforms unconscious production
into a regulated and therefore limited structure. Such a
transformation is in Lawrence's view a repressive act, placing what
Deleuze and Guattari regard as the production of desire in harness.
This passage underlines the Deleuzian parallel with Lawrence on this
topic. It is argued that in current psychoanalytical practice,
The whole of desiring-production is crushed, subjected to
the requirements of representation, and to the dreary games
of what is representative and represented in representation.
And there is the essential thing: the reproduction of desire
gives way to a simple representation, in the process as well
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as theory of the cure. The productive unconscious makes way
for an unconscious that knows only how to express itself --
express itself in myth, in tragedy, in dream.
But who says that dream, tragedy, and myth are adequate to
the formations of the unconscious, even if the work of
transformation is taken into account? ... It is as if Freud
had drawn back from this world of wild production and
explosive desire, wanting at all costs to restore a little
order there, an order made classical owing to the ancient
Greek theater. (Anti-Oedipus, p.54)
This shows exactly why Lawrence responded aggressively to what he
perceived as the banality of his critics (and admirers) reading Sons
and Lovers, for instance, as an ordered representation of his Oedipal
sexuality, and why he felt unjustly 'framed'. The question asked in
this passage is implicitly asked by Lawrence in his chapter 'Sleep and
Dreams'. His way of resisting the classical or mythic framing of the
dynamic unconscious is to contrast Freudian 'dream-meaning' (F&F
p.167) with his own economy of 'flows'. His emphasis is on the blood:
once again we are in a position to ask how literal Lawrence is being
when he explains nightmares by referring to 'an arrest of the
mechanical flow of the system' (F&F p.165), an arrest which effects
the organs, stimulating dreams. There is a literalness, but there is
also an ambivalence, one which Deleuze and Guattari, partly
accidentally, help to bring into clearer focus. The 'physical flow'
and the 'mechanical flow' (F&F pp. 165-6) on which Lawrence
concentrates are not merely literal: we have to understand 'the
friction of the night-flow' (F&P p.167), for instance, metaphorically
before we begin to fathom the complexity of Lawrence's interaction
with Freud. This return to metaphor, to language, is in Lawrence a way
of confronting the ordered unconscious formulated by Freud in terms of
classical myth where Oedipus is the principal term.
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2.6 Concluding remarks: language and the unconscious
In my introductory chapter I suggested that Psychoanalysis and the
Unconscious and Fantasia of the Unconscious constitute, not a theory
of the unconscious, but the most extended treatment of Lawrence's
recognition of the inextricability and interconnectedness of language
and the unconscious. This is not anything that Lawrence states as
such, but is a recognition which is rooted in the metaphoricity of the
essays. However, it is precisely this metaphoricity which enables
Lawrence to 'frame' Freud in the sense of his work 'bracketing'
Freudian thought and at the same time interacting dialogically with
it. Metaphor is the way Lawrence argues with Freud, and institutes his
own sense of the inseparability of language and the unconscious. At
the root of this is his rejection of the hegemony of Oedipus in
Freudian thought, the better to solve the very real problems which
have taken hold at the deepest levels of the human unconscious. I have
rehearsed the assumption that where Lawrence resists Freudian
perspectives he does so because of a subliminal recognition of his own
oedipalization, which he prefers to conceal. However, there is also
the sense in his essays that oedipalization is itself a repressive
enforcement of the 'Law' over desire. Freud is perhaps the ultimate
Father wielding the ultimate Law.
As I have argued, Lawrence's metaphoricity embodies the anti-
Oedipal direction of his own understanding. Lawrence 'speaks by virtue
of the flows of sexuality and the intensities of the unconscious'
(Anti-Oedipus, p.115). To say so is implicitly to recognize the
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importance of Lawrence's metaphorical language as a 'speaking' which
dismantles the Oedipal triangle by embodying the 'flow' of the libido
across, through and in spite of the limits of this triangle ('the holy
family'). This is not in itself a crude negating of Freudian
understanding, but it offers a challenge to the rigidity of Freudian
formulations. Freud is not abused here, but productively challenged
within his own terms. In their book Deleuze and Guattari return to
Lawrence's language, referring appropriately to Psychoanalysis and the
Unconscious in particular, in order to articulate this libidinal
'flow' against the enclosing 'triangle'. Psychoanalysis, it is argued,
restricts this 'flow' and calls it a cure but,
flows ooze, they traverse the triangle, breaking apart its
vertices. The Oedipal wad does not absorb these flows, any
more than it could seal off a jar of jam or plug a dike.
Against the walls of the triangle, toward the outside, flows
exert the irresistible pressure of lava or the invincible
oozing of water. •.. We are all libidos that are too viscous
and too fluid -- and not by preference, but wherever we have
been carried by the deterritorialized flows. ... Who does
not feel in the flows of his desire both the lava and the
water? (Anti-Oedipus, p.67).
What Deleuze and Guattari do with this, in terms of extending and
developing their thesis of schizophrenization as a more accurate
formulation of the human psyche, socially constructed, than Freudian
oedipalization, is outside the purview of the present study. Of
interest and immediate relevance is the way they resort to a highly.
metaphorical mode and language in order to gain access to this
unconscious and the processes of human desire. Clearly they are
working within the domain of psychoanalysis but like Lawrence they
view Oedipus as a repressive and obfuscating construct, concealing
116
rather than explaining the problems of the unconscious. Also like
Lawrence, they construct a 'biology of feeling' with their 'desiring-
machines' and 'the body without organs' which are, like Lawrence's
plexuses and upper and lower centres of consciousness, ambivalently
present in the individual. As metaphors these are a way of challenging
established perceptions about the organization of the psyche. Inasmuch
as this metaphorization is a noticeable strategy, in Deleuze and
Guattari as well as in Lawrence, it gives us a newly focused sense of
our libidinal and psychic economies: the 'stable ego' is reconstructed
as an anoedipal self of 'flows' and 'tides'. References to such
'flows' and 'tides' continually recur in Lawrence's writing
inseparable from the 'flow' of language: I concentrate on this quality
of the language in my chapter on The Rainbow, focusing on its
'undulating styles'.
The unconscious which Lawrence apprehends in these essays is not,
then, the ordered construct posited by Freud. The mode and language of
Psychoanalysis and the Unconscious and Fantasia of the Unconscious are
implicated, as I have argued, in dis-empowering what are viewed as the
repressive structures of oedipalization and castration. We are now in
a position to recognize the real force of the word 'fantasia' in the
title of the longer essay: the language and structure of the essay, as
spontaneous as it can reasonably be, is invested with desire, is in
itself a 'flow' of language breaking across the more formal
limitations which its stated subject, the unconscious, would usually
demand. Metaphor and 'metaphysic', Lawrence's personal philosophy,
have been shown to coincide radically in these essays. I now propose
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to move on to a fictional text in which this kind of co-incidence is
also central. In Women in Love, as in these essays, the philosophical
importance of the novel is grounded not so much in referential
statement as in its complex and sophisticated metaphoricity. In this
novel metaphor moves significantly away from its purely, or merely,
rhetorical function. One of the novel's achievements is the extent to
which its specific concerns are embodied in its language, and by the
same token it represents Lawrence's alertness to the philosophical
qualities of language at large.
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43. Susanne K. Langer, Philosophical Sketches (Baltimore: Johns
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45. ibid.
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48. See Julia Kristeva, Powers of Horror: an essay on abjection,
trans. by Leon S. Roudiez (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982).
49. The emphasis in the essays on the unconscious on posture and
bearing, and the implicit relation between mood and the physical body,
recalls other philosophies which insist on the interaction of body and
mind for total mental and physical well being. For instance, the
psycho-physical programme developed by F. M. Alexander, which
attracted interest in the 1930s (see Aldous Huxley, Ends and Means:
An Enquiry into the Nature of Ideals and into the Methods employed for
their Realization (London: Chat to & Windus, 1937), p.223, p.326)
introduces the concept of 'use', which refers to good posture and
muscle control leading to good physical and mental health. Few of the
ideas behind this and related philosophies which emphasize the mind-
body dualism would have sounded strange to Lawrence had he been aware
of them. Regarding the levels of physical communication between the
mother and baby, one of the leading exponents of the Alexander
Principle in Britain has written that,
From the moment of birth the helpless child is dependent
on the handling and the ideas of its mother. It is picked up
Jerkily or smoothly, crossly or kindly: its head and back
are supported carefully or ignorantly. It lies fece duA\
face up, according to fashion. It is allowed to yell or it
Is picked up on demand. It connects with the mother, on
breast or bottle, and as it suckles, it likes to gaze long
and deep into the mother's eyes, with a unified visual
connection which it may never know again. But in the main,
Its connection is kinaesthetic, through muscles and
movement, and it is quick to pick up feelings of tension,
timidity or rejection from the bodily rather than the visual
contact: and especially from the mother's hands, since
another person's hands are a most powerful stimulus towards
good or bad USE. (W. Barlow, The Alexander Principle, p.161)
The reference to the infant's gaze, which it is suggested s/he will
grow out of, relates to the 'lost' human vision (lost in Lawrence's
view) discussed above. The baby is 'pre-visual'. Whilst Alexander
worked as a therapist with individuals and placed considerable
emphasis on the physical and emotional uniqueness of each subject, it
Is clear that the Alexander Principle describes a programme. Whilst
such intentionalism does not apply to Lawrence it is worth underlining
the fact that significant similarities persist in their thinking
inasmuch as in his essays on the unconscious Lawrence pays a great
deal of attention to the physical body operating in hostile as well as
pleasing environments. Kinaesthesia, for example, is also central to
Lawrence's thinking on the child. Lawrence:
For a child's bottom is made occasionally to be spanked. The
vibration of the spanking acts directly upon the spinal
nerve-system, there is a direct reciprocity and reaction,
the spanker transfers his wrath to the great will-centres in
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the child, and these will-centres react intensely, are
vivified and educated.
(Fantasia of the Unconscious, F&P, p.50)
Less controversially, there is the recognition in the essays on the
unconscious that bad posture reveals something about the individual's
sense of self:
So, weak-chested, round-shouldered, we stoop hollowly
forward on ourselves. It is the result of the all-famous
love and charity ideal, an ideal now quite dead in its
sympathetic activity, but still fixed and determined in its
voluntary action.
(Fantasia of the Unconscious, F&P, p.53)
Without transforming Lawrence into a therapist, these examples
emphasize a context in which Lawrence's views are meaningful, without
suggesting that those views constitute a programme.
50. Anne Fernihough, 'The Tyranny of the Text: Lawrence, Freud and the
Modernist Aesthetic', in Modernism and the European Unconscious ed. by
Peter Collier and Judy Davies (Cambridge: Polity Press; Oxford: Basil
Blackwell, 1990), p.50
51. See 'The "Uncanny" in Sigmund Freud, Art and Literature, ed.
Albert Dickson, The Pelican Freud Library, vol. 14 (Penguin, 1985),
pp. 335-76.
52. David Cavitch, D. H. Lawrence and the New World (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1969), p.156. Further references to this study are
given after quotations in the text.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE OXYMORONIC MODE OF WOMEN IN LOVE
If Women in Love did not exist the general view of Lawrence's language
would be very different. If either of the major novels existed in
isolation, if we had The Rainbow without Women in Love, or vice versa,
we would have a very different sense of Lawrence's language. In fact
it cannot be presupposed that the novels share even an identical mode
of language. The conceptions of language which each novel embodies are
radically different. It is crucial to realize that Lawrence does not
have a fixed or prescriptive view of language which characterizes his
oeuvre. The critical emphasis should be placed on positive difference
rather than continuity.
In holding this view I differ from Michael Ragussis for whom Women
in Love is unequivocally the representative text: in his reading of
Lawrence no reference is made to the other novels, with The Rainbow
conspicuously absent. The reasons for this are not difficult to
divine. Not only is Women in Love one of the two major novels but it
has the advantage, from Ragussis's point of view, of being about
language and the difficulties of expression. The way in which language
is given thematic status there is very alluring and it would seem that
Ragussis has been seduced by what language is, and what it does, in
Women in Love, so that he does not at any stage question its
representativeness.' However, the emphasis need not be so much on what
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is stated, but on what is evident on the subliminal, sub-textual
levels.
In fact Women in Love is representative but it is not typical, a
distinction to which Ragussis is not sensitive, or which his study
does not enable him to make. It is a novel which exemplifies
Lawrence's major habitual preoccupations and tendencies: his
exploration of personal relations, his critique of Western culture,
the development of his 'metaphysic' and his highly metaphorical style.
In the present chapter I propose to concentrate on this metaphoricity
(which is not separable from the other tendencies) because it is here
and in other matters of language that the atypicality of Women in Love
resides. Why, for instance, does Lawrence engender such a radically
metaphorical language in Women in Love? Is it because he is
continually trying to get a complex and difficult conception of
otherness into his sights? If so, language is the only medium in which
this is even a possibility. The chapter to follow is long and has
several threads because there is no easy or direct route to an answer
to these questions.
I begin by addressing the simultaneity and 'friction' of styles
which characterizes Women in Love and contrasts it with The Rainbow
which is the subject of the next chapter. Simultaneity will emerge as
an important concept for Lawrence in this novel because it helps him
break down certain oppositions like internal/external (subjective
value is understood within the 'external' in Lawrence), and
visual/anti-visual. Otherness is usually perceived in terms of such
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binary oppositions, I/you, for example, but as we shall see Lawrence
is after a more radical conception of the Other: his sense of it is
not of the merely 'objective', what the camera, for instance, records.
Hence, from a consideration of its styles the chapter moves into an
examination of the visual in the novel, and what I shall call the
anti-visual (where what is described is not strictly visualizable),
because vision, of all the human senses, is the principal metaphor in
Western thought for knowing: sight 'makes us know and bring to light
many differences between things' (Aristotle, Metaphysics, 980a,25). It
is a dictum which is implicitly at work in much of Lawrence's highly
metaphorical, and occasionally anti-visual, writing: both the
metaphorical and the anti-visual, which interact in the narratives,
constitute what Ricoeur calls a 'thinking more' (RM p.303). Much of
this 'thinking more' occurs at subliminal levels in Lawrence: a great
deal of effort and sophistication went into Heidegger's saying of some
of the same things but his discourse, although it is radically
metaphorical, is more 'conscious' than Lawrence's. 'Sight' in
Aristotle's thought is not mere sensory perception. It is only a sign
of our desire for knowledge in some higher sense. The play of visual
and anti-visual language in Lawrence in part constitutes a critique of
the merely optical and in doing so provides him with a means of
'seeing further' and 'thinking more'. The 'visual' in Lawrence, of
course, is really linguistic. We must therefore recognize the visual
and anti-visual strains of his narrative as most truly a part of his
non-conceptual 'thinking' language; as fundamentally metaphorical.
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Lawrence also contrasts the 'visual' with the 'physical' as in the
novella The Fox which I briefly discuss because it focuses quite
tightly some of the issues which are more extensively but less
explicitly dealt with in Women in Love. There is a kind of
physicality, Lawrence argues, which is distinct from the everyday
sensual physicality. 'Love' is the focus for this argument because of
Its physical dimension and the fact that it inevitably has a physical
object. I then examine how Lawrence's critique of 'love' in Women in
Love takes him to the deep, unconscious levels of metaphor at work in
human understanding. In Women in Love Lawrence has begun to bring
together the threads of his critique of, and involvement in, -romantic
love in his earlier works. I shall argue that in doing so he pulls
away from the traditionally oxymoronic rhetoric of love, which
externalizes the emotion, and institutes a new conception of the love-
relation, the oxymoronic nature of which is much more radically a part
of the general quality both of the language and of the experience.
These constitute the themes and levels of thought contained in the
following chapter. I propose now to turn to the first of these, the
simultaneity of styles in the narrative language of the novel.
3.1 The simultaneity of styles in Women in Love
Simultaneity is a word which in general terms describes the mode of
Women in Love and in this respect the novel can be contrasted with The
Rainbow. The difference between them is principally a question of
language. Great variations of language occur in The Rainbow but these
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variations are part of the vast sweep, or 'wave', of language which is
that novel. Its distinctive monumental metaphoricity is the subject of
my next chapter. I propose here to rehearse briefly a few familiar
points of style in The Rainbow in order to underline a particular and
philosophical difference between its mode of language and that of
Women in Love
In The Rainbow the reader typically recognizes moments, or
episodes, as being particularly important where the style reaches a
certain pitch of intensity. There are many instances of this. One
example is provided in 'Childhood of Anna Lensky' (The Rainbow,
chapter III) where the emotional connection between Tom Brangwen and
Lydia Lensky is properly forged after two years of married life. A
contributory factor is Tom's visit to his brother's mistress, his
consequent reflections on his own existence and, later, Lydia's words
and touch which he initially resists. The language moves from a
description of Tom's visit to Wirksworth, to his quiet domestic
evening in his own house and finally to the genuine emotional
intensity of non-verbal communication with Lydia, described as a
'transfiguration' (IR p.91). An important feature is the difference in
the language at the moment of intensest feeling from the kind of
language which preceded it: 'Blind and destroyed, he pressed forward,
nearer, nearer, to receive the consummation of himself, be received
within the darkness which should swallow him and yield him up to
himself.' ... 'It was the entry into another circle of existence, it
was the baptism to another life, it was the complete confirmation.'
(2 p.90). The intensely metaphorical tone is the 'foreign language'
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Lawrence felt he was using in writing the novel (Letters I, p.544;
'another language', Letters II, p.132). Indeed this metaphor of
foreigness is evoked both in this scene and earlier in the novel to
designate the emotional distance between the alien and different Lydia
and her new surroundings in which she must learn to be 'at home'. In
what sense is Tom 'blind' and 'destroyed'? As the result of this union
is ultimately enriching and, from his (and Lawrence's) point of view,
positive, the 'destruction' is oxymoronic in a very familiar
Lawrencean sense, in the commingling, at the crucial moment, of
positive and negative terms which by their interaction succeed in
reaching out to the experience. The metaphorical language does not
visualize what is really happening to Tom: this is the physicality in
Lawrence which is not merely sensual. The experience as it is given to
us is principally linguistic and non-visual. The camera's objectivity,
argues Lawrence, is inappropriate for the authentic experience taking
place. This suggestion of a non-visualizing mode will gain particular
significance in Women in Love.
Another example is the scene where Will and Anna put up the sheaves
in the corn field. This episode is too long to quote in full but it is
characterized by the following language in which a distinctive rhythm
builds:
There was only the moving to and fro in the moonlight,
engrossed, the swinging in the silence, that was marked only
by the splash of sheaves, and silence, and a splash of
sheaves. And ever the splash of his sheaves broke swifter,
beating up to hers, and ever the splash of her sheaves
recurred monotonously, unchanging, and ever the splash of
his sheaves beat nearer.
(The Rainbow, p.115)
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The Rainbow is full of such examples. Variations of language occur, of
course, in Women in Love but there is something very distinctive, and
different, in their simultaneity in that novel. Hence Women in Love is
a much more elusive medium than The Rainbow, which points to its not
being typical, as I said at the outset. In The Rainbow the reader
recognizes moments of special significance because at these moments,
as in the passages highlighted, the language palpably differs from the
rest of the language around it. The reader has reached an especially
significant place, signalled as such by the language. The narrative
moves into these moments seamlessly, giving the book its distinctive
'voice' and 'rhythm'. In fact the novel progresses by the movements
into and out of these moments of heightened feeling.
In Women in Love, by contrast, the reader is presented with co-
incident styles. Significantly with this novel it is very difficult to
isolate one kind of language from the rest of the text effectively
because of the extent of this co-incidence, or simultaneity. The
following dialogue between Ursula and Birkin, however, provides some
idea of the effect:
He looked up at her. He saw her face strangely enkindled,
as if suffused from within by a powerful sweet fire. His
soul was arrested in wonder. She was enkindled in her own
living fire. Arrested in wonder and in pure, perfect
attraction, he moved towards her. She sat like a strange
queen, almost supernatural in her glowing smiling richness.
"The point about love," he said, his consciousness quickly
adjusting itself, "is that we hate the word because we have
vulgarised it. It ought to be proscribed, tabooed from
utterance, for many years, till we get a new, better idea."
There was a beam of understanding between them.
"But it always means the same thing," she said.
"Ah God, no, let it not mean that any more," he cried.
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"Let the old meanings go."
(Women in Love, p.130, my italics)
The places which I have emphasized in this passage indicate a
different order or variety of language from that which surrounds them.
These lines describe the non-verbal and non-physical (or ambivalently
physical) experience of each in the 'presence' of the other. The
passage starts with typically 'Lawrencean' reference to an impersonal
quality of Being which characterizes Ursula at that moment to Birkin:
he 'perceives' it. Describing her, Lawrence's metaphors are physical.
The sentences emphasized describe a level of consciousness other than
that of their dialogue as each subliminally recognizes the 'otherness'
of the other person. Leo Sersani has called the 'sudden shifts of
language' in this novel 'disorienting' and argues that they
show Lawrence's attempt to pull away from the 'old stable
ego' and to show every individual as 'nonindividualized', an 'a-
psychological, mass of life and death energies'. 3
 Bersani, whose theme
is desire, focuses on some extreme examples of narrative language
which indicate personal crises in the lives of the characters, when
they 'lapse out' for instance. My emphasis, in contrast, is on the
subtle shifts, like those outlined in the long quotation above, which
characterize the whole narrative, and not just moments of extremity in
feeling. These subtle shifts are surely the 'frictionality' to which
Lawrence refers in the Foreword to the novel, which I shall come to
presently. In this passage Birkin's self-adjusting consciousness is
recalled, by way of contrast, later on in 'Snow' (Women in Love,
chapter XXX) where Gudrun, absorbed in, and by, her vision of the
mountainous landscape, and recoiling from Gerald, stands on the
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threshold between two worlds: 'She closed her eyes, closed away the
monotonous level of dead wonder, and opened them again to the everyday
world. / "Yes," she said briefly, regaining her will with a click.'
(WL p.402, my italics). If we are reminded of Birkin here we also
notice the contrast between his subtly shifting modes of consciousness
and Gudrun's: Birkin's consciousness is self-adjusting where with
Gudrun the change is obviously a matter of a more relentless will,
derived from her ego, acting upon her mood. Whatever Birkin is saying,
at some deeper level he is responding positively and instinctively to
Ursula. This contrasts with Gudrun's machine-like change: 'click' is a
word which evokes a mechanism. So, when these descriptions recall each
other they do so by way of both similarity and contrast.
In 'Water-Party' (Women in Love, chapter XIV) this sense of there
being different kinds of language is underscored by Ursula's choice of
song to which Gudrun does eurythmics.: '"Sing anything you like, and
I'll take the rhythm from it." / But Ursula could not for her life
think of anything to sing. However, she suddenly began, in a laughing,
teasing voice: / "My love -- is a high-born lady -- " (WI.. p.166).
This precedes the recognizably 'Lawrencean' description of Gudrun
dancing:
Gudrun, looking as if some invisible chain weighed on her
hands and feet, began slowly to dance in the eurythmic
manner, pulsing and fluttering rhythmically with her feet,
making slower, regular gestures with her hands and arms, now
spreading her arms wide, now raising them above her head,
now flinging them softly apart, and lifting her face, her
feet all the time beating and running to the measure of the
song, as if it were some strange incantation, her white,
rapt form drifting here and there in a strange impulsive
rhapsody, seeming to be lifted on a breeze of incantation,
shuddering with strange little runs. Ursula sat on the
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grass, her mouth open in her singing, her eyes laughing as
if she thought it was a great joke, but a yellow light
flashing up in them, as she caught some of the unconscious
ritualistic suggestion of the complex shuddering and waving
and drifting of her sister's white form, that was clutched
in pure, mindless, tossing rhythm, and a will set powerful
in a kind of hypnotic influence.
(Women In Love, p.166)
In introducing this passage I have written 'Lawrencean' in inverted
commas because generally speaking this kind of repetitive and
metaphorical language is recognizably and uniquely of Lawrence, with
Its distinctive sentence structure and verbal rhythm. Lawrence is
aware that the reader will have no difficulty in visualizing a woman
dancing, but our gaze might well be the uncomprehending gaze of the
nearby cattle. In fact our tendency to provide an image for what is
written is challenged once more by the non-visual, or more properly
anti-visual, language. Gudrun is de-personalized, communicated to us
kinaesthetically as movement, or by a catalogue of de-personalizing
metaphors: 'fluttering', 'waving', 'drifting', she is a 'white form'.
The level of metaphoricity employed prevents the description from
delineating the merely physical dimension of Gudrun. Neither are we
'seeing' her with our eyes at this point, but with some other vision
within us which responds to the language. It is difficult to say what
this passage is about -- it is not just about Gudrun dancing. But it
highlights many of the levels of the novel which the present chapter
addresses: in particular the metaphorical language works against
expectations of a description which visualizes the scene. Lawrence
draws attention to Ursula's eyes. These do not in themselves do the
seeing; Ursula does that through them and perceives an 'unconscious'
suggestion for which the language is the vehicle. She cannot say that
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she perceives it: she is truly 'unconscious'. And only the
metaphorical density of the passage communicates an unconscious
suggestion to the reader: referential language, an unproblematically
realistic or visual description of the dance, could not do it so
effectively and bring the focus back to language.
Gudrun's two dances in 'Water-Party' are details, in the painterly
sense, rather than the explicit focus of the chapter: in fact an
unfocusedness characterizes Women in Love. Here is a fundamental
difference from The Rainbow where such intensity of language
frequently indicates intensity of personal feeling. Regarding the
water-metaphors here, there is a fundamental difference between
Gudrun's figure 'waving' and 'drifting' over the ground and Tom
Brangwen's experience in the passage referred to at the beginning,
whose 'blood beat up in waves of desire' (R p.90). Tom's blood, his
feelings, his very self are much more a part of the whole linguistic
background of the novel than Gudrun who, as here, is 'suspended', at a
remove from her immediate environment, or scene. The 'metaphysic' of
The Rainbow stresses the inseparability of individual from scene,
whereas in Women in Love a gulf has opened up between them.
This example is part of the expanding context where Lawrence draws
attention to what he calls in 'Introduction to these Paintings'
'intuitional awareness' (Phoenix, p.558) as an aspect of physical
being. The complex nature of the interaction between purely sensual
physicality, physicality which is not just sensual and intuitional
awareness is what the narrative labours to express by its simultaneity
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of styles: in the swift but subtle changes from 'plain' metaphor in
some (unproblematic) passages to a more difficult, sometimes more
opaque, metaphoricity as in the examples given. In Women in Love,
uniquely, these inflectional changes are rapid and challenge the
reader to 'think more'. If in The Rainbow the reader knows by the
narrative tone that a significant episode has been reached, in Women
in Love the language acts as less of a guide: the complex
metaphoricity of the narrative is scattered over a large area, and
this makes it difficult to assess. In a critique of The Rainbow fairly
substantial passages can be isolated to make a point about its
language. But with Women in Love the metaphorical levels are more
elusively distributed: single phrases signal a subliminal level of
thought at work across the entire narrative and interacting with
further levels -- the difficulty lies in isolating such phrases from
the whole and retaining their significance.
The constantly changing levels of significance in the narrative can
be seen in the way the 'physical' frequently and surprisingly
contrasts with the 'visual'. The novel has the characters continually
participating in primarily physical activities: there are many
instances of dancing and swimming; there is physical conflict
('Gladiatorial', 'Breadalby', 'Snowed Up'); there are the sexual
encounters; the 'ecstasy of physical motion' described in 'Snow' (141..
p.421). These do not simply 'happen' but are given a special status by
the language which describes them. None of these activities is merely
physical: as experiences they demonstrate the mind/body relation so
central to Lawrence. For example, in 'Class-room' (Women in Love,
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chapter III) Birkin is watched by Ursula: 'She seemed to be standing
aside in arrested silence, watching him move in another, concentrated
world. His presence was so quiet, almost like a vacancy in the
corporate air.' (WL p.36). 'Corporate air' sounds like a contradiction
in terms, one of the oxymorons which are so fundamental in
articulating the metaphysical specificity of this novel. A pertinent
play on body resonates from 'corporate' and as a metaphor it is
exactly right. The invisible 'incorporeal' air has a physical
structure which cannot normally be 'seen' but is nevertheless present.
The physicality of air is known inasmuch as it is breathed or felt.
Birkin is not a ghost, but he is not simply flesh either. The
continual interaction of the physical and non-physical, the
visualizable and the non-visualizable (for how is 'presence' in
Lawrence's sense visualized?), is common in Lawrence. That this
interaction has a special significance in Women in Love helps to focus
the subtle relation in Lawrence between the general (the body of
language and thought identified with Lawrence) and the particular (the
force of language in this novel distinct from the rest).
If simultaneity of styles is one distinctive characteristic of
Women in Love, the 'friction' of styles is another, related, feature.
In this novel, again in contrast with The Rainbow, words operate
'frictionally', having a 'frictional' relation to each other and to
the immediate context. This is the word which Lawrence uses to
describe the style of Women in Love in the Foreword to that novel. He
writes:
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In point of style, fault is often found with the
continual, slightly modified repetition. The only answer is
that it is natural to the author: and that every natural
crisis in emotion or passion or understanding comes from
this pulsing, frictional to-and-fro, which works up to
culmination.
(Foreword to Women in Love, p.486)
In this context 'frictional' is obviously sexual but here it is
linked, crucially, to a broader sense of language which is what
Lawrence is actually talking about. The sexual metaphor, as long as it
sustains Lawrence's point about language, is highly appropriate. Word
and context in Women in Love are as two bodies moving not together but
against each other in active contact. It is an abrasive, chafing
movement. The emphasis is not, as it could be, on the phallic pen as a
means of combining literary creation and (male) sexuality. Lawrence's
emphasis is not on the functional metaphor of emission as ink and
language come from the pen of the writer, but on the movement of
relative elements (bodies). After all, ink is only drawn from the pen
because of the friction between nib and paper. This frictional
relation of word and context is at the heart of meaning in Women in
Love. The metaphor is of course a sexual one and as such it is useful
in underlining a specific problem to do with how Lawrence is read:
what happens constantly in Lawrence studies is that a subject, and
here it is sex, distracts from what in a work of fiction is actually
the deeper, or real, subject, namely language. The present thesis is
preoccupied with precisely this problem, and with a reading of
Lawrence which depends on this recognition.
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The contrasts with The Rainbow which I have alluded to in the
course of this reading of the language of Women in Love will be
developed further in the next chapter. For the time being I propose to
concentrate on the dialectical relation of the visual and the anti-
visual which I have begun to address in the preceding discussion.
Keith Alldritt's study, The Visual Imagination of D. FL Lawrence, is
still the most thorough examination of Lawrence's ability to visualize
in language. He tends to see the differences between the novels in
evolutionary terms which justifies in Lawrence the search for a new
form, and articulates this search with particular reference to the
development of Lawrence's visual, as well as verbal, consciousness. My
own approach is to address the visual more as a feature of the
subliminal dimension of Lawrence's creativity and less as a theme in
the novels. I will be raising the question whether to confine comments
to Lawrence's visual imagination is in fact to relegate some key
passages to the margins: important though his study is, especially in
his critique of Women in Love, Alldritt could have made more positive
use of the fact that certain aspects of Lawrence's language cannot be
accommodated to his theory of the visual in Lawrence.
3.2 The anti-visual imagination of D. H. Lawrence
When this study was at its earliest stage the visual question in
Lawrence, particularly as it is posed in Women in Love, presented
itself as an important route to the ultimately more interesting
question of his language. While it was always evident that the visual
141
and language had an important relation in Lawrence the exact nature of
that relation had not been fully examined.
Vision, the visual and the visible are important themes in my previous
chapter which in part addresses Lawrence's 'Heideggerean' sense of
there being different kinds of vision. In the course of that
discussion 'root-vision' was singled out for special attention as one
way Lawrence chooses to express a mode of understanding which is quite
distinct from retinal seeing, that is to say, from vision which is
'merely optical' (Phoenix, p.560). His thought can also be compared to
Kant's important distinction between phenomenon and noumenon, and in
particular to Kant's opinion that things-in-themselves cannot be known
by the human mind. Lawrence, like Kant, comprehends that there are
things which have their own character even though they are not
intuited by us as phenomena, things which are apprehended through our
understanding as distinct from sense. Lawrencean 'root-vision' is, as
I have suggested, about understanding rather than sense (narrowly
understood): it indicates an order of relationship which is distinct
from those concepts like time and space which, as Kant recognizes,
help us to impose some sort of order on nature, on the world. Indeed,
there is an implicit play on 'noumen' (Kant's term) and 'numen',
primitive energy, to be exploited in Lawrence's work. These
observations come to the fore in Women in Love which we may usefully
think of as Lawrence's principal anti-visual novel, if only because it
ado0s
/ a position which returns the critical gaze to language.
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It is evident that Lawrence is generally regarded as a highly
visual writer in the tradition of Thomas Hardy. One sign of this is
the comparative frequency with which his novels, like Hardy's, are
made into films. These include The Rocking Horse Winner, Lady
Chatterley's Lover, Sons and Lovers, The Fox, Women in Love and The
Virgin and the Gypsy. 4 Kangaroo, The Rainbow and a remake of Lady
Chatterley's Lover can be added to the list, whilst Sons and Lovers
and The Rainbow have been serialized on British television. To commit
Lawrence to such a visual medium is in part to encourage assumptions
about the fiction which are at best wide of the mark. The point that
there is nothing 'visual' present when there is only language has been
resisted by those who make films of the 'stories' who are confusing
the visual with the pictorial, and ignoring the special relation in
Lawrence between vision and 'knowing' which deserves attention.
There are highly visual scenes in Women in Love, the stoning of the
pond in 'Moony' (Women in Love, chapter XIX) for instance, but there
are also those scenes which, importantly, resist visualization
altogether. In these instances such resistance is the business of
language. To say so is to return to the position that Lawrence has
something special to say, something which springs from a deeply
personal source, and that he must use language to say it. So language
is at once a deeply conscious and deeply unconscious medium: Lawrence
corVously produces events using language, and less consciously spells
out his philosophical preoccupations in the metaphorical configuration
of the work. To produce an event is in part to visualize something:
but the creative will is also absorbed in the enduring philosophical
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themes of Lawrence's work, principally the relation of language and
understanding. In asking how we 'know', Lawrence is also asking how we
'see'. In order to think about this kind of 'vision', which is a
metaphor for a higher order of knowing than the conceptual kind, an
anti-visual mode of discourse develops (in those scenes which, as I
will show, are fundamentally non-visualizable). This profoundly
personal way of thinking in language means that Lawrence's work cannot
be seen just in terms of a literary tradition or school. The general
description of 'realism', for example, which can be applied too
uncritically to Lawrence and which would imply a distinctly visual
narrative, is an inadequate description of the novels because it
threatens to efface the intrinsic and specific qualities of his
narrative language.
I would prefer to shift the emphasis to Lawrence's active dialogue
with earlier writers. To a great extent his works can be seen as
unaffected by the anxieties reflected in Virginia Woolf's essays and
novels, for instance, about the predicament, as she sees it, of modern
literature. Whilst her gaze, and that of Joyce, Eliot and the
important Modernists, is on history and tradition Lawrence uniquely
passes these through the 'lens' of his own 'metaphysic'. Woolf's
metaphors for the modern writer's condition at the beginning of
rlok' only
'Modern Fiction' (1919) bear witness
	 to her anxieties/about
authority but also about the judgement that history will make about
modern writing;
We do not come to write better; all that we can be said to
do is to keep moving, now a little in this direction, now in
that, but with a circular tendency	 . . we look back with
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envy to those happier warriors, whose battle is won and
whose achievements wear so serene an air of accomplishment
that we can scarcely refrain from whispering that the fight
was not so fierce for them as for us. It is for the
historian of literature to decide; for him to say if we are
now beginning or ending or standing in the middle of a great
period of prose fiction, for down in the plain little is
visible. (' Modern Fiction', in The Common Reader, p.146)
The 'materialists', Galsworthy, Bennett and Wells, are to be
superseded by the 'anti-materialists' (these are Woolf's terms) like
Joyce who overtly challenges the authority of tradition in order to
make language the medium of a new vision: 'he disregards with complete
courage whatever seems to him adventitious, whether it be probability,
or coherence, or any other of these signposts which for generations
have served to support the imagination of a reader.' (The Common
Reader, p.151) It is significant that Woolf did not perceive an
intelligent resistance to the novel's weaknesses in Lawrence.
In this passage, as in her novels, Woolf is articulating the
Modernist anxiety about the assumptions of fiction, and giving change
a historical character. If Lawrence, a central but not programmatic
Modernist, is not affected by this anxiety it is because of the
uniquely individual depth of his 'metaphysic' underpinned by his
position, famously articulated in Studies in Classic American
Literature, that whatever the artist wills of the novel, the novel has
Its own 'morality' in spite of the novelist. Lawrence's anxieties are
not, therefore, about representation and the language (languages) of
representation, but about the way the novelist fails the novel.
Success or failure is achieved precisely where the struggle occurs, at
the level of language. That is why there are no programmes as such in
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Lawrence to 'visualize' differently as a result of anxieties about
traditional forms of representation.
The sense that we get from Paul Ricoeur that the special power of
language is its capacity to free us from the visibility and
limitations of situations, thereby opening up new dimensions of being
in the world, helps us to understand why language is such a crucial
issue for Lawrence. In particular I would like to suggest that the
limitations of language encompass physical visibility. In Lawrence, as
I have already hinted, 'seeing' is evidently not solely a question of
external vision: the world of Women in Love is not consistently
visualized. There is a wonderfully effective dialectic in this novel
in particular between highly visual scenes, and scenes which resist
visualization. For the most part in Women in Love the reader 'sees'
the world through the eyes of the characters. It is partly because of
this visualization through a variety of characters that visualization
Itself is so flexible. To say this is to say something more than
there are as many worlds in the novel as there are important
characters (although this is the case). The Lawrencean figures
'visualize' differently: the same scene -- Gerald swimming; Gerald
riding the Arab mare; the Tyrolean landscape -- is different in the
eyes and minds of the different characters. However, this is not to
impose a 'Cubist' aesthetic on Lawrence: the principal interest is not
the same object viewed simultaneously from different sides, but the
nature and significance of different kinds of vision.
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I propose to set my following remarks in relation to some of Keith
Alldritt's observations. His book, as I say, provides the most
extensive commentary both on the visual traditions with which Lawrence
was familiar and the visual references in the novels: 'visual art is a
subject of these novels, but it is also, more importantly, a key
influence upon their style.' (Alldritt, viii). Throughout his study
Alldritt's focus is most often on Western painterly traditions and the
visual arts. He rightly refers to Lawrence's interest in these, and in
doing so highlights Lawrence's own leanings towards paint as a medium.
However, there is a very literal approach to the visual in this book
which, in my view, results in the non-visual or anti-visual dimensions
of the novel's language being evaded. This part of my study in a sense
begins where Alldritt leaves off, because in taking the visual so
literally he by-passes some of the more philosophical aspects of
Lawrence's style.
Discussions of the visual in Lawrence are often preceded by
recourse to references in the novels to named visual traditions such
as Renaissance and Victorian painting. Reproductions of Carpaccio's
'The Dream of St. Ursula', Fra Angelico's 'Last Judgement' and Mark
Gertler's powerful 'The Merry-Go-Round' are accordingly incorporated
into the text of Alldritt's study where they become powerful icons
attached to Lawrence's narratives. Lawrence's critique of Modernist
concepts like Significant Form, associated in Britain with Bloomsbury
critics Clive Bell and Roger Fry, is also summarized, hence the visual
Is principally meaningful inasmuch as it signifies specific
traditions. It is interchangeable, in this context, with the painterly
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or representational. In his appraisal of the early novels, chiefly The
White Peacock, Alldritt considers characters' assessments of other
characters according to their physical resemblance to pictorial types,
to Burne-Jones's female figures, for example, which is an appropriate
response to the novel and underlines Lawrence's early tendency to
express sentiment through art. In the mature novels, in contrast, a
style becomes significant because of the epistemological mode it
communicates. The African fetishes and Chinese drawing in Women in
Love function in this way. In the early novels reference is commonly
made to an actual person -- in The White Peacock to Burne-Jones,
Rossetti, and Griffenhagen, in The Rainbow, the first 'mature novel',
to Fra Angelico and so on -- whereas in Women in Love different
ontologies (African fetish, Chinese goose drawing) are more
significant. References to named artists, like the reference to the
Picasso reproductions introduced by Gudrun, do not have nearly the
same force in Women in Love that they have in the earlier novels.
The visual question will to some extent slide into the question of
metaphor wherever references to styles and works of art are seen as
having a metaphorical function in the novels. Alldritt regards
Lawrence as essentially a Realist writer writing in the tradition of
Hardy, but one whose innate sense of the visual and whose familiarity
with the history of art provided him with a series of powerful
metaphors in his description of the emotional life of men and women.
The development of the visual into the pictorial is seen as being in
line with this tradition, and Alldritt, especially with reference to
The Rainbow, highlights passages which form 'tableaux' or 'icons' and
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which themselves provide a powerful image of an essential relationship
before, or in the absence of, dialogue. I have already referred to his
assessment of Tom Brangwen's vision of Lydia and Anna through the
vicarage window on the evening of the proposal where the mother-and-
child image stands for the stillness which will counter Brangwen's
'sometimes terrifying freedom' (Alldritt, p.134). It also points up
the moral authority of woman for the early Brangwen men, and captures
both the mystery, distance and paradoxically the nearness of Lydia for
Tom: 'Thus in utilising the madonna theme Lawrence is employing a
motif which, besides alluding to a familiar item in the general
western tradition of feeling, also has a special significance in
Brangwen experience.' (Alldritt, p.134).
Hence, for the most part the emphasis is on both the scene or the
physical backdrop for events, and the seen, what the character sees
(and by the same token what the reader visualizes). Hitherto the
principal frame of reference has been the pictorial. In what follows I
propose to show some of the difficulties which arise when the non-
pictorial in Lawrence is evaded. In the course of his discussion of
The Rainbow Aildritt does briefly transfer his attention to the anti-
visual without recognizing it as 'anti-visual' as such. In this
context he refers to Lawrence's 'physical metaphors', hinting at the
profound connection between the psyche and the body but without
drawing out the full implications of this. His comments are restricted
to a single paragraph from which the following observations are
isolated:
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Another feature of the writing which is difficult to
illustrate with quotations (and which, incidentally, critics
have sometimes found unacceptable) is the description of
feeling in terms of physical metaphors. For example, in his
description of the Brangwens moving into their new house in
Beldover Lawrence writes: "There the hard rush floor-
covering made the ground light, reflecting light upon the
bottom of their hearts;..." And on one occasion during the
searing conflict between Will and Anna we are told that "All
the blood in his body went black and powerful and corrosive
as he heard her." And on another, "His heart was scalded,
his brain hurt in his head, he went away, out of the house."
In isolation these sentences may seem, word for word, to be
strained and excessive. But in the actual text this physical
representation of an emotion is what lends authenticity and
intelligibility to the dense complexes of feeling which it
is one of the prime purposes of Lawrence's art to elucidate.
Indeed, this mode of suggesting non-cerebral states of
consciousness may even be regarded as one of the innovating
achievements of this novel in representing the reality of
human experience. (Alldritt, p.125)
A certain uneasiness with this theme is betrayed by the rather evasive
comments in parentheses. Which critics have difficulty with Lawrence's
physical metaphors? For what reasons are these expressions of a
certain kind of experience problematic? However, the positive sense
towards the end of the passage about this mode being the only one
available to Lawrence to express certain kinds of emotion seems
exactly right. If it is not developed, it is perhaps because the
critic has attuned himself too strongly to the pictorial in Lawrence
to be able to accommodate effectively the anti-visual. He concedes
that in isolating examples from the rest of the language one has the
sense of having lost something crucial. This is underscored by the
reference to a feature which is 'difficult to illustrate with
quotations'. Although the text in question is The Rainbow I would
suggest that this difficulty applies more especially to Women in Love
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and thereby underlines something very distinctive about the language
of that novel.
Regarding Women in Love Alldritt remarks that 'as in none of the
earlier novels, there is a striking sense of the imperfect coincidence
of the visual and the optical'. The 'traditional linearity' of The
Rainbow is contrasted with the fragmented scenes of Women in Love
which represent the 'uncertainty' which underpins the book (Alldritt,
p.204). The description in 'Gladiatorial' (Women in Love, chapter XX)
where Birkin is described as 'more a presence than a visible object',
and where Gerald is 'aware of him completely, but not really visually'
(WL p.269) is for Alldritt an example of the breakdown between the
visual and the optical which, although he does not use the word, the
'metaphysic' of Women in Love necessitates, but the consequences of
this are not pursued, at least not with regard to the language of the
whole. In my view, this is a passage in the novel where the reader is
forced to consider what 'presence' is if it is not visual, and why
Birkin has more 'presence' than Gerald who is described as 'concrete
and noticeable, a piece of pure final substance'. Both are literally
present, of course. But Birkin's 'presence' is felt by Gerald as the
two combine in the 'slippery' act of jiu-jitsu. It is revealed to
Gerald, 'aware of him [Birkin] completely', by the physical contact
between them (which is not purely sensual) where ordinary ocular
perception has failed to reveal it. The interaction between Gerald and
Birkin here is analogous to the phosphorescent wave breaking over the
ship: only the physical interaction makes 'knowing' possible. The
language is anti-visual in this scene, I would argue, because were
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Gerald simply to visualize Birkin his friend's 'presence' would elude
him. It is this 'vision' which Lawrence can write about only in a
consciously anti-visual mode because it is a mode which re-routes
critical attention back to language, and back to the metaphorical
nature of understanding.
The interaction between the visual and non-visual language changes
the significance of the 'visual', or apparently 'visual', parts of the
novel. Whilst they are 'visual' in a very straightforward sense, the
dialectic with the non-visual, or the anti-visual, challenges the
notion of there being a scale or spectrum at one end of which is the
visual, which the novels either tend towards or pull away from. The
dialectic, the extent of interaction, is the means by which Lawrence
explores certain modes of knowledge and feeling, certain recognitions,
which his language is after. The critical challenge is not to be
distracted by the crudely 'visual' as such from the real subject,
which is presence.
Gerald Crich, who is 'carbon' in this description and not the
'stable ego' of orthodox narratives, is experiencing 'root-vision',
which underlines the question of there being different kinds of
vision. I have argued here that considerations of the visual in
Lawrence ultimately relate to philosophical, or 'metaphysical', and
linguistic questions. This indicates how radically Lawrence turns
things on their head in dissolving the boundaries between the physical
and non-physical, visual and non-visual. These domains must interact
in the narrative language if they are to be meaningful. The 'merely
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optical', for instance, is barely of interest, and the passage
describing Birkin and Gerald wrestling represents as literally as
anything can the importance of the positive contrast in Lawrence of
the visual and anti-visual. Questions of the 'visual' and the
'physical' underlined here are also explored, more centrally, in the
novella The Fox, written in 1918 and expanded in 1921. There the
'visual' and the 'physical' are brought into a specific relation:
Lawrence manages to write about both without reducing his theme to the
merely ocular or to mere sensual physicality. It will, therefore, be
helpful to pursue the question more generally as it is formulated in
The Fox before continuing the discussion of Women in Love.
3.3 The Fox
Written shortly after Women in Love, The Fox deals explicitly with
'internal vision', or more specifically the relation in Lawrence
between vision and 'knowing', focusing on the fact that it is not
appropriate in Lawrence to think of the visual as simply something
external but as a deeper form of 'knowing'. The many references in the
story to the eyes of Ellen March, 'big and wide and dark' (F p.8),
underline her significance as one who experiences the world visually,
but vision will come to signify more than optical perception in her
encounter with the fox, both 'real' and in the form of Henry Grenfel.
In March the division between optical vision and internal knowing is
explicit but until she 'sees' the fox close at hand her 'inner mind'
is unstimulated, neither seeing nor knowing. This partial wakefulness
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is her usual condition:
One evening March was standing with her back to the
sunset, her gun under her arm, her hair pushed under her
cap. She was half watching, half musing. It was her constant
state. Her eyes were keen and observant, but her inner mind
took no notice of what she saw. She was always lapsing into
this odd, rapt state, her mouth rather screwed up. It was a
question, whether she was there, actually consciously
present, or not.
(The Fox, p.10)
Her capacity for efficient optical vision is emphasized but equally
her internal stasis becomes a matter of not being 'consciously
present', as if the connection between the external world and her
inner mind is not yet made. In the confrontation with the fox it is
the fox who makes eye contact and in the event something about March
is given away to him. As in the following example the verb 'to know'
takes the place of 'to see':
She lowered her eyes, and suddenly saw the fox. He was
looking up at her. His chin was pressed down, and his eyes
were looking up. They met her eyes. And he knew her. She was
spell-bound. She knew he knew her. So he looked into her
eyes, and her soul failed her. He knew her, he was not
daunted.
(The Fox, p.10)
In this passage the fox is both animal and not-animal. This suggestion
that the animal is never purely so, but also something which is less
readily knowable than the bestial object, also characterizes
Lawrence's poetry, so much of which is about animals. Lawrence is also
raising the question about animals being able to 'see' in the way the
human being 'sees', that is, 'knows' something. The fox 'knew' March
and this knowledge both moves her and robs her of autonomy. It can
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know her in this way because it is not simply a fox: its otherness is
eventually the otherness (and humanness) of Henry Grenfel.
'Spell-bound' occurs repeatedly in the following paragraphs,
differentiated from March's mechanical vision and 'automatic
intelligence' (F p.11). The fox continues to elude her in their
hunter/hunted relationship, but her 'inner mind' is entirely full of
him and the obviously sexual power which he exerts. In this passage
the connection between vision and 'knowing', Lawrence's 'root-vision',
is developed along with the animality of the fox, embodied in a word
like 'muzzle':
She took her gun again and went to look for the fox. For
he had lifted his eyes upon her, and his knowing look seemed
to have entered her brain. She did not so much think of him:
she was possessed by him. She saw his dark, shrewd,
unabashed eye looking into her, knowing her. She felt him
invisibly master her spirit. She knew the way he lowered his
chin as he looked up, she knew his muzzle, the golden brown,
and the greyish white. And again, she saw him glance over
his shoulder at her, half inviting, half contemptuous and
cunning. So she went, with her great startled eyes glowing,
her gun under her arm, along the wood edge.
(The Fox, p.11)
Here the eye becomes the mind. Seeing becomes knowing, or
consciousness, but distinct from the kind of consciousness which
simply reveals the world of phenomena as present-at-hand. The eye has
developed beyond its purely optical use. The language in these
passages is clearly about vision and it is also sexual, about male
sexual power, underscoring the relationship between Henry Grenfel and
March. In the passages quoted the language deliberately gives the
visual and the physical a specific relation. Sight continues to be a
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metaphor for 'knowing' but also for masculine desire as the intense
sexuality of each barely sexual encounter between March and the fox
(Grenfel) is expressed in the language of eyes and vision. The fox
'holds' March with his eyes and penetrates her with his vision.
Lawrence's achievement here, and this is really the point, is to
recover physicality without resorting to the mere everyday
physicality. This is also true of 'Excurse' (Women in Love, chapter
XXIII) where the description of the sexual union of Ursula and Birkin
is expressed in a language which is not simply in the service of the
ordinarily physical or carnal experience. In both The Fox and Women in
Love 'love' focuses this question (which is in the first place a
question of language) because it has a 'physical' object. Indeed, in
Women in Love Lawrence provides a penetrating critique of 'love' and
eventually brings it radically back to the linguistic.
3.4 'Love'
It is useful for Lawrence that 'love' is a familiar word and an
apparently simple and traditional one. In his book Rational Love
Warren Shibles' view is that 'The word "love" is very familiar. This
is unfortunate. It suggests that we know more about love than we
really do.' G Lawrence would not agree that the familiarity of the word
is so unfortunate, indeed on one level its simplicity makes it a
highly suitable word for him to address. The etymology of 'love' does
not reveal a very different sense from its current meaning (the
meaning we think we have grasped, and which is culturally determined).
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In some contexts the traditional meaning would not pose a problem for
Lawrence at all but in Women in Love it is addressed as a problematic
term precisely because it is simultaneously an ancient and 'natural'
word and one with a distinctively modern and sublimative inflection.
For this reason, for his alertness to this co-existence of the ancient
and modern in the word, Lawrence's novel should be included in any
thorough bibliography of works on 'love'. It offers a.	 rigorous
and philosophical critique of the Western conception of 'love' in the
English novel. The following discussion will build on this claim and
IndeJed,
develop the point further./' love' is a word Lawrence must 'get behind'
In the course of his literary career and his consciousness of the
word's literary-historical past is the first step on the way.
Rupert Birkin is the character in the novel whose radicalism lies
in his interrogation of a tradition of European loving which has its
roots in a literary form, and it is Lawrence's consciousness of this
literary representation of love which I propose to begin with. In his
early novels he consciously and actively resists the Wagnerian ethic
derived from the courtly love tradition and commonly thought of as
'natural' in the West insofar as it defines orthodox relations with
the other sex. This is the substance of Lawrence's critique of
'romance' which he worked out in its essentials in his early career.
In the early novels he demolishes, or sets out to demolish, the
historical tradition with varying degrees of success. In a work like
The Trespasser, for instance, he is himself both inside and outside
the Wagnerian tradition. It is not until The Rainbow that he has
pulled away from that ethic altogether, as he finds a language which
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can better articulate his own 'metaphysic'. The treatment of love in
Women in Love in particular has an important relation to its treatment
in much of Lawrence's discursive writing on sexuality from the
Renaissance to the modern day, and with his critique of the
sentimental novel and ethics. This sense of an implicit historical
synopsis working in the term 'love' is central to what follows.
Lawrence's position, uniquely, is his dissolution of the received
conceptions and expectations which conventionally delimit heterosexual
love and which he describes in 'Morality and the Novel' as the
principal human relationship (STHOE p.175). He is not, of course, the
first writer to offer a critique of the Western conception of love.
Without wishing to rehearse ideas which are by now widely familiar I
want to draw attention to the two most celebrated books on this theme
in order to signal the broad scholarly context against which
Lawrence's critique may be measured, and more crucially to throw
Lawrence's thought into relief. These are Denis de Rougement's Passion
and Society 6 and C. S. Lewis's The Allegory of Love 7 which between
them summarize the tradition.
Lawrence's 'metaphysic', as it emerged, accorded a central place to
love in the light of his critique of the legacy of the courtly love
ethic as Lewis describes it, with 'love' taken over by courtly love,
and the continental 'romantic love' myth described by de Rougement,
given that these are at the heart of what is generally considered
'natural' (a highly problematic conception) in heterosexual relations,
and given that to Lawrence's mind the cast of contemporary human
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relations is fundamentally false. One of Lawrence's major concerns,
therefore, is his interrogation of what Lewis calls 'the erotic
which has
tradition of modern Europe' /become familiar enough to be central to
'our ethics, our imagination, or our daily life.' (Lewis, pp.3-4).
Rupert Birkin's insistence on suspending the old meanings of the word
'love', and his conception of 'star-equilibrium' (WL p.319) which
occupies a central place in Lawrence's 'metaphysic', can and should be
seen against this background. Lawrence's love ethic has its origins in
his critique of the love-religion or system of ethics represented in
the conventions of courtly love and viewed as the origin of
contemporary love-values. Any discussion which Lawrence institutes on
love, including that in Women in Love, contains this critique
implicitly and dramatically.
Whilst an inquiry into the origins of this tradition is not the
subject of Women in Love an inquiry into its effects as an ethic is
central to this novel and to the novel as a genre. The novel
supersedes poetry as the important vehicle for these cultural
structures, with significant differences evolving between European and
English fiction. Lewis cites Chrdtien de Troyes as one of the
originators of 'the novel of sentiment' (Lewis, p.29) implying that in
psychological terms the novel's debt to the northern European romance
tradition is considerable. There are grounds for arguing that in main-
land Europe the anti-matrimonial cast of chivalry that Lewis describes
is maintained at a very deep, one could say unconscious, level in the
novel. This is in contrast to the English novel where erotic
unorthodoxy has become marriage. Marriages (chiefly among the ruling
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class), argues Lewis, were business contracts where love was not a
consideration. Gudrun Brangwen echoes this sentiment: '"Marriage is a
social arrangement, I take it, and has nothing to do with the question
of love." (WL p.289), and in Aaron's Rod marriage is rejected
altogether as Lawrence explores the metaphysics of separateness in
contrast to the metaphysics of 'stable equilibrium' (WL p.150),
achievable between two individuals, which is analyzed in Women in
Love. Lewis adds, 'Any idealization of sexual love, in a society where
marriage is purely utilitarian, must begin by being an idealization of
adultery', (Lewis, p.13) and this extends oxymoronically into marriage
itself as in medieval theory sexual feelings for a spouse (ie. for a
wife, this being a purely masculinist theory) were judged to be
sinful. Lewis cites the early church fathers Hugo of St. Victor,
Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas on this theme, and quotes from
Peter Lombard 'omnis ardentior amator propriae uxoris adulter est,
passionate love of a man's own wife is adultery.' (Lewis, p.15).
Feudal marriage as it is here described and the views authorized by
the medieval church, it is argued, contributed much to the development
of the erotic 'religion' of courtly love in literature.
In the tradition the lover, who is distinguished by nobility of
behaviour rather than by personal wealth is also distinguished by his
piety and 'worships' the lady as he worships at the altar of Amor. The
object of such devotion is conventionally a married woman. As Lewis
reminds us, husbands commonly play a minor role and are frequently
absent: the lover's rival is not the husband but another lover. Denis
de Rougement places a different emphasis on the husband stressing the
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necessity of this figure as an obstruction. Discussing the story of
Tristan he argues that 'But for the existence of a husband, the lovers
would have had to get married; and it is unbelievable that Tristan
should ever be in a position to marry Iseult.' (de Rougement, pp.44-
5). In the tradition husband-figures expect obedience from a wife and
so conventionally in the husband-wife relationship the roles are
reversed, because in courtship the man is servile. Iseult notably
offers a challenge to that perception. Both Lewis and de Rougement
make the point that the rules of love are opposed to marriage and that
courtly love ultimately results in an adulterous myth of feeling.
Lawrence is determined to pull away from an ethic with an
artificial basis. The contemporary conception of love has developed
from this literary model even if it has developed different emphases
in the European and English novel respectively. His criticism of the
treatment of love in the novel derives from his sense that this ethic
or system of values and relations barely conceals what he calls a
pornographic tendency in literature. Like Lewis and de Rougement
Lawrence's initial interest is on love as a cultural construct and one
that is constructed in language. The problem for Lawrence is the
problem identified by Lewis in his critique of courtly love that the
expression, the rhetoric of courtly love, over an undefined period of
time comes to be seen as genuinely representing the emotion when in
fact it is rather creating that emotion. The feeling imitates the
invention, which is Lewis's point, and which in large measure accounts
for the contemporary conception of love. Lewis's position is partly
that, in recognizing this, we can reach a better understanding of the
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present. For Lawrence, however, the gulf which persists between the
genuine feeling, which is not easily defined, and its literary-
historical representation begs to be closed. If the rhetoric of
courtly love maintains that gulf, Lawrence's purpose is to bring a
different conception of love back to language.
A split has opened up between the 'natural' emotion 'love' which
has to do with the arousal of specific and immediate feelings in
people, and the artificial language of love in literature,
particularly that derived from medieval tradition. The cultural
construct becomes naturalized, is taken to be the thing itself, and
'love' as 'natural', existing prior to language, is to all intents and
purposes effaced. It is lost to, and because of, a highly artificial
language which persists in making the same assertions. Lawrence's
critique of 'romance' is grounded in his sensitivity to this artifice.
Much of the point is that courtly love is expressed in a rhetoric of
oxymoron, that is to say in a language of contradiction and
opposition: the courtly lover suffers in love and experiences love
most often as pain and denial. It is a love characterized by servility
and prostration. So the love-ethic which is seen as 'natural' in the
West is an oxymoronic conception and in Lawrence's view negatively so.
In his own love-ethic, as I shall argue, the oxymoronic is given a
more positive significance. Traditionally, the rhetoric of oxymoron,
which is so overt in the poetry, creates and sustains the rupture
between language and love, the thing itself.
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Love is therefore culturally constructed as a problem and one
founded on a multiplicity of oppositions and contradictions. In the
tradition outlined the loved object is fundamentally and forever
unattainable and paradoxically much of her mystique depends on this.
The attraction felt between the lover and his object in the courtly
love tradition can never result in a union like the official
contracting of husband and wife. The two people in the potentially
adulterous relationship are restrained from coming together physically
in any legitimate sense. In the first place the distribution of
attraction is unequal inasmuch as the love originates typically in a
man (the lover is male), whose object is conventionally one of the few
women in the feudal court who as Lewis describes is responsible for
'whatever "courtesy" is in the place' (Lewis, p.12). Marriage is not a
possibility because of the disjunction of marriage and love in
medieval theory. In which case courtly love can be construed as an
essentially self-defeating male fantasy which sets in place the
distinction between wives and mistresses in the European
consciousness. Birkin and Ursula frivolously refer to this distinction
in 'Flitting' OIL p.371) although their sense of Gudrun as a 'natural'
mistress, anyway an unsound conception, is not the same as the
virtuous object of desire in courtly love. Courtly love is easily
recognizable as a masculine construct predicated on male desire.
Oxymoronically expressed from the male point of view it unfairly
attributes to women a 'cruel kindness'.
Lawrence's (Birkin's) ethic is a response and an alternative to
this fundamentally unequal conception of love and desire in the
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tradition, now 'naturalized'. I propose to show how his alertness to
the rhetoric of oxymoron and its implications motivates in his own
thought a rather different oxymoronic consciousness. As in all things
in Lawrence, the problem of 'love' must be brought back to language.
Birkin is the central mouthpiece for this. The relation of woman and
man which described metaphorically as 'star-equilibrium' is obviously
the pivotal conception in Lawrence's critique of 'romance' properly
developed in Women in Love In 'star-equilibrium' Lawrence has
returned to the hyphenated construction with which we are already
familiar (in 'root-vision', 'blood-consciousness', 'sap-consciousness'
and so on), but in this context the construction has a unique and
striking force. The reader responds to it as a description of
relations between lovers and as a particular instance of 'Lawrencean'
language, but in this example the metaphor and the idea it embodies
radically co-incide. In 'star-equilibrium' two normally unrelated
verbal elements are brought into a specific relationship which is
concretized by the graphic presence of the hyphen. However, in
bringing these elements into mutual proximity the hyphen also
simultaneously holds them apart, an event in which the structure of
oxymoron is unconsciously imitated. There is consequently a profound
homology between the structure of oxymoron and the structure of 'star-
'
equpbrium'. This makes 'star-equilibrium' a linguistic structure
which resembles the central 'metaphysical' idea which it describes as
Birkin tries to represent it to Ursula. As I will now argue this
hyphenated construction represents the centrality of oxymoron in
Lawrence's view of 'love' without itself being, strictly, an oxymoron.
It does so by bringing two (verbal) elements into the relation
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described and simultaneously holding them apart so that each retains a
separateness in relation to the other. This is crucially a linguistic
equivalent to Birkin's ideal of male/female relationships.
The astral metaphor predominates wherever Birkin makes a serious
attempt to cast this ethic or 'metaphysic' into words. These are the
strongest terms in which love's traditional rhetoric of oxymoron is
implicitly challenged. Birkin: '"What I want is a strange conjunction
with you -- " he said quietly: " -- not meeting and mingling; -- you
are quite right:-- but an equilibrium, a pure balance of two single
beings:-- as the stars balance each other." (WL p.148). What is being
rejected is the oxymoronic language of a love-lorn lover experiencing
the desirable pain of love, as well as the loss of independence of
either party in the course of the relationship. The kind of love which
has the effect of consuming both bodies, making them inseparable,
relieving them of their singularity, has no place in Birkin's
conception. The same terms he uses here describe the, as Ursula sees
it, bullying relationship between the tom-cat Mino and the she-cat.
Birkin argues that '"with the Mino, it is the desire to bring this
female cat into a pure stable equilibrium, a transcendent and abiding
rapport with the single male. -- Whereas without him, as you see, she
is a mere stray, a fluffy sporadic bit of chaos." (WL p.150).
Ursula's appropriation of the negative term 'satellite' (WL p.150)
points up the possibility of a misogynist sub-text in his description,
which arguably identifies a genuine flaw in the conception. Birkin is
anthropomorphising as he regards the unquestionably male superiority
over the 'fluffy' she-cat. However, Ursula's response also underlines
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the usual reception of Lawrence's more radical ideas, typically
misunderstood. It could, after all, be argued that Lawrence's critique
of 'romantic' love does not result in a misogynist ethic, as Ursula
suspects, inasmuch as he is challenging the particularly masculinist
conception of courtly love, and given that in the thesis of 'star-
equilibrium' the mutual separateness of each individual 'in love'
rather than the gendered superiority of one over the other is
foregrounded.
Birkin continues to re-state the ethic using the same metaphor as
before: '"No," he said, "it is a law of creation. One is committed.
One must commit oneself to a conjunction with the other -- forever.
But it is not self-less -- it is a maintaining of the self in mystic
balance and integrity -- like a star balanced with another star." (WL
p.152). This commitment is not necessarily that of marriage or
'pseudo-marriage' and, as the closing argument of the novel makes
clear, Birkin perceives that many such conjunctions can be achieved
and can thrive simultaneously in the course of a single life. Ursula
is ironically perceived as subscribing uncritically to the masculinist
conception of 'natural' love: the word 'love' is never as problematic
to her as it is to Birkin. He articulates the kind of love he
associates with her desires and which Lawrence regards as the
contemporary view. Birkin: '"I tell you, you want love to administer
to your egotism, to subserve you. Love is a process of subservience
with you -- and with everybody. I hate it." (WL p.153). Grounded in
his philosophy is Lawrence's recognition of the reductive hegemony of
the ego in Western society. Just as he is anti-oedipal Lawrence/Birkin
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is also anti-ego. In 'Man to Man' (Women in Love, chapter XVI) Birkin
is to articulate the egoism of love as '"a lust for possession, a
greed of self-importance in love. She [Ursula] wanted to have, to own,
to control, to be dominant.'" (WL p.200). This consciousness is
written into the other remarks in the novel about love as 'a dance of
opposites' (WL p.153) which is how Birkin describes Ursula's
conception, also calling her relation with Will 'a love of opposition'
(WL p.367). Within this scheme opposition and equilibrium are clearly
very different conceptions.
The theme of polarisation and relation, central too in the
description of family relations in Fantasia of the Unconscious, is
then more explicitly introduced. The notion of separateness is
qualified by a new emphasis on difference and interaction. Although
Birkin is always in danger of sounding tedious and monologic the
'metaphysic' which he articulates has a fundamentally dialogic basis.
Using terms which rehearse and recall the language and conceptions of
the discursive essays, particularly Fantasia of the Unconscious,
Lawrence argues that men and women are not simply different in order
to couple 'naturally' but are 'fulfilled in difference' (WL p.201).
Woman is not-man and man is not-woman and in this they are 'perfectly
polarised' (WL p.201). Interaction between the poles rather than
dependence on the part of either in relation to the other avoids the
'self-abnegation of love' (WL p.201). As de Rougement suggests,
romantic love, which Birkin is criticising, is projected from a lover
onto an object so that the object's own truth is masked. At its best
Birkin's ethic challenges the erasure of the woman's identity in
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'love', even if concern about his own male identity motivates his
critique. This enduring theme of self-abnegation is derived from
Lawrence's awareness of the literary-historical origins of the modern
conception of love. Birkin's complaint concerns the cultural re-
invention of love and the consequent loss, as he sees it, of 'separate
being' (WL p.201), that is of intrinsic difference, for both men and
women in love.
By making 'love' the subject of metaphysical speculation Lawrence
is consciously destabilizing the word. Earlier I argued that the
'visual' was inescapably linguistic in Lawrence and one effect of this
is the destabilization of 'world' in the narrative. There is no
'world' in the novel, argues Lawrence, there is only language as a
profoundly philosophical medium. It is a medium where the conscious
creative will produces events, world, but there is also a level below
the narrative idiom where 'language thinks'. In 'star-equilibrium' the
conventional conception of 'love' is radically destabilized.
Lawrence/Birkin has effectively deconstructed 'love' by uncovering new
words which reveal the standard conception as purely artificial and
even politically motivated. I want now to underline the suggested
relationship between love and language which Lawrence recognizes. To
do so is to point up the newly realized relation of metaphor and
'metaphysic'.
Whilst 'love' is not a metaphor in conventional terms, love and
metaphor share certain characteristics. Like metaphor, love always has
an object. It requires two terms or entities, better to say two
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'bodies', in order to work at all. Narcissism might be construed as an
exception because of desire directed towards the self, but in the myth
the self is confronted literally as the other because of the subject's
reflection in the pool, and in any case Echo is available in the myth
as a second term. Prior to Lawrence the physical aspect of love is
effaced in language. It is never linguistic, but merely written about
or spoken of. Lawrence's uniqueness is to make the physical dimension
of love a linguistic matter: this is implicit in Birkin's language
although Birkin never realizes it consciously. This explains the
centrality of oxymoron in Lawrence, a metaphor predicated on two
bodies in close proximity. The suggestion is that in Lawrence the
relation between two elements, whether they are individuals like
Ursula and Birkin or words like 'star' and 'equilibrium', 'stable' and
'equilibrium', is oxymoronic. Birkin's language covertly attests to
this. Importantly, the subliminality of this effect in Lawrence's
prose contrasts with the deliberately oxymoronic rhetoric of
traditional love poetry.
The rhetoric of oxymoron in courtly love, for instance, keeps the
language at a considerable distance from 'love', the thing itself.
Lawrence, by destabilizing such apparently unshakeable conceptions
like 'love', is removing the sense of rhetorical oxymoron in the
literary tradition and pushing the oxymoronic quality back into the
nature of the thing itself. The relation of two lovers, Lawrence
argues, must ultimately be oxymoronic in order to escape the
disintegrative consequences of a state which is conventionally only
expressed or conceptualized as oxymoron. Lawrence's conception is
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therefore of separate entities in a dialogic relation. In heterosexual
relations, jealousies and (marital) discord stem from a resistance to
this dialogism and betray an unconscious cleaving to the traditional
conception.
The oxymoronic narrative of Women in Love, in the very grain of its
language, represents the sense that we can never get 'outside' love
be.cAuse	 it is a cultural construction. A problem which Birkin
never confronts, nor Lawrence, is that 'star-equilibrium' is also a
construction, as much as the courtly love-religion. The problem is one
of casting something which is non-linguistic (i.e. love, like vision)
Into language. As Birkin identifies in his references to an age where
love was conceived differently -- he might as well say in different
cultures rather than inventing a mythical past -- love was
nevertheless present. This would be a difficult assertion to
contradict. All that can be said is that in cultures different to this
one our conception of 'love' does not exist but people still love. As
It is, our conception of love surrounds and envelops us too closely
and completely, perhaps 'naturally', for us ever to be genuinely
outside or beyond it, just as we are never outside or beyond language.
This is of course recognized by Lewis and de Rougement but they point
us to a tradition and a language, a discourse, which sustains the
rupture between the feeling and the language which Lawrence dislikes
so much and to a considerable degree writes against. We still 'feel',
but the language forces us to construe feeling in a determined way,
one that Lawrence argues is erroneous. The rupture between love as a
feeling and 'love' as a construction is something which Lawrence draws
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attention to, so that, like Birkin, he can attempt a critique of the
conception.
Ursula's insistence at the end of the novel on Birkin's not being
able to achieve the relationships he desires because of 'perversity'
(WL p.481), in other words, unnaturalness, reinforces our sense of the
very real difficulties of challenging any conception which has entered
the collective consciousness as 'natural'. To be conventionally 'in
love' is to reappropriate for oneself an artificial mode of being. To
be in 'star-equilibrium' or 'stable equilibrium' with an Other is
equally an artificial construct but it does, at least, destabilize the
legitimate and official conception which is why Birkin's positive
subversiveness is underlined as the novel closes.
It could be argued that Lawrence has simply returned 'love' to
oxymoron rather than destabilizing the familiar conception. Is he in
fact only re-stating the traditional view that 'love' is oxymoronic
and, therefore, only bringing us back to the standard cliché about
'love'? The answer to this rests in Lawrence's own subliminally
oxymoronic language. In contrast to the tradition where the rhetoric
of oxymoron is overt and easily available to the reader, the
oxymoronic nature of Lawrence's conception is covert, latent within
his narrative. The homology between the conception (and structure) of
'star-equilibrium' and oxymoron, for instance, which I have argued is
central, is far from explicit in Women In Love but this does not rob
it of its significance. On the contrary, Lawrence's point is partly
that the explicit has a distancing function which his own language
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resists, although in phrasing it in this way I am not arguing that the
effect of his language is altogether conscious. To sum up, the
oxymoronic is veiled and subliminal within the narrative and at the
same time is the central structuring element of the whole. Once again
metaphor and 'metaphysic' are demonstrably not separable.
There is another level where love and metaphor have a distinctive
relation. This is where 'love' becomes difficult to define except by
metonymy, synecdoche or synonym. The popular if commercialized formula
'love is ...' followed by a word intended to represent the familiar
experience has a certain symptomatic value representing the general
need to say what 'love' is (it becomes a fixed notion) in terms of
collective recognition. This formula is, of course, only words, and
never extends to say what love is not when the romantic myth,
popularly sustained by the commercialized form, fades. Where a
definition is sought 'love' is commonly defined in relation to
something else. In Rational Love Warren Shibles, offering a general
'truth', says 'any definition given of love is only a metaphor which
is expanded and so should not be taken literally.' (Shibles, p.20).
The 'only' in his statement is too negative and he consequently throws
out too much. Part of the interest of 'love', as the preceding
discussion shows, is that we can only approach an understanding of it
because of metaphor. As I have said, 'love' is no more of a metaphor
than any other word but metaphor is profoundly implicated in its
meaning for us.
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In his interrogation of 'love' Birkin is asking the question asked
by Nietzsche; the question continually and implicitly addressed by
Lawrence: 'Is language the adequate expression of all realities?' (PT
p.81). For Birkin 'love' has become a 'herd' word and his response is
to see it in moral terms. To use the word 'love' with its old meanings
intact reminds him that to use language at all is 'to lie according to
a fixed convention' (PT p.84). The use of the word 'intact' here
underlines the relentless appropriateness of metaphor. Like Lawrence's
use of 'frictional' in the Foreword to Women in Love, 'intact'
resonates with sexual and physical meaning. In the present instance it
Is a metaphor which emerged unconsciously given the immediate context,
but it underlines some of the seminal points of the larger argument.
Does the value of 'love' therefore change? This critique should
force us to look again at those places in the novel where the word
'love' previously seemed innocuous enough. The title becomes more
problematic than it at first seemed. Ragussis rightly draws attention
to its ambiguity: 'It is only in the course of reading the novel that
he [the reader] begins to realize he did not understand the title at
all.' (Ragussis, p.191). Reading the novel it is soon apparent that
the principal emphasis is not unequivocally on the intransitive
construction 'in love' in the sense in which it has been a traditional
preoccupation of poets and novelists. The title seems in the first
place as descriptive as Sons and Lovers or Lady Chatterley's Lover,
for instance, titles which refer to personal relations. e
 Although on
the face of it the title does refer to the relationships of Ursula and
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Gudrun Brangwen, the talk which characterizes these relationships
brings the word 'love' sharply into focus as problematic.
The phrase 'women in love' begins to resonate like the phrases
'women in work' or 'women in politics', signifying the female
'trespass' into predominantly masculine domains. Courtly love
represents the male point of view: love/desire traditionally
originates in the perceiving male while the woman is the object and
that she enjoys being the object is part of the male myth. Casting
'women in love' in the light of these other phrases has the effect of
pushing 'love' further from the 'romantic' ideal. 'Love' in this novel
is combative in the first place. Ursula and Gudrun conduct their
relationships with Birkin and Gerald fairly egoistically. In both The
Rainbow and Women in Love Ursula is represented as independent and,
therefore, modern: she is a woman who desires to be 'in work'. In love
she is prepared to participate only in a relationship that leaves her
with her own sense of self, which Birkin interprets as egoism, but at
the same time subscribes to a received conception of 'love' believing
it to be 'natural'. She challenges any idea of love as a construct and
therefore questions the notion of an alternative to the emotion she
'feels'. Ursula: '"You can't have two kinds of love. Why should you!"
(WL p.481). She can only make sense of the 	 emotion in terms of
the myth. Given the way she fights her corner, however, it is evident
that in her public and personal lives her horizons are political, more
truly so than are Gudrun's who, as an artist, situates herself outside
the common boundaries. Ursula is, in this sense, an extension of The
Rainbow's Winifred Inger although this earlier model of the
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independent, self-sufficient woman pays for her politics by being cast
first as a lesbian and subsequently as a fitting mate for Ursula's
Uncle Tom. Winifred Inger is as significant as Skrebensky in Ursula's
development but her response to the break with Ursula is barely
considered. She is kept marginal by Lawrence which makes him
vulnerable to accusations of homophobia. However, Winifred's sexual
orientation is deeply related to the questions of 'otherness' and
'polarity' which have been raised here. In general, Lawrence's
treatment of homosexuality should be seen in these broader,
philosophical terms. The point of interest with Lawrence is the
quality (arguably the anti-egoistical quality) of the human
relationship and not just its sexual configuration. This, at least,
seems to be Birkin's point. Once again the real subject is not simply
sex. In the particular instance of Winifred Inger and Ursula a cosmic
metaphor serves to define the relation between them: not that of
positive polarity which is intrinsically part of the 'metaphysic' of
the later novel, but of a sun and its 'satellite', the word with which
Ursula will berate Birkin. Regarding her and Winifred, 'the girl sat
as within the rays of some enriching sun' (R p.312). The relation
between them is not the unity of two bodies posited in the relation of
Tom and Lydia, or the balanced singleness desired by Birkin, but a
wavering and uneven relation which shifts between unity and
separation: this is represented in the swimming scene where 'the
bodies of the two women touched, heaved against each other for a
moment, then were separate.' (R p.314).
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When Ursula herself enters the world of work as a school-teacher in
the chapter of The Rainbow pointedly entitled 'The Man's World' (The
Rainbow, chapter XIII), the problem of her female status in a
predominantly male preserve (although educated women traditionally
became school-teachers), is accentuated in the narrative: 'She tried
to approach him [the headmaster] as a young bright girl usually
approaches a man, expecting a little chivalrous courtesy. But the fact
that she was a girl, a woman, was ignored or used as a matter for
contempt against her.' (R p.351). Lawrence treats the subject of
Ursula's employment ironically, and not only to underline her naivety.
She wants her pupils to 'love' her: 'She dreamed how she would make
the little, ugly children love her. She would be so personal. Teachers
were always so hard and impersonal. There was no vivid relationship.'
(R p.341). In the dialogues of Women in Love the mature Ursula
apprehends love differently of course and those dialogues in which she
participates so fiercely throw the love-experiences of The Rainbow
Into relief. 'Star-equilibrium' is only achieved with Birkin who
forces them both into a consciousness of the politics of love and
language. Lawrence is explicit about the resulting relationship in
'Excurse': 'She was next to him, and hung in a pure rest, as a star is
hung, balanced unthinkably
	 he too waited in the magical
steadfastness of suspense' (WL p.319). By the end of Women in Love
'love' is not reduced to a manageable quantity, an unproblematic
marriage or a separation, but is distinguished by the contradictions,
oppositions and mobility which it has helped to focus throughout the
novel.
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Warren Shibles argues that '"I love you," may become "I understand
you," in order to distinguish the term love from related terms and to
gain insight into the word "love." (Shibles, pp.20-1) but simple
substitutions like this do not engender the profound critique which
Lawrence finds necessary. In part Shibles' problem is the one the
characters are struggling with as they endeavour to define the word,
or define themselves in relation to the conception they carry about
with them in their heads. In the following pages I propose to isolate
some passages from the novel in which a single meaning is resisted.
In 'Flitting' (Women in Love, chapter XXVII) Ursula wants
exaggerated verbal declaration, 'overstatement' (WL p.369), from
Birkin. Even so the words she hears 'sounded like lies' (WL p.369):
Even when he said, whispering with truth, "I love you, I
love you," it was not the real truth. It was something
beyond love, such a gladness of having surpassed oneself, of
having transcended the old existence. How could he say 'I',
when he was something new and unknown, not himself at all?
This I, this old formula of the ego, was a dead letter.
(Women in Love, p.369)
This is Birkin as anti-ego achieving 'star-equilibrium' although
ironically Ursula is less certain than he about this relationship.
Lawrence writes here of a 'new One' which is a 'paradisal unit
regained from the duality' of Ursula and Birkin (WL p.369). This 'One'
is not the reductive 'angel' that Tom Brangwen talks about at the
wedding of Anna and Will (R pp, 128-9), but comprises, oxymoronically,
the 'separate parts' of Ursula and Birkin in a relationship which
transcends the push and pull of egoism. The phrase 'I love you' sounds
like a lie because within it the elements 'I' and 'you' are not in a
177
balanced relation. 'I', always capitalized, is the privileged term,
the first term in the binary opposition I/you where 'you' is always
secondary and by implication female.
This moment occurs towards the end of the principal conflict
between Ursula and Birkin. After this they will continue to argue but
In the knowledge that some basic understanding has been reached. In
'Mino' Birkin has already struggled to articulate that which is
'beyond love', that is beyond the received view, and has engendered
the usual contest. He is thrown into considerable confusion. A man who
hates his own metaphors, 'love', or the conception he prefers to
'lave', resides for him in a place beyond the lexicon. He is aware
that we are enveloped by love, that in fact there is no 'beyond', but
his desire for silence is recognition that language, the available
rhetoric of love, is inadequate: 'And it is thereI would want to meet
you -- not in the emotional loving plane -- but there beyond, where
there is no speech and no terms of agreement.' (WL p.146). His words
suggest his philosophical profundity: what he cannot speak of he must
consign to silence. 9 He is in need of a different language for his
different conception of love, but the point is that love is still, on
an important level, linguistic. Birkin has conceived of a
transcendental condition but, perhaps because he is not a poet, it
seems to him that it resists being contained by discursive forms.
The debate on love is taken up again in the conflict between Gerald
and Gudrun. One of Birkin's themes, as he deconstructs the word, has
been that what 'love' really means is 'hate'. Gerald and Gudrun
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operate within this opposition. For them 'love' and 'death' are also
associated terms, a further binary opposition. Appropriately enough
'Death and Love' (Women in Love, chapter XXIV) is the title of the
chapter in which Gerald makes his way to Gudrun's bedroom, a
trespasser in the familial home. Gerald, who is cast in an heroic
mould even if he is to represent the destructive impersonal forces of
an industrialized society, sets out on his journey to Gudrun (the
legendary Guthrune is a husband-slayer) on a quest for renewal at a
time paradoxically both of loss (of the father) and gain (of the
family business). Although 'death' in Lawrence's chapter heading is
prophetic inasmuch as Gerald eventually perishes and inasmuch as the
relationship with Gudrun is one of decay and corruption, in the
immediate context it refers to the dead father. In calling his chapter
'Death and Love' Lawrence associates two terms which are very closely
associated, again oxymoronically, in the European psyche. Romantic
tradition is stocked with characters who literally and metaphorically
'die' for love. The irony of the chapter depends to some extent on
this association. Unhappy love-affairs have a distinct place in
European literature, as elsewhere. As de Rougement notes with
reference to the European tradition, 'happy love has no history' (de
Rougement, p.15). Lawrence's early novels subscribe to this while the
mature works turn to the developing critique of 'love'.
In the mountains Gudrun and Gerald act out the final stages of
their conflict. Gudrun, now become 'elemental' (WL p.441) and
'diabolic' (WL p.442) taxes Gerald with the concept 'love'. As before,
the question becomes ostensibly one of semantics:
179
GUDRUN: "You know you never have loved me, don't you?"
GERALD: "I don't know what you mean by the word 'love'."
(Women in Love, p.442)
Gerald's appeal to the question of meaning here is defensive. In the
course of this exchange the word 'love' is used repeatedly and by
denying knowledge of the word as Gudrun uses it Gerald attempts to
protect himself both from the force of the emotion and from the
consequences of ever having loved, or of ever having gone through the
motions of loving Gudrun at all. He never displays with her the
unconscious sympathy which he displays in his involuntary clutching of
Birkin's hand in 'Gladiatorial'. Gudrun, cast as an agent of
destruction, or as one critic puts it 'modernist villain' (Pinkney,
p.93), demonstrates her power by forcing a declaration of love from
Gerald:
"Say you love me," she pleaded. "Say you will love me for
ever -- won't you -- won't you?"
But it was her voice only that coaxed him. Her senses were
entirely apart from him, cold and destructive of him. It was
her overbearing will that insisted.
"Won't you say you'll love me always?" she coaxed. "Say
it, even if it isn't true -- say it Gerald, do."
"I will love you always," he repeated, in real agony,
forcing the words out.
She gave him a quick kiss.
"Fancy your actually having said it," she said, with a
touch of raillery.
He stood as if he had been beaten.
(Women in Love, p.443)
Gerald's declaration of love while he is 'in real agony' provides an
ironic slant on the courtly lover's oxymoronic rhetoric, he who
suffers in a bittersweet love. This scene highlights the relation
between speech, lies and power which is given a high profile in the
180
novel. Formerly it is Birkin who wants to prevent the utterance of
'love' until the old meaning has gone from it, while Gudrun enjoys
hearing the old meaning evoked within the framework of mutual
antagonism which characterizes her relation with Gerald. Here silence
and speech in league with an oppressively traditional conception of
'love' alternately become repressive instruments of the will.
The modern lovers are Gerald and Gudrun and alternately Gerald and
Pussum, Loerke and Leitner, and Gudrun and Loerke, 'modern' because of
the insistent egoism of each participant in contrast to the anti-
egoistic 'star-equilibrium' which is potentially Birkin's and
Ursula's. Only in that relationship is romantic idealism even remotely
dismantled in order to achieve a recognition of a 'truer' otherness,
at a remove from the view which sees the Other merely as 'not I'. The
old rhetoric of oxymoron in courtly love acquires a new meaning as a
result of Lawrence's critique: it is now no longer an external
rhetoric but the implicit nature of the experience. Love is revealed
by Lawrence to have an oxymoronic structure which arises from the
generally oxymoronic quality of the language in Women in Love, and the
'metaphysic'. The oxymoronic conception of love replaces the
Idealistic, romantic conception which had engendered the oxymoronic
rhetoric.
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3.5 Oxymoron
If there is a difficulty in saying that with Lawrence metaphor expands
to include the whole of language, that difficulty resides in
distinguishing what is generally true of language from that which is
specific to Lawrence. Lawrence, like Nietzsche, is recognizably an
individual stylist but in him the question of metaphor goes beyond
bare style. My next point goes some way to illustrating this
assertion. In my last chapter oxymoron was identified as the most
dynamic, most potent, form of metaphor for Lawrence, in large part
because it makes something positive out of difference and opposition,
rather than resemblance. The tension between two unrelated terms
brought suddenly into proximity is there described as 'frictional', a
word which in Lawrence has sexual overtones but which more properly
refers to language. In an oxymoron 'friction' is 'generated' (or
tension and therefore meaning is created) by the semantic difference
between the two terms brought together. It is a type of metaphor which
does not invent relations so much as rely on our knowledge of
semantics. Yet the emphasis does not fall entirely on this principle
of opposition. Structurally oxymoron comprises two single
contradictory elements in a new relation to each other. As I have
argued, it is this structure which resonates with significance because
of its resemblance to the structure of the central metaphysical image
of the novel, Birkin's description of 'star-equilibrium'. The critical
focus has been sometimes implicitly and sometimes explicitly on the
homology between the structure of oxymoron and this central image of
Women in Love in order to underline the fact that the metaphysic of
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this conception is being expressed at a very deep structural level
within the book's language.
Michael Bell contrasts the image of star-equilibrium with the
rainbow and arch imagery of The Rainbow rightly arguing that the
'architectural' stability of the latter represents an intrinsic
solidity which is absent from the idea of the star with its 'openness
on all sides' (Bell, p.98). I propose to build on this perception by
emphasizing the two-star or two-body structure of star-equilibrium in
the light of what has been said about the oxymoronic mode of this
novel, and Lawrence's oxymoronic spirit generally. Star-equilibrium
represents Birkin's desire to be simultaneously single and exist
meaningfully in relation to an Other. Two stars describe two beings,
or souls, as separate elements high above the earth. The image does
contrast, as Michael Bell says, with the more architectural rainbow
image of the 'sister' novel with its stable arch and two ends rooted
firmly in the earth, and the stars are, in contrast, unattached both
from each other and from the ground. However, and this is what I would
wish to add, they are not entirely free floating bodies: a tension
keeps them in place, that is to say, both in their orbits and in
relation to each other. Obviously without this force or tension the
cosmos would either collapse into itself or its elements would simply
drift apart. The structure of oxymoron and the structure of star-
equilibrium therefore have in common the notion of two separate
elements held apart (and together) by tension, as well as being in a
balanced relation. If both elements were to come together without this
tension they would be meaningless. It is in this way that a linguistic
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structure importantly and unconsciously echoes the novel's principal
metaphysical image.
The metaphysic of impersonal duality which Birkin/Lawrence
struggles to make conscious in his encounters with Ursula is therefore
represented at a deeper subliminal and linguistic level than might be
expected. The structure of oxymoron reproduces the fundamental
metaphysical principle which Birkin struggles to articulate through
his cosmic metaphor, which is extended throughout the novel. In
resorting to metaphor Birkin is endeavouring to make something
conscious by using language as a descriptive medium -- he has a
comparison view of metaphor l ° which means that the relation he wants
with Ursula is expressed almost as a simile in that they must become
like two stars -- whereas the 'metaphysic' actually gets expressed at
a much deeper structural level. Consequently the relation between the
language and 'metaphysic' of the novel is unequivocally established,
but not by Birkin, at least not directly. The habitually separate
levels of metaphor and 'metaphysic' merge as the structures of
language mediate the philosophy.
Lawrence has not consciously laboured to achieve this homology, and
that is very largely the point, so at an unconscious level the
linguistic structure of the book is identical to its philosophical, or
metaphysical, premises. As Ricoeur says, 'Things that until that
moment [of being brought together] were 'far apart' suddenly appear as
'closely related'.' (RM p.194, my brackets). The emphasis here is not
on 'local' effects of the language: I will go on to show that what I
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have already shown can only grow out of a pervasive quality of the
book's language. Occasionally in Women in Love two characters achieve
a momentary equilibrium but on the whole this state is elusive and the
individuals remain for the most part locked into their singleness. In
'Death and Love', for instance, Gudrun and Gerald are 'such strangers
-- and yet they were so frightfully, unthinkably near.' (WL p.330, my
italics). In 'A Chair' (Women in Love, chapter XXVI) the young man's
'slinking singleness' (WL p.359) is represented, projecting him as a
potential Aaron. In 'Flitting', thinking about marriage as a social
institution, Gudrun sees herself as 'free' (IC p.374) and as 'one of
the drifting lives that have no root' (WL p.376), that is to say
without the impersonal connection desired by Birkin. Birkin's
trajectory as he leaves Britain with Ursula is represented as
positive, in contrast to the Futuristic descent of Gerald and Gudrun
following a different trajectory on the toboggan in 'Snow' (Women in
Love, chapter XXX). There the star metaphor is given an ironic
meaning: their movement is described as 'a fall to earth, in a
diminishing motion' (WL p.420).
The suggestion is not that Lawrence has singled out oxymoron for
particular attention: to insist on this goes against the whole grain
of the argument. It is difficult to say how consciously achieved the
oxymoronic suggestion of phrases like 'star-equilibrium' and 'root-
vision' is, for instance. In orthodox terms, of course, they are not
oxymorons but both enjoy the creative conjunction of the two composite
words, both being metaphorical expressions of quite complex levels.
Consciously or unconsciously, Lawrence is evidently sensitive to what
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Ricoeur calls 'the complex expression at play in oxymoron' (RM p.194).
The point is that somehow these forms have been arrived at, that they
are incongruous and yet distinctive, and special to Lawrence. For
Lawrence, language is instrumental rather than problematic. Put
crudely he has something to say and his linguistic sensitivity is
vital to the saying of it. This is the origin of constructions like
'star-equilibrium', 'root-vision' and 'blood-consciousness'. At the
same time these 'Lawrencean metaphors' effectively concretize
Lawrence's mode (or modes) of thought in a way that makes this
available to examination.
Oxymoron, then, participates in the collapse of the boundary
between metaphor and 'metaphysic' because Lawrence's language and
philosophy are ultimately not separable. This collapse is of
particular importance in Women in Love whose mode of language this is.
To Ricoeur, who despite his own argument still tends to regard
metaphors as isolated occurrences within a narrative, the tension, or
explicit contradiction in oxymoron, is significant only inasmuch as it
points to a metaphorical meaning which solves, that is brings to an
end, the problem of contradiction itself. His rather prescriptive view
Is that 'The metaphorical meaning as such is not the semantic clash
but the new pertinence that answers its challenge.' (RM p.194). But
the artist, particularly one with Lawrence's subtle relation to
language, need not dispense with metaphorical structures so finally. A
metaphor is not an isolated occurrence and a fleeting thing, just as
language is never a thing apart from the reader, writer or speaker.
Lawrence's unconscious use of the oxymoronic in this novel is a sign
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of his deep-lying linguistic response to his own 'metaphysic' as he
writes from within language. It is an indication of the extent to
which he is 'at home' in language, to recall the Heideggerean
metaphor. It remains to distinguish between oxymoron and the
oxymoronic in Lawrence which, as I have implied, is distinct from
'oxymoron' as a conventional, separable, figure of speech. There is no
need in Lawrence to attempt to uncover a metaphorical meaning which
solves the problem of contradiction when the fact of oxymoronic
contradiction, or more specifically the friction between the composite
elements, is what is important and positive, as well as the notion of
these elements in a balanced relation.
Whilst it is the structure of oxymoron, rather than instances of
the actual metaphorical expression, which is at the 'heart' of Women
in Love, I propose to examine the first instance in the novel, in
'Sisters' (Women in Love, chapter I), of an oxymoronic statement, and
to draw out its significance within the text as a whole, before
discussing parts of the 'Diver' chapter (Women in Love, chapter IV),
which is particularly rich in oxymoronic expressions. There is a
subliminal message in the first few pages of the novel which alerts us
to the possibility of Lawrence innovating with a tension theory of
metaphor: I take it that oxymoron, with its structure of anti-thesis,
and the usually unreconcilable distance between opposites being
suppressed, best illustrates a tension theory of metaphor." In plain
terms oxymoron is a metaphorical expression which demonstrates a
tension theory, being predicated on two unlike concepts brought into
each other's neighbourhood in a semantic challenge. Two of the
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commonest examples in day-to-day speech are 'a living death' and
'bittersweet' which Ricoeur, for instance, cites alongside 'obscure
clarity' (RM p.194). Poetic examples include Milton's 'darkness
visible' and the oxymoronic density of Keat's 'unconfined / Restraint,
Imprisoned liberty' (Endymion I, lines 455-56). Sense depends on the
differences between what the terms signify being reconciled. As
Ricoeur explains, the solution of the enigma or riddle (which is a
reference to Aristotle's dictum, 'for metaphors imply riddles'
(Rhetoric, III, 1405b, 5)) therefore depends on a new semantic
proximity being established between the unlike terms. Whilst this is
how oxymoron functions conventionally at the level of discourse, it is
essentially structurally that this trope has a special status in
Lawrence. Having now set out the general argument I propose to
conclude the discussion with some specific readings of 'language and
metaphysic' in selected passages from Women in Love.
3.6 'Purple twigs were darkly luminous': oxymoron in 'Sisters' and
'Diver'
Early on in the novel, in the context of the sisters' conversation on
marriage, Gudrun's physical response to Ursula's words is ambiguous:
"You wouldn't consider a good offer?" asked Gudrun.
"I think I've rejected several," said Ursula.
"Really!" Gudrun flushed dark.
(Women in Love, pp. 7-8, final emphases added)
The description of Gudrun shows that in physical terms she has
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experienced a sensation akin to a frisson. The phrase 'flushed dark'
Is oxymoronic: the semantics of 'flushed' with its luminous, glowing,
reddish connotations evidently challenge the semantics of 'dark'
although 'dark' also belongs to that special group of words which have
meaning in the context of the 'psychic' life as in the phrase 'the
dark sun' often unproblematically viewed as the exemplar of Lawrencean
oxymoron. Had Lawrence written of Gudrun that she 'flushed deeply' the
sense would have been different. Gudrun's response is to all intents
and purposes generated from the centres of feeling described in the
essays on the unconscious. It is entirely appropriate that in the
narrative she should 'flush' -- a physical sign -- 'dark', something
which is not so evidently physical, but related more (in Lawrence's
lexicon) to the psyche and the emotions. The same formula occurs in
The Rainbow the young Baroness Skrebensky has the effect of making
Will Brangwen 'flush darkly by assuming a biting, subtle class-
superiority.' (R p,185). Here it is a formula which has not yet
acquired the structural and symbolic significance that it has in Women
in Love, but it is nevertheless deeply embedded in Lawrence's
unconscious: evidently he is a writer who is drawn to oxymoron, and
the other novels furnish us with examples, but in Women in Love the
homology outlined between metaphor and 'metaphysic' underlines the
particular significance of the oxymoronic in that novel. Unlike
oxymoron in an ordinary language context the enigma in 'flushed dark'
cannot be easily solved, at least not without recourse to what we
already know about Lawrence's language,
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There is a related moment in 'Snow' as the characters pass through
the wintry landscape on their way to the lodge: 'Up and up, gradually,
they went, through the cold shadow-radiance of the afternoon, silenced
by the imminence of the mountains, the luminous, dazing sides of snow
that rose above them and fell away beneath.' (WL p.400, emphasis
added). 12 'Shadow-radiance' functions like 'flushed darkly'.
Hyphenated, it recalls constructions like 'root-vision' and 'blood-
consciousness' but, where these are metaphors for a state of being and
knowing, 'shadow-radiance' communicates the numinous scene.
Visualizing what Lawrence means is difficult although the terms which
are offered relate to an a priori understanding of a mountain scene
('seen'). Like 'flushed darkly', 'shadow-radiance' can be compared and
contrasted with an expression like 'bittersweet' in everyday
linguistic exchange. 'Shadow-radiance' does not communicate commonly
felt experience as effectively, and universally, as the more everyday
example. This is not simply because 'bittersweet' is more familiar, or
more concrete, but because Lawrence's term, uniquely, throws its own
elements into question. His is a construction which questions the
'kodak-objectivity' discussed at length by Lawrence in his essays on
art and wherever he interrogates the merely optical as a sense.
'Flushed darkly' and 'shadow-radiance', like the 'cold-burning mud' of
the Chinese goose drawing (WL p.89), are therefore oxymorons which
articulate the anti-visual, but they also have a relation to other
aspects of oxymoron which sustain the homology with 'star-
equilibrium'.13
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The landscape of 'Snow' is characterized by 'imminence': the snow
is 'luminous' and 'dazing'. The mountain lodge is at once the centre
of a snowy expanse and metaphorically an open rose. The paragraph
rendering the scene is dense with similes: the lodge, the only man-
made landmark is 'like a dream'. I take it that this reference is
strategic: 'like a dream' goes a long way to explaining the special
nature of the language and also alludes to the relation of visual and
anti-visual in Women in Love. Furthermore, it is a repeated note in
the novel: in 'Mino' Ursula, travelling in a tram-car on her way to
see Birkin, 'seemed to have passed into a kind of dream world,
absolved from the conditions of actuality' (WL p.144). This contrasts
with the more literal understanding of dream as a framing device as in
Aaron's Rod for instance. Ursula's 'dream world' is a temporary
absolution from work-a-day limitations. The implicit division is
between the social world and the private world of the Self. Worlds,
however, are constructed in the mind of the viewer and in language: in
a chapter like 'Snow' the language does seem to describe a dream-
scape, a world which is fundamentally different from that of Beldover;
one where Gudrun can become a crystal and 'pass altogether into the
whiteness of the snow' (WL p.420). As in a dream the 'real' world is
present only as a 'shadow-world' (WL p.410). Journeying to the same
landscape Ursula 'visualizes' her childhood and life and consigns it
to a past for which she has no further use. Generally speaking,
therefore, the language of the novel is dream-like in the dimensions
it imagines. It delimits an elusive world which is both alien and
familiar, a far cry from incorporating an 'actual' dream into the plot
on grounds of symbolic continuity.
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As in a dream the scene in 'Snow' is simultaneously many things.
They are, for instance, 'in the heart of the mountains' (WL p.398,
emphasis added), which is unambiguous in itself as a metaphor from
popular parlance. However, we know from Psychoanalysis and the
Unconscious how much the heart is implicated in Lawrence's thought
about metaphor, or if this sounds too conscious, in his thinking
metaphorically. Lawrence is not simply being anthropomorphic but is
investing the 'real' mountains with a special uncanny significance.
The drama of feeling ends here. The silence in the mountains has the
effect of 'surrounding the heart with frozen air' (WL p.399); the
peaks become 'the heart petals of an open rose' (WL p.400), literally
a 'muscular' image. The repetition of 'heart' is in keeping with the
'hair' and 'navel' imagery and the description of the station platform
and lodge interior as 'naked'. This language recalls the 'heart of the
world' passage in The Trespasser (T pp. 79-80) where Helena, listening
to the actual heart-beats of Siegmund, contemplates the possibility of
an unconscious impersonal force in the world.
Oxymoron demands that several meanings be apprehended
simultaneously. Continuing the examination of instances of the
metaphorical expression I propose here to consider the oxymoronic
structures which occur in a cluster in the opening paragraph of the
'Diver' episode because of what they communicate about the subliminal
levels at work in the passage. In an ordinary language context
oxymoron does not generally take care to conceal itself being a clever
and pertinent formula for expressing a felt condition, like a 'living
death'. We are usually conscious of it in the communicative act
192
because opposites are not normally combined meaningfully, and where
they occur appositely they have a special power. The following passage
would most likely be read as both 'naturalistic' and typically
Lawrencean. Whilst the language here is highly oxymoronic it most
usually passes unremarked:
The atmosphere was grey and translucent, the birds sang
sharply on the young twigs, the earth would be quickening
and hastening in growth. The two girls walked swiftly,
gladly, because of the soft, subtle rush of morning that
filled the wet haze. By the road the blackthorn was in
blossom, white and wet, its tiny amber grains burning
faintly in the white smoke of blossom. Purple twigs were
darkly luminous in the grey air, high hedges glowed like
living shadows, hovering nearer, coming into creation. The
morning was full of a new creation.
(Women in Love, p.46) 14
Here the use of oxymoron is not overt but at the same time the
oxymoronic is an important characteristic of the language, in the
repeated formula of 'wet ... burning', for example. The paradox is
that these are not strictly oxymorons but they do partake of the
oxymoronic in quite an obvious way, in the bringing together of
opposing terms and ideas. The first sense of an oxymoronic tension
which raises questions about resemblance, or verisimilitude, occurs
with the reference to the blackthorn in blossom. Naturalistically the
blossom is 'wet' while the pollen is metaphorically 'burning' in the
'white smoke' of blossom. The metaphor of the blossom as 'smoke' puts
the literalistic 'wet' on the defensive. If noticed, the struggle
between the naturalistic and the metaphorical language can raise the
reader's consciousness about ways of naming. If it passes unnoticed it
may be meaningful at some other subliminal level (whence it came). The
struggle is resolved in the interaction of the two expressions:
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Lawrence succeeds in expressing the physical quality of the blackthorn
and its vital spirit or inner life rather than sacrificing one for the
other in the narrative, the 'kind of marriage between ideas and
experience' to which Ragussis refers (Ragussis, p.180). Lawrence
returns to the idea of a 'burning' landscape a little later on, using
Hermione as a mouthpiece: 'Isn't the young green beautiful? So
beautiful -- quite burning.' (WL p.50), and again the association of
the fresh spring growth and 'burning', given the principally watery
environs of the novel, is oxymoronic.
Two more oxymoronic constructions follow on almost immediately from
the reference to the blackthorn: 'Purple twigs were darkly luminous in
the grey air, high hedges glowed like living shadows' (emphasis
added). The first of these corresponds to the negative imagery of
Lawrence's poem 'Bavarian Gentians' (CP p.697, p.960) which represents
the more typically, and more available, oxymoronic spirit of
Lawrence's language. At the opening of this discussion attention was
drawn to the force of 'dark/darkly' to Lawrence in the context of
Gudrun's experience. It is a word which is recognized as having a high
value in Lawrence's personal lexicon, along with words like 'quick'
and 'motionless'. Bringing 'darkly' and 'luminous' (from lumen, light,
which functions in opposition to the theme of 'darkness', and, as I
argue in the context of 'Snow', relates to larger questions of the
visual and seeing in Lawrence) into one neighbourhood is highly
effective. It could be argued that the purpleness of the twigs
Introduces a naturalistic quality which effaces the efficacy of the
oxymoronic, at the least forcing the status of the oxymoron into
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question. my sense of it, however, is that the oxymoronic mode
dominates, and that Lawrence's language is not simply evoking a rural
scene visually.
The terms used to relate to twigs, blossom and hedges have a
physicality but they are primarily important because of the way they
highlight the play of the noumenal and the numinous in Lawrence. Their
very physicality contrasts with the landscape in 'Snow', for instance,
where the 'physical' resists the 'visual' as much as possible.
Principally through metaphor and metaphorical expressions like those
examined here, Lawrence reaches beyond the conditioned reality of
empirical observation determined by time and space, to the world of
noumena, of things-in-themselves: the sea of language flows around the
object. It is in this context that metaphor in Lawrence relates to
large ontological questions, which plain language is not accustomed to
do. The numinous, in contrast to the noumenal, is represented as the
vital generative force suggested by Lawrence's description which
cannot ultimately be rendered naturalistically.
The second instance of oxymoronic language in this passage is
related to the first. The hedges 'glowed' like 'shadows', a
description which functions in a similar way to 'darkly luminous'.
Glow signifies light, brilliance and heat, words which have a positive
force suggesting 'life' and 'presence'. 'Living shadows' is more
ambiguous. In the first place the phrase is part of a simile wherein
'high hedges glowed like living shadows', but to have something
'glowing' like 'shadow' is again naturalistically problematic. It is
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more difficult, given the sui generis nature of these expressions, to
apply Ricoeur's understanding of a metaphorical meaning making sense
of the enigma caused by the relation of the two nominally dissimilar
terms, more difficult, that is to say, than it would be in a plain
language context. Like the purpleness of the twigs, the greyness of
the air and the rush of the morning, 'living shadows' contributes
effectively to the physical sense of the time and place. Shadows are
by definition immaterial, non-physical. Their mobility in response to
the sun's shifting signifies the movement of time. The 'life'
(inescapable metaphor) of a shadow depends upon the presence of a
physical object, just as the rainbow's luminescence depends upon the
conjunction of light and water.
It is an image to which Lawrence returns in 'Breadalby' (Women in
Love chapter VIII). Hermione and some of her guests take a swim in
one of Hermione's terraced ponds, and Gerald is described in the
following terms: 'Gerald wavered and flickered, a white natural
shadow.' (WL p.101). It is very difficult to decide, in the immediate
context at least, whether this is a positive or a negative image:
Lawrence may indeed be playing with the idea of positive and negative
images in the photographic sense, as an extension of his thought on
seeing as knowing, as opposed to photographic viewing. In these
descriptions Lawrence is again playing on scene/seen. Clearly his
language is highly visual, even if the oxymorons (should the reader
become conscious of them) make visualizing the scene problematic. The
point is, the language accommodates both the 'seen' in the sense of
the past tense of 'to see', given that the characters are 'seeing',
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and the 'scene' which is the author's vision, as well as the noumenal
dimension which is not optically 'seen' so much as known
'insightfully'.
A brief comparison can be sustained with the opening paragraphs of
Hardy's The Return of the Native where the emphasis is essentially on
the 'scene'. This is confirmed by the wording of the second chapter-
heading, 'Humanity Appears upon the Scene, Hand in Hand with Trouble'
(emphasis added). Only in that chapter is attention drawn to the
characters and what they see principally across vast distances: the
officer straining to see Diggory Venn in the distance; their meeting
and the officer's departure so that he too becomes a speck in the
distance; the 'traveller's eye' view of Eustacia Vye on the barrow and
her displacement by the rustics (RN pp.37-42). Hardy also talks about
'The scene before the reddleman's eyes...'	 p.40, my italics) that
is to say, not a projection from Diggory Venn, but something which is
on the outside, and which he contemplates as external to himself.
The solitary furze-cutter of the first chapter who, like the
Brangwen men, looks down towards the soil, is significant principally
as an element in the overall composition. This feature alone
underlines an important distinction between Lawrence and Hardy. With
Hardy we are aware of the authority of Hardy himself delineating the
scene very expressively. He describes the 'stage' upon which his
characters act out their destinies. His furze-cutter, therefore, is
placed in a setting. The Brangwens, in contrast, are already creating
their own surroundings in the act of looking, and Lawrence's prose
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adopts their vision. The Brangwens are transforming the scene for us
as well as for themselves, something which Hardy's characters are
powerless to do. Lawrence is not, therefore, present as an authority
in the sense that Hardy is. For Lawrence, the boundary between the
scene and the 'seen' which is explicit in Hardy itself disintegrates.
It has been noted many times how significant Lawrence's re-reading of
Hardy was in the sharpening of his own thought. Indeed, the comparison
with Hardy rather than other nineteenth-century writers is far from
arbitrary principally because Lawrence took the term 'metaphysic' from
Abercrombie's study of the writer. "5 The point is Lawrence's response
to the notion of 'metaphysic' and what he did with his recognition
that Hardy had for the most part concealed the authentic 'metaphysic'
of his novels beneath another external 'metaphysic', not his own.
Reading Abercrombie and re-reading Hardy, Lawrence was able to
internalize as language what for Hardy was external.
So it is that the oxymoronic quality of some of Lawrence's
constructions, quite apart from their structural significance, also
relates to the visual/anti-visual question and helps to bring the
novel's mode of language and consciousness to light. In an ordinary
language context we are invited to establish a degree of semantic
proximity which will bring the distant terms of the oxymoron close
together in a meaningful way. Looking at 'Diver' the fundamental
difference between the oxymoron in an ordinary language context and
the oxymoronic in Lawrence is obvious. Both generate meaning by
bringing unlike terms together but Lawrence's expressions are context-
specific as well as being what creates the context. Because of this
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characteristic the metaphorical expressions here in 'Diver', unlike 'a
living death' from the store-house of ordinary language expressions,
would lose their force away from this context. This reinforces my
point that metaphor, these immediate phrases, are inseparable from the
'metaphysic', the overall philosophical context. Not only are the
examples from 'Diver' poetic, and expressive, they are specifically
features of the radical grammar of Women in Love
These are among the apictorial features of 'Diver'. They vividly
recreate because, paradoxically, they do not 'resemble' the object.
The reader's reception of the opening scene is largely unconscious. It
Is not imperative for the reader to isolate these stylistic features,
even though to do so is to raise linguistic consciousness. This is not
a conscious rhetoric on Lawrence's part. But the related question of
resemblance is important. The language which introduces Gerald to the
scene swimming in the 'uncreated' water of the lake indicates that
pictoriality is not Lawrence's primary concern. There are several
anti-visual passages running close upon each other which serve to
dramatise the noumenal life within the landscape. These include the
'uncreated water' (WL p.46), and 'the grey, moist, full space of the
water' (WL p.46-7, emphasis added) with the oxymoronic suggestiveness
of the emphasized phrase. The description of the lake as 'all grey and
visionary' (WL p.46) is significant: 'visionary' is an unusual word in
this context giving the lake a 'presence' which is not altogether
physical. The hedges are described as 'hovering nearer, coming into
creation' (WL p.46, emphasis added).
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This style of 'rendering' the world of experience is more
exaggerated in the descriptions of Gerald whose human frame, and by
inference his humanity, is shed for something more abstract. He is de-
personalized from the outset, 'a white figure' (WL p.46), identified
in motion: 'frightening in its swift sharp transit' (WL p.46, emphases
added). To describe Gerald diving as 'a white arc' is to continue the
process of his alienation. It is also a compelling image, a
featureless version of the rainbow. Whereas the infinitely coloured
rainbow has a primordial charge associated as it is with first things
in its Biblical context, the white arc is a stark Modernist
construction of pure form. Rather than polarising the naturalistic and
the abstract, Lawrence has them interacting, thereby stressing their
relationality. Neither is evoked for its own sake. It is worth adding
that Gerald swimming is also an element, but a single one, in a state
of equilibrium. Strictly speaking, neither Gerald nor his environment
are 'created' here. This is appropriate in as much as we see the
episode through the eyes of Gudrun and Ursula who as yet can only
regard Gerald as being outside their immediate world. This separation
is emphasized in the narrative: 'He waved again, with a strange
movement of recognition across the difference' (WL p.47, my italics).
Elsewhere the lake is 'his separate element' (WL p.47). Gerald feels
his 'possession of a world to himself' (WL p.47), and 'exalted in his
isolation in the new element, unquestioned and unconditioned ...
without bond or connection anywhere, Just himself in the watery
world.' (WL p.47). The word 'unconditioned' continues the
signification of a noumenal world which characterizes these
'naturalistic' descriptions. The significance of 'separate', and the
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fact of Gerald's lack of connection with the scene despite being
ostensibly a part of it, will be examined in greater detail in my next
chapter where the differences between the 'metaphysic' of Women in
Love and of The Rainbow are made explicit, and where the human figure
swimming again becomes an important image.
The opposition of 'motion/motionless' points up the elemental
differences at this stage between Gerald, de-personalized, and Gudrun
whose individuality has been emphasized from the beginning of the
novel, externally with regard to her distinctive clothing, and
internally in her responses to her environment. Gerald is motion, a
word which in Lawrence's lexicon signifies a male principle: 'among
the smooth ripples a swimmer was making out to space, in a centre of
faintly heaving motion' (WL p.46); 'The sisters stood watching the
swimmer move further into the grey, moist, full space of the water,
pulsing with his own small, invading motion' (WL pp.46-7); 'she stood
watching the motion on the bosom of the water' (WL p.47); 'In the
faint wash of motion, they could see his ruddy face' (WL p.47); 'He
loved his own vigorous, thrusting motion' (WL p.47). The word is
repeated five times in a relatively short space and each repetition
reinforces the idea of life as a fluid interplay of elements rather
than static and, in Gudrun's words, 'final'. Gerald is perceived as
little more than movement, fundamentally a thing apart from his
environment. In contrast to Gerald, Gudrun is 'motionless' a word
which communicates both her physical stasis as she becomes absorbed in
her subject, and the psychic profile of their future relationship,
suggested linguistically by the opposition of motion/motionless. We
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are not given to expect anything like 'star-equilibrium' between them
because the language does not suggest it. Her absorption is of the
kind which is implied in 'Sisters' when on seeing Gerald for the first
time she conceives of the 'arctic light that envelopes only us two'
(WL p.15, emphasis added). At its best, as Birkin insists, the
'metaphysic' of 'star-equilibrium' accommodates a plurality of
relations, not simply and narrowly I/you as it is traditionally
understood.
Although the word is not Lawrence's, at least not here, Gudrun's
heart is indeed 'contracted' to Gerald, something which is evident
from 'Sisters' and which is finalized in 'Sketchbook': 'The bond was
established between them, in that look, in her tone. In her tone, she
made the understanding clear -- they were of the same kind, he and
she, a sort of diabolic freemasonry subsisted between them.' (WL
p.122). This bond is the alternative to the social arrangement of
marriage which Gudrun later disparages (the contract into which Ursula
and Birkin enter, having first 'read the terms' (WL p.148)): it bears
a sense of the two being 'contracted', a word which also recalls the
physical movement of the heart, traditionally the seat (another
metaphor) of the emotions, especially love; it also, by extension,
bears the sense of 'shrinking', of physical recoil from something
('shrink' and 'recoil' are both repeatedly used by Lawrence in other
contexts where the individual withdraws from the Other). In the light
of what we know of the 'metaphysic' of Women in Love we can see that
Lawrence is punning on the word 'singled': 'Am I really singled out
for him in some way'. 'Singled' resonates in the popular sense as
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Gudrun uses it, not in the context of two single bodies in a relation
of mutual balance.
Punning is conventionally regarded as having more to do with the
superimposition of linguistic levels than with oxymoron with its
dependence on the pertinent juxtaposition of meanings. Its general
significance is communicated succinctly by Jonathan Culler in the
context of his assessment of Raymond Roussel's Locus Solus the pun
'displays the infinite play of differences by which a word sends us
off to other words instead of linking directly with a world.'. 1 ° This
Is pertinent to Women in Love given the extent to which the central
quartet of Ursula, Gudrun, Birkin and Gerald, debate meanings,
although language mediates something specific in Lawrence as well as
being about 'language' at large as Culler suggests in the case of
Roussel. However, Lawrence may also be suggesting that the dynamic of
meaning, even in a single word (like 'love' for example), is
oxymoronic rather than either centripetal (tending towards other
meanings as with puns) or centrifugal (tending towards a world). Out
of these thoughts emerges the question whether pun is in fact in a
profound sense related to oxymoron? Certainly a punning consciousness
characterizes Lawrence's language, although that language is not
identical from work to work. 17 After all, a pun is effective because
It aligns two separate meanings, and as soon as this is said a
rhetorical similarity with oxymoron emerges. Both tropes are
predicated on difference, although in the case of oxymoron difference
is of course opposition, which it is not necessarily in pun. Without
wishing to push their similarities too far, the fact of their kinship,
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in the context of Lawrence's language in particular, suggests that
important contiguity of language and thought already alluded to.
Gudrun's yearning, as she watches Gerald, is also the artist's
yearning in her for some abstraction, some conceptual grasp of
experience pared of temporal human concerns. In Lawrence's terminology
Gudrun seems to be yearning not for Gerald, of course, but for an
Absolute: 'Gudrun envied him almost painfully. Even this momentary
possession of pure isolation and fluidity seemed to her so terribly
desirable, that she felt herself as if damned, out there on the high-
road.' (WL p.47). The pure artist in Gudrun wants this abstraction and
her relationship with Gerald who is too much 'man' -- '"God, what it
is to be a man!" she cried.' (WL p.47) -- in comparison with Loerke
represents the conflict between the human and the inhuman in their
relationship. In 'Diver' it is Ursula who, in contrast to the general
tone of the episode, falls back on conventional forms of naming giving
the scene in front of her its 'worldly', workaday, meaning -- '"It is
Gerald Crich" (WL p.47). Her reference to Gerald as a Nibelung is not
so everyday, but all the water-scenes in this novel involve attempts
to understand what is seen in metaphorical terms like this. In
'Breadalby' Ursula sees Gerald as Dionysus 'because his hair was
really yellow' (WL p.101), Gudrun perceives the swimmers at Breadalby
as 'saurian', and so on. These metaphors represent in the first
instance the point of view of the sisters as they translate the 'seen'
into 'known' terms.
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Two similes stand alongside each other in 'Diver' underpinning the
dialogue between Ursula and Gudrun which is occasioned by the chance
meeting with Hermione and Laura Crich: 'The two sisters were like a
pair of scissors, snipping off everything that came athwart them: or
like a knife and a whetstone, the one sharpened against the other.'
(WL p.51). These images with their high definition occur unexpectedly,
interrupting the dialogue, and differ in kind from the more subliminal
level of metaphor earlier in the chapter. It is most likely that the
reader will be for the most part unconscious of the oxymoronic in
'Diver' but these similes force themselves into the reader's
consciousness: they make conscious something which exists at a
subliminal level. It is a fact that Lawrence uses certain words and
certain combinations of words in an unusual way. This is not only
confined to the oxymoronic. Also writing about the opening of 'Diver',
Michael Bell remarks on the unusual context of certain words and
underlines the reader's unconscious absorption of the real point:
His [Lawrence's] language hovers in near oxymoron at times
so as to bring out this constant play of energies rather
than the conventional fixities of named objects. But it only
hovers; we respond to the object rather than to a stylistic
device. Hence when we are told that the two girls "drifted
swiftly along" we are not likely to notice consciously the
oddity of this as a way of walking. The acquiescent
unconsciousness of "drifted" and the purposiveness of
"swiftly" make immediate sense as the sisters' implied
responsiveness to the world as described. For this "world"
Indeed exists in their response. (Bell, p.111, my brackets)
Arguably more force can be given to the 'stylistic device' (as a
medium): whether or not the reader consciously responds to them, the
metaphorical levels within the narrative contain the thought. Michael
Bell is here referring to a local effect of the style. My point, in
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contrast, is that the oxymoronic in Lawrence is pervasive,
representing a distinctive level of thought (about language and how
language refers to anything) within the language. My response is
therefore to emphasize the profoundly oxymoronic temper of the
language of this novel, rather than stay with 'near' oxymoron in a
particular passage. Understanding any of the terms used in 'Diver', or
In the novel generally, and this is also true of the oxymoronic
expressions highlighted in the course of this discussion, lies between
the poles of their transparency and their ambivalence. In comparison
the scissor and knife imagery of the similes is less ambivalent. On
one level it underlines the nature of the sisters' critical exercise.
As images they could be regarded as Futuristic with their hard lines
and unsentimental ruthless Modernism. In this they contrast with the
concluding simile of the chapter which refers to Ursula and which is
more typically 'Lawrencean', recalling the individual who must break
through the 'integuments' into self-hood: 'Her spirit was active, her
life was like a shoot that is growing steadily, but which has not yet
come above ground.' (WL p.52). These similes, the latter organic and
the former mechanistic, do not lose anything by their proximity. On
the contrary they advertise what I have underlined all along, the
positive inter-dependency and simultaneity of styles in Women in Love,
a mode which distinguishes the language and manner of this novel from
its predecessor The Rainbow, a feature to which attention was drawn at
the beginning of this chapter.
This chapter has traced a route through specific themes in
Lawrence's novel and has arrived, inevitably, back at language. The
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principal focus has been on Lawrence's ability to close the distance
between language and what it describes. His subtle critique of 'love'
most ably demonstrates this, but it is equally apparent in the way
Lawrence recovers a special kind of seeing from ordinary optical
seeing, and a special kind of physical being from the purely physical.
In this sense Womesin Love is Lawrence's most authentically
philosophical novel, in contrast to the highly 'novelistic' The
Rainbow: within its own narrative language, philosophically and
structurally, Women in Love deals in the most penetrating fashion with
the central problems of language and rhetoric. This is not to say the
'metaphysic' is any less achieved in The Rainbow but there are
important differences, and these are the subject of my next chapter.
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CHAPTER FOUR
UNDULATING STYLES: THE RAINBOW
In this chapter I propose to examine The Rainbow's very different mode
of language from that of Women in Love, keeping the focus on the power
of metaphor and its different levels within the single work. The
unconscious modality of Women in Love has been thrown into relief by
the conscious metaphoricity of Lawrence's essays on the unconscious.
The way its thought is embodied in its narrative language,
particularly the way it partakes of the oxymoronic, and its critique
of the merely rhetorical has made it the appropriate starting place
for a consideration of Lawrence thinking metaphorically in the context
of a major work of fiction. Whilst Women in Love is about themes and
issues which continually preoccupy Lawrence in his writings, its sui
generis manner helps us to grasp the profound role of metaphor in his
work. My reading of The Rainbow, or more specifically my concentration
on the metaphorical levels of language within it, will build on this
recognition. Central as it is, Women in Love is far from covering all
the stylistic possibilities available to Lawrence. It is not the work
in which we are presented with Lawrence's final word on language, but
a stage in his thinking about it -- like the other novels it came, in
a significant measure, 'unwatched'. As I have argued, whilst it is
most explicitly concerned with language as a theme, compared to the
other works, it does not represent a theory of language, or a theory
of meaning, which is rehearsed and reproduced elsewhere. To say so is
to highlight the fact that in Lawrence we are aware of different modes
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of language rather than being presented with a monolithic concept of
'Language', and yet through these radically dissimilar works an
understanding of language-in-general emerges. This chapter, like the
last, is concerned with recognizing the work's particular tone, which
exists within the general domain of language, through attention to
metaphor which as I have begun to show is no simply rhetorical figure
in Lawrence.
Evidently the wealth of critical writing on Lawrence, and in
particular on his mature fiction, means that the main ideas are
continually laid down and augmented. Lawrence's style almost always,
rightly, receives critical attention. Traditionally the emphasis has
been on the narrative technique of particular texts in the context of
scholarly liberal humanism. However, the explosion of interest in
language since the emergence of French post-structuralism has resulted
in studies exemplified by those of Doherty and Bonds which I signalled
earlier. That there are right ways and wrong ways of approaching
Lawrence's language is something which is implicitly taken up in this
study. Before embarking on my own examination of The Rainbow's
metaphoricity I propose to review some recent critical approaches to
its language, the better to establish my own position.
Allan Ingram's book The Language of D. H. Lawrence is a modern
introduction to the language of the fiction, with a brief excursion
into the poetry. Ingram appropriates the theme of articulacy in his
assessment of the mature novels and in particular The Rainbow which is
in his view the text which best focuses the language theme. In this he
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differs from Michael Ragussis and those critics who find Women in Love
the text which principally centres on questions of language, whether
from the perspective of the difficulties of expression which it
addresses, or the subtlety of metaphorical thinking which it embodies,
and for which I argue.
Ingram's interest is largely in Lawrence's handling of prose
language principally with a view to grammatical and rhetorical
structures. He traces the movement from the pre-linguistic condition
of the Ur-Brangwens, through the difficult and limited speech of the
generations leading up to Ursula, to her return to the pre-linguistic
through knowledge and experience in the novel's final, non-verbal,
moments. He explains his concentration on The Rainbow Baying that it
Is 'itself about language, about the relations that are possible
between articulacy and inarticulacy, between expression and the
inexpressible, between speech and silence, and is therefore peculiarly
appropriate for special treatment in a discussion of Lawrence's
language.' (Ingram, p.119). By 'language' he really means 'speech' and
his strategy is the familiar one of concentrating on the verbal
development of the characters as a means of identifying their
psychological and emotional wholeness, or conversely their paucity.
The narrative meta-language is read as largely expressive and
enactive. At times the critic seems to be arguing for a structural
equivalent of the 'metaphysical' condition of character in relation to
world, but the implications of this as a quality of the metaphor are
not examined. Ingram's concluding remarks to his chapter entitled 'The
Language of Prose' are an adumbration of Michael Bell's theme of
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Lawrence's need 'to develop a new language for the feelings' (Ingram,
p.72), and Michael Ragussis's notion of a new vocabulary or 'new
grammar' (Ingram, p.72), although Ragussis's conception refers
specifically to Women in Love. Essentially Ingram identifies a
typically 'novelistic' sense of language as opposed to a philosophical
one, or more properly an amalgam of the two.
Diane Bonds on the other hand suggests that the Brangwen existence
is structured like a (Derridean) conception of language. Working from
the novel's 'prologue' where the men 'defer' to the women and where
the 'external' world of society, commerce and development is
represented to the Brangwen women as 'epic', she argues that
If the men locate their meaning or significance in the
woman, and the woman locates her meaning or significance in
the world beyond, and the world beyond is presented as a
system of signs, then the relations of the Brangwens to each
other and to the world constitute a system of deferral and
substitution that resembles the structure of language
conceived as a system of differences or differential
relations among signifiers. (Bonds, p.56)
This really is to impose an external model of language onto Lawrence
thereby obstructing the way to his own sense of it. Relations between
Brangwen men and women are taken to 'mirror two alternate theories of
the linguistic sign', that is, 'the symbolic conception of the sign'
where signifier and signified are 'united', and 'the differential
conception of the sign' where the relation of signifiers to each other
is posited on their semantic difference (Bonds, p.56). In short, Bonds
transforms a post-structuralist theory of language into a metaphor for
the specific male/female relations described. The men 'empty their
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moral significance into "the woman". Thus she becomes truly a symbol.'
(Bonds, p.55). But at the same time the woman 'refers herself to' the
world outside the farm, a world signified by plurivocity, an act which
'displaces her own significance' as a symbol (Bonds, p.56). The
Intention is to show Lawrence's 'metaphysic' as principally
deconstructive, but it could be argued that a theory of language alien
to Lawrence is a weak source of analogy given the novel's available
'metaphysic'. Lawrence's language is alluring in this regard, but the
appropriateness of the comparison needs to be argued very strongly.
Concluding her critique, and the metaphor of deconstruction, Bonds
argues that the Brangwen relationships which are articulated in terms
of achieving an 'Absolute' or the 'infinite' are grounded in a 'denial
of difference and absence' (Bonds, p.75). Sexual and marital union is
achieved as desired but at this cost. Only Ursula resists the union
achieved by Tom and Lydia, Will and Anna, in which each individual is
perceived to have lost something intrinsic to their own sense of self,
and is thereby saved.
Regarding metaphor, Bonds traces a process of literalization: the
'Futuristic' imagery of blades and swords, and the animal imagery
which pervades some of the encounters between Ursula and Skrebensky,
becomes for her literalized in 'the actual, animalistic conflict
between the lovers (that is symbolic action)' (Bonds, p.60). This
literalizing of the metaphorical is interpreted as 'a logocentric
impulse, a reaching toward some actuality to which words refer.'
(Bonds, p.60). But in the first place Bonds has not questioned the
literal/metaphorical opposition which I believe Lawrence's language
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invites her to do. She maintains what could be called a 'Ricoeurean'
distance from metaphor, ignoring the Nietzschean understanding which
Lawrence's language embodies. 'Literalization' is also the theme of
one of her two chapters on Women in Love (Bonds, pp. 77-92).
Michael Bell's examination of the ontological specificity of The
Rainbow's narrative language (Bell, pp.51-96) is characterized by an
alertness to Lawrence's language in contrast to Bonds whose project is
also to engage with 'the ontological and metalinguistic implications
of the texts' language' (Bonds, p.5). It is in the context of his
concentration on the ontological dimension of language that Michael
Bell has recourse to Heidegger, and via him to a pre-Socratic
conception of the unity of subject and world rather than the dualistic
conception which determines modern consciousness and obscures Being.
Michael Bell shows language in the book being put under a specifically
Lawrencean pressure as the narrative language renders 'feeling' rather
than 'ideas about feeling' (Bell, p.53). The appropriate response to
Lawrence is perceived as a 'feeling' one rather than an analytical
one. This quality of responsiveness is seen as essential inasmuch as
it answers the shortcomings of language which the The Rainbow
particularly thematizes especially through Tom and the early
Brangwens, but also in relation to Will and Anna whose relationship
becomes one of sensual experience rather than speech. Michael Bell's
argument is based on the premise that 'the indirection of language is
a necessary condition for the emotionally supple and ontologically
sophisticated meanings which are to be imparted.' (Bell, p.57). An
oeuvre based study of the fiction, this book examines the language
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theme in Lawrence as a way the writer can explore and come to terms
with his medium as a mode and agency of feeling, and ultimately of
Being.
My concentration on metaphor both challenges and builds on the
various responses to language summarized here. Lawrence is, of course,
recognized as a highly metaphorical writer; one whose narratives are
suffused with metaphors and metaphorical chains. Inasmuch as language
and 'metaphysic' are not separable in Lawrence, and inasmuch as he is
thinking metaphorically and doing something with language, his mature
work is about language (and the experience to which it 'refers'), that
is to say about the necessarily metaphorical nature of understanding.
This 'thinking metaphorically' in order to think further is Lawrence's
principal theme which inhabits conscious and subliminal levels in his
work. Therefore, I would be reluctant to say that The Rainbow is
'about' language, as Ingram does for instance, anymore than Women in
Love or the essays on the unconscious are 'about' language, or 'about'
metaphor. What I hope to focus here is the centrality not of metaphor
as merely textual play, but once again as the proper vehicle for the
'metaphysic' of the book, which is not another 'metaphysic' different
from that of Women in Love or the essays on the unconscious, for
example, but a specific inflection of Lawrence's 'metaphysic' in
general. To make a metaphor is not the same as 'thinking
metaphorically' which is what Lawrence does: The Rainbow embodies its
own mode of thinking metaphorically which, I shall argue, communicates
what it is really 'about'. This discussion opens with a concentration
on something which is on the face of it quite 'local', that 18 to say
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on the wave imagery of the novel as representing a tangible body of
metaphor within the work. This is with a view to focusing on the
question of how an instance of metaphor within a narrative can also
come to be seen as the language of the whole novel. Essentially it
will emerge that without the 'wave' in The Rainbow there is no novel.
So that even at this point it is possible and appropriate to talk
about The Rainbow's 'engulfing' medium.
There is nothing in the first paragraph of The Rainbow to suggest
the radical view of language which will emerge in the course of the
novel. It unproblematically sets the scene after a traditional model,
and the debt to Hardy has often been noted. However, the contrast
between this language and the language (incorporating the view of
language which will emerge) of the novel which grows out of it reveals
Lawrence's awareness of the distance between himself and the
traditions of the past, a distance which he can strategically develop.
The second paragraph, and successive relatively short paragraphs
leading into this distinctive 'prologue', begin to suggest that the
narrative language itself will have a specifically Lawrencean
ontological bearing. The 'wave which cannot halt' (R p.9) has been set
in motion. It refers to a structure of repetition Just as evident in
the narrative language as in terms of the action. The characteristic
rhythm and repetition of words and sounds represented in the often
quoted sequence 'the pulse of the blood of the teats of the cows beat
into the pulse of the hands of the men' (R p.10) is a kinaesthetic
language which signals the wave-like quality of the entire narrative:
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the continuous ever-changing nuances of the language imitate, as far
as language can, a wave form, rhythmic, repetitive, with a suggestion
of motion.
The immediate emphasis here is on the undulating quality of the
language rather than the 'frictional' which is to underline something
very distinctive about The Rainbow. The kind of repetition indicated
here contrasts sharply with the 'continual, slightly modified
repetition' described in the Foreword to Women in Love (WL pp. 485-6).
I have already drawn attention to this passage where the emphasis is
more sexual perhaps because more personal: 'every natural crisis in
emotion of passion or understanding comes from this pulsing,
frictional to-and-fro, which works up to a culmination.' (WL p.486).
As I said earlier, the 'physical' is really linguistic in Lawrence,
exemplified in the thoughtful application of 'frictional' in his
writing as in his alertness to the oxymoronic as a medium for ideas.
The word 'frictional' implies the resistance of one body to another in
the context of a sexual heat; it describes a momentary, local,
resistance between two 'bodies', and as I have suggested, recalls the
relation of the elements in oxymoron. It is a word which Lawrence used
again and again, exploiting the different levels of meaning in the
word as they appeared to him. Towards the end of The Plumed Serpent,
for instance, the word is given purely negative connotations. As in
the Foreword to Women in Love it refers to the sexual, but here sex
and speech are seen in the first place as being too conscious and too
sensational:
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He [Cipriano] was aware of things that she herself was
hardly conscious of. Chiefly, of the curious irritant
quality of talk. And this he avoided. Curious as it may
seem, he made her aware of her own old desire for
frictional, irritant sensation. She realized how all her old
love had been frictional, charged with the fire of
Irritation and the spasms of frictional voluptuousness.
(The Plumed Serpent, p.421, my brackets)
This passage is charged with a sexual language signifying a sexuality,
or a sex-consciousness, that no character could voice in The Rainbow.
Variations on 'friction' and 'frictionality' announce a concept of
female sexuality for which Lawrence has been famously criticized.' The
language, of the Foreword to Women in Love at least, represents a mode
of consciousness which contrasts, therefore, with that of the The
Rainbow represented here in the description of the Brangwens 'feeling
the pulse and the body of the soil, that opened to their furrow for
the grain, and became smooth and supple after their ploughing, and
clung to their feet with a weight that pulled like desire' (R p.10).
In this passage the sexual is less personal: it exists at a much
deeper, prolonged, sustained and more unconscious level. In this we
are referred to the subterranean sweep of The Rainbow, to language and
consciousness as process. The 'slightly modified repetition' of Women
in Love, in contrast, effectively focuses that novel's preoccupation
with problems of expression where what Lawrence sees as the problem of
being so 'conscious' is seen as inseparable from the problem of being
verbal. It is the problem which the main characters, in their
different ways, discuss. In The Rainbow, in crude terms, language
essentially rolls on, unconscious, impersonal, undulant.
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There is an ebb and flow between the paragraphs of the first pages
of this novel which helps to establish the point about undulating
styles. Taking the first section of the book as a prologue, it is
likely that the reader is drawn in by the language; not only does it
define a certain mode of being-in-the-world, it does so seductively.
Whether this state is claustrophobic or suffocating for the Brangwens,
seemingly saturated by their environment, is not the initial point.
The point is the reader's awareness of the language having a special
quality. Ontological difference at this early stage is largely the
difference between Brangwen-male and Brangwen-female. The language
describing the existence of the Brangwen male is distinctive and
different from the tone which describes the yearning outwards of the
women who are in comparison more 'conscious' (which is what Bonds
responds to). Once again it is the general rather than the individual
terms which are an important part of the difference: there are no
named individuals at this stage, only male and female. Difference is
implied in the minute changes of style (the inflectional changes) even
within a relatively small space. The reader is encouraged to be
sensitive to subtle modulations in the narrative language exemplified
in the difference between the paragraphs quoted below. The paragraph
break is the moment of change, of the subtlest transition:
It was enough for the men, that the earth heaved and opened
its furrow to them, that the wind blew to dry the wet wheat,
and set the young ears of corn wheeling freshly round about;
It was enough that they helped the cow in labour, or
ferreted the rats from under the barn, or broke the back of
a rabbit with a sharp knock of the hand. So much warmth and
generating and pain and death did they know in their blood,
earth and sky and beast and green plants, so much exchange
and interchange they had with these, that they lived full
and surcharged, their senses full fed, their faces always
turned to the heat of the blood, staring into the sun, dazed
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with looking towards the source of generation, unable to
turn round.
But the woman wanted another form of life than this,
something that was not blood-intimacy. Her house faced out
from the farm-buildings and fields, looked out to the road
and the village with church and Hall and the world beyond.
She stood to see the far-off world of cities and governments
and the active scope of man.
(The Rainbow, pp. 10-11)
A quality of repetition persists where the woman is the focus but it
is appropriately of a different order. Such tonal difference is
pronounced by the obvious contrast to the more 'ordinary' language of
a line which is often quoted by critics to signal a decisive change in
narrative interest: 'About 1840, a canal was constructed across the
meadows of the Marsh Farm 	 (R p.13), in the simple past tense of
completed action, which offers the most obvious contrast stylistically
with either of these earlier modulations and is itself part of the
'wave' of language 'which cannot halt'. The shift can be compared to
the adjustment from one key to another in a piece of music.
It is generally recognized that these linguistic modulations signal
to the reader when a particularly significant moment of feeling or
experience is about to be entered upon. The Rainbow is indeed
characterized by 'memorable' passages which might serve to typify the
book to the wide community of its readers. These episodes include the
novel's opening; Tom Brangwen and the infant Anna feeding the cattle
on the night of Lydia's confinement; Anna and Will putting up sheaves;
Ursula's 'epiphanic' moment on looking into her college microscope;
her encounter with the horses. The placing of these episodes within
the narrative results in their being on the crest of a structural
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wave, being in some senses of the nature of a crescendo, an increasing
of verbal and rhythmic force. The point is not the fact alone of
heightened language, but the strategic function of this heightened
language.
Having examined the novel's opening in this light, in the pages to
follow I have isolated some episodes where the Lawrencean ontology
continues to be most distinctively felt in the grain of the metaphor.
The description of Will Brangwen in the cathedral provides a case in
point:
Here the stone leapt up from the plain of earth, leapt up
in a manifold, clustered desire each time, up, away from the
horizontal earth, through twilight and dusk and the whole
range of desire, through the swerving, the declination, ah,
to the ecstasy, the touch, to the meeting and the
consummation, the meeting, the clasp, the close embrace, the
neutrality, the perfect, swooning consummation, the timeless
ecstasy. There his soul remained, at the apex of the arch,
clinched in the timeless ecstasy, consummated.
And there was no time nor life nor death, but only this,
this timeless consummation, where the thrust from earth met
the thrust from earth and the arch was locked on the
keystone of ecstasy. This was all, this was everything. Till
he came to himself in the world below. Then again he
gathered himself together, in transit, every jet of him
strained and leaped, leaped clear in to the darkness above,
to the fecundity and the unique mystery, to the touch, the
clasp, the consummation, the climax of eternity, the apex of
the arch.
(The Rainbow, pp. 187-88)
To some readers this sort of writing loses much of its credence
because the double meanings are too clumsily spelled out and sexual
inference dominates at the expense of the text's more serious project.
But this is the linguistic climax to a relatively long passage. The
'wave' of language can be heard building up as Will and Anna approach
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the cathedral and as they enter. The context is, therefore, extremely
Important inasmuch as it will ultimately offer the best explanation
both of the passage and of Will's experience. Anna too is revealed to
us through her experience of the cathedral, and through her judgement
of what it means to Will.
Not surprisingly, in view of my argument that water (and waves) as
a metaphor in Lawrence is a far from arbitrary 'choice' on the
writer's part, the context, when it offers an explanation of Will's
emotional commitment to the cathedral, does so in the following terms:
His soul would have liked it to be so: here, here is all,
complete, eternal: motion, meeting, ecstasy, and no illusion
of time, of night and day passing by, but only perfectly
proportioned space and movement clinching and renewing, and
passion surging its way in great waves to the altar,
recurrence of ecstasy.
(The Rainbow, p.188, emphasis added)
There are three distinct levels of language here. First, the
supplementary association of 'waves of feeling' can have the effect of
transmitting Will's experience into cliché, which is not necessarily
Inappropriate: feeling for Will is always mediated by some external
object, usually a work of art or architecture, and he struggles
hopelessly for something original, which cannot be counterfeited, in
his own artistic projects. Being aware of Will's cliché leads into a
more particular awareness of the fact that Lawrence is here making
creative use of a body of already existing, or 'dead', metaphor in
common usage. So the second level is the use of deep-lying metaphor
already in language, quite apart from cliché. And yet cliché can have
the effect of reviving a tired, even a dead, metaphor if the ground is
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prepared. Often a pun, for instance, is the means to this revival. In
this passage the language is inflected towards both, that is to say
towards cliché and towards a 'deep' level of common metaphor in the
language. These discriminations are very interesting for Lawrence.
The third, more difficult, level is Lawrence's overall view of
language, which is implicit and emergent. A 'thinking about' and a
'listening to' language is only possible from within language itself,
rather than from a place 'beyond' it: one of the questions Lawrence
implicitly poses is 'Is there a place 'beyond' language?' It is only
the concentrated metaphoricity in Lawrence (as in the passage
describing Will's 'ecstasy') which helps us to think this through. In
this passage the wave is also a model for a kind of sentiment. Waves
have now become a common figure for the course of feeling represented
by contact with the cathedral. The syntax in this short passage has an
impressionistic function, imitating as closely as possible wave-
repetition and wave-rhythm. Anna's resistance is articulated in
related terms: 'She was not to be flung forward on the lift and lift
of passionate flights, to be cast at last upon the altar steps as upon
the shore of the unknown.' (R p.188). These are the terms for Anna's
determination to maintain her own selfhood, her own sense of where she
is. But as a description it also contains an element of readerly
resistance bearing in mind the common experience of some of Lawrence's
readers who feel that he is evidently saying something of importance
although it is often difficult to pinpoint his meaning.
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This language culminates in the longer passage which is given over
wholly to Anna's desire to go against the 'current' she perceives in
Will:
So that she caught at little things, which saved her from
being swept forward headlong in the tide of passion that
leaps on into the Infinite in a great mass, triumphant and
flinging its own course. She wanted to get out of this
fixed, leaping, forward-travelling movement, to rise from it
as a bird rises with wet, limp feet from the sea, to lift
herself as a bird lifts its breast and thrusts its body from
the pulse and heave of a sea that bears it forward to an
unwilling conclusion, tear herself away like a bird on
wings, and in the open space where there is clarity, rise up
above the fixed, surcharged motion, a separate speck that
hangs suspended, moves this way and that, seeing and
answering before it sinks again, having chosen or found the
direction in which it shall be carried forward.
(The Rainbow, p.189)
The 'fixed, surcharged motion' and the 'fixed,	 forward-
travelling movement' describe the mode of The Rainbow itself with its
great wave of language: 'fixed' refers to the complex movement of the
wave as perpetually mobile and yet eternally running along the same
course. Anna imagines herself temporarily detached from the enveloping
wave of experience, the Brangwen experience which characterizes the
novel's opening, but ultimately recognizes that she will be carried
forward as part of it, even in the end creating it as child follows
child. It is inappropriate, and impossible, for her to imagine the
'isolation unbearable' which Gudrun feels in 'Water-Party', as the
direct result of being separate (WL p.182). However, whilst Anna is
content to return to a condition in which she will again be 'carried
forward', the 'separate speck that hangs suspended' which she
momentarily desires to be recalls both the moon, a principal image in
both The Rainbow and Women in Love, and the star which floats without
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connection. In this light Anna can be seen to anticipate the
'metaphysic' of Women In Love, as will Ursula as she becomes
increasingly more individuated, but it is here a fleeting projection.
Even where water is more literal in the text, moving the action of
the novel on, the same and related issues are thrown into relief. The
death of Tom Brangwen is a case in point. The passage is lengthy but
worth quoting in full:
He hung up the shafts and took the gig-lamp. As he came
out of the familiar jumble of shafts and wheels in the shed,
the water, in little waves, came washing strongly against
his legs. He staggered and almost fell.
"Well what the deuce!" he said, staring round at the
running water in the black, watery night.
He went to meet the running flood, sinking deeper and
deeper. His soul was full of great astonishment. He had to
go and look where it came from, though the ground was going
from under his feet. He went on, down towards the pond,
shakily. He rather enjoyed it. He was now knee deep, and the
water was pulling heavily. He stumbled, reeled sickeningly.
Fear took hold of him. Gripping tightly to the lamp, he
reeled, and looked round. The water was carrying his feet
away, he was dizzy. He did not know which way to turn. The
water was whirling, whirling, the whole black night was
swooping in rings. He swayed uncertainly at the centre of
all the attack, reeling in dismay. In his soul, he knew he
would fall.
As he staggered, something in the water struck his legs,
and he fell. Instantly he was in the turmoil of suffocation.
He fought in a black horror of suffocation, fighting,
wrestling, but always borne down, borne inevitably down.
Still he wrestled and fought to get himself free, in the
unutterable struggle of suffocation, but he always fell
again deeper. Something struck his head, a great wonder of
anguish went over him, then the darkness covered him
entirely.
In the utter darkness, the unconscious, drowning body was
rolled along, the waters pouring, washing, filling in the
place. The cattle woke up and rose to their feet, the dog
began to yelp. And the unconscious, drowning body was washed
along in the black, swirling darkness, passively.
(The Rainbow, pp. 228-9)
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In the first place this passage communicates the physical force of the
element, and Tom's vulnerability in its presence. Part of the initial
fascination which the sight holds for Tom is the strangeness of there
being water in the place where usually there is none. He is compelled
to meet the 'running flood'. In drowning he becomes barely
distinguishable from the whole: he becomes part of the continually
moving flood and part of the darkness outside. In his final moments of
consciousness his struggle is to 'get himself free' (which was
momentarily Anna's impulse). His failure to do so marks his ultimate
unity with the whole. The manner of his death reinforces our sense,
nourished at the novel's opening, of the inseparability of the
Brangwens from their environment, their phenomenological world. In
death Tom is merged with the external world, with which he
nevertheless had an instinctive connection as a Brangwen: the
'freedom' evinced by the 'wave' is the freedom to be a part of the
whole, within the larger milieu. The individual and the background
become one, which is the mode, the specifically linguistic mode, of
The Rainbow.
In all the passages identified so far there is always the hand that
writes the tale. In none of the passages outlined above is the
character's consciousness simply or ingenuously represented. The
consciousness of individuals -- first the unspecified Brangwens
differentiated principally by gender, then specific characters -- is
communicated but not because they speak. The speaking voice, which is
Lawrence, is speaking in a way which is beyond the consciousness of
the characters involved whilst their presence in the physical scene
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makes that scene and language possible. The narrative language comes
in waves as the music does at Fred Brangwen's wedding, so that it is
possible to talk about 'the deep underwater' (R p.295) of the novel.
The description of the 'one great flood heaving slowly backwards to
the verge of oblivion, slowly forward to the other verge, the heart
sweeping along each time, and tightening with anguish as the limit was
reached, and the movement, at crisis, turned and swept back' (R
pp.295-96), can be applied to the narrative as much as to the dance
and dancers. The 'flood' of language in The Rainbow, heaving between
the great tide of oblivion and the individual wake of heightened
consciousness describes how the novel itself progresses. In the longer
passage relating to Anna Brangwen quoted above it is the 'forward-
travelling movement' which she has to escape. This movement is
inherent in the structure of generation and succession of The Rainbow.
It is in the simultaneity of styles in Women in Love that this 'wave'
is eventually halted.
'Undulating' as a description of the stylistic structure of The
Rainbow refers to waves as distinct from other water metaphors such as
the rainbow. The rainbow, formed by light reflecting from minute
droplets of water, is also a far from arbitrary image for Lawrence and
of course it is one of the novel's central images. Two poems, 'The
Rainbow' and 'Rainbow', (CF p.692, pp.818-20) give the double
significance to Lawrence of the rainbow as a phenomenon. The latter
relates more to Women in Love in its emphasis on the essential
separateness of man and woman, and to the condition of Tom and Lydia
as married, separate but meeting 'to the span of the heavens' (IR
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p.91). The former relates more closely to the implied connection
between water and consciousness:
Even the rainbow has a body
made of the drizzling rain
and is an architecture of glistening atoms
built up, built up
yet you can't lay your hand on it,
nay, nor even your mind.
(The Complete Poems, p.692)
In the poem the complex quality of the rainbow's presence is
paramount. The rainbow is manifested because of the light which
reveals it (it is light, but it needs water too, to have any
existence) just as the unconscious unconceals itself to the dreamer,
for instance, as a metaphorical chain. But the rainbow is more than
light: that is to say both concepts 'rainbow' and 'light' are
difficult to get hold of as Ideas. Another question persistently asked
by Lawrence, and underlined here, is how to understand what a rainbow
is rather than simply its cause, which is easy to comprehend. It is
the Idea itself, rather than cause and effect, which is elusive. Not
only that, but the idea of 'rainbow' depends on the idea of 'light',
and who, asks Lawrence, can explain the Idea of light? Only metaphor
can further thought along these lines: like the phosphorescent wave,
metaphor flows around Idea, revealing, in some part, its form. And
this is how metaphor in Lawrence addresses the problem of how to
understand the Idea of anything. Metaphor translates Idea into
something for the mind to understand. The poem describes the
elusiveness of Idea, for which the rainbow becomes a metaphor.
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To return to the rainbow, it is paradoxically both present and not
present, certainly not in the sense that Will's cathedral is three-
dimensionally present. The elusive quality of the rainbow's presence
can be inferred where the phenomenon occurs in the novel as 'actual',
as event, and it is useful to start with this sense of water as actual
in the novel. Beyond that, the recognition must be of 'water and wave'
as inseparable yet as being unconscious and conscious: like Tom
Brangwen one can be conscious of water, yet unconscious of the 'wave'.
This recognition is the linguistic achievement of The Rainbow.
Up to this point I have intentionally highlighted the wave imagery
as representing a specific and extensive body of metaphor within the
text. This is to establish The Rainbowo s terms. The wave imagery
relates to the sense in Lawrence of language as a sea of the
conceivable flowing around reality which is knowable but not
conceivable. The phosphorescent wave reveals the presence of some
form: it is the closest language can be to revealing that form. In The
Rainbow the language is like the wave which pulls back revealing the
stable rock: the rock would not glisten with its real presence if the
water had not first been there to reveal it.
The focus has returned and will continually return to the function
of metaphor in these works, and specifically to the view of language
to be inferred from it. The wave metaphor comes now to be seen as a
meta-level of narrative consciousness within the novel, the true focus
and interest of which is language. It is a 'subterranean' and fluid
level within the work which essentially speaks about the work and
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about language, in particular (as it applies to The Rainbow) and in
general. My next step will be to break down the notion of metaphor
further, by arguing that the language of the novel functions like the
metaphors it contains.
4.1 Language as Metaphor
It will now be evident that the use of water as a stylistic analogy is
a far from arbitrary choice on my part: as the examples cited show,
the image is itself derived from Lawrence. In 'A Propos of "Lady
Chatterley's Lover" (1930), the image of water combines with
Lawrence's 'belief in the blood' as the most appropriate way of re-
stating some basic principles of the 'metaphysic':
Two rivers of blood, are man and wife, two distinct
eternal streams, that have the power of touching and
communing and so renewing, making new one another, without
any breaking of the subtle confines, any confusing or
commingling. And the phallus is the connecting-link between
the two rivers, that establishes the two streams in a
oneness, and gives out of their duality a single current,
forever.
(Phoenix II, p.506)
He also Juxtaposes notions of 'the great dark blood-stream of
humanity' (Phoenix II, p.506, emphasis added), the 'streaming of the
sun and the flowing of the stars' (Phoenix II, p.506), and to this can
be added Lawrence's more general comments on the novel in the ninth
chapter of Lady Chatterley's Lover:
And here lies the vast importance of the novel, properly
handled. It can inform and lead into new places the flow of
our sympathetic consciousness, and it can lead our sympathy
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away in recoil from things gone dead. Therefore, the novel,
properly handled, can reveal the most secret places of life:
for it is in the passional secret places of life, above all,
that the tide of sensitive awareness needs to ebb and flow,
cleansing and freshening.
(Lady Chatterley's Lover, p.92)
can be. relaFed hp the
The explicit image of 'cleansing' i function of language in Lady
and &
Chatterley's Loveclis an idea which is more subliminally, but
Importantly, written in to the language of the earlier novels.
Language is the appropriate medium if the intention is to 'clean out'
ingrained conceptions of what is 'normal', 'natural' and 'right' in
human relations and attitudes. One of Lawrence's goals is not just to
question such conceptions analytically but to modify or transform them
by a continual, gradual, barely recognizable process, as with the word
'love'.
Quite apart from this explicit image of cleansing, water is an
image of psychic activity, as in the earlier reference to dream
process, and this is particularly true in The Rainbow. The choice of
water is not an arbitrary one: the Samesian concept of 'stream of
consciousness', for example, so significant to Symbolist and Modernist
novelists, is entirely familiar as a psychologist's metaphor but one
which grows out of a collective sense of the continuousness of
thought. But in Psychoanalysis and the Unconscious Lawrence was ironic
about this particular conception, linking it with Freud and the
Freudian conceptualization of the 'unknown' (F&P pp. 202-3). In
'Introduction to Pictures' (Phoenix, pp. 765-71) he returns the
concept to the physical but conscious body and to the 'flow' which, as
Deleuze and Guattari recognize, cuts across the psychologists' model:
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The nerves and brain are the apparatus by which we signal
and register consciousness. Consciousness, however, does not
take rise in the nerves and brain. It takes rise elsewhere:
In the blood, in the corpuscles, somewhere very primitive
and pre-nerve and pre-brain. ... All the cells of our body
are conscious. And all the time, they give off a stream of
consciousness which flows along the nerves and keeps us
spontaneously alive. While the flow streams through us, from
the blood to the heart, the bowls [sic], the viscera, then
along the sympathetic system of nerves into our spontaneous
minds, making us breathe, and see, and move, and be aware,
and do things spontaneously, while this flow streams as a
flame streams ceaselessly, we are lit up, we glow, we live.
('Introduction to Pictures', Phoenix, p.767)
The metaphorical language of streams and flows serves Lawrence's
'metaphysic' of presence, the special kind of experience to which the
language refers: we recall the meditation on the writing hand.
By the same token, water in Lawrence is an effective image of
consciousness and language because of its special qualities as a
changeable, pervasive, ever-present and sustaining medium. It is
distinct from the Modernist 'stream' which is usually individual and
typically describes a steady flow moving in a single direction. It is
not the engulfing image of The Rainbow 'where 'water and wave' Jointly
become an image of the evolving psyche, although the point about the
wave is that it has to be seen in relation to the whole 'body' of
which it is a part. The opening of the novel depicts Ursula's
forebears in psychological terms (Brangwen-consciousness), and the
often rehearsed movement throughout the book towards individuation
(completed in Ursula herself) is sustained principally by the water
and wave imagery. It would be inappropriate for Lawrence to
incorporate an external model of consciousness as influential as the
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Jamesian 'stream' into his novel as to do so would seriously undermine
his own sense of psychic evolution, a central theme in The Rainbom
and run counter to his own consciousness of language.
In short, Lawrence's own implicit view of language makes any
external theory irrelevant. The wave imagery in The Rainbow does not
mechanically reproduce or represent a linguistic consciousness, which
is Lawrence's view of the Modernist 'stream'. The significance of the
wave metaphor in his novel is precisely this: Lawrence is thinking
metaphorically about language as a medium rather than conceptually and
consciously. His 'thinking' is implicit rather than explicit, as suits
the nature of the subject. It is a 'thinking' which is at home in the
language of the novel, as an embodiment of Lawrence's intelligence,
rather than being a linguistic representation of any current, and
inevitably quite general, theory of consciousness.
In this lies the significant contrast between Lawrence, a central
but not a programmatic Modernist, and his contemporaries in the
British modernist tradition who are most usually associated with the
'stream of consciousness' conception. James Joyce and Virginia Woolf,
for instance, despite their intrinsic differences, represent a more
conscious approach to language and consciousness than Lawrence, and
one which is more evidently related to Symbolist innovations. The
central text in this regard is Ulysses with its decisive influence on
the European and American novel, at least. The 'stream of
consciousness' technique completed the move of 'consciousness' as a
novelistic preoccupation to a centre-stage position in the Euro-
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American tradition. With Joyce in mind, Virginia Woolf, in her essay
'Modern Fiction' (1919), famously considered the 'shower' and 'shape'
of thoughts in 'an ordinary mind on an ordinary day', and added that
'For the moderns ..., the point of interest, lies very likely in the
dark places of psychology' ('Modern Fiction', p.151, p.150, p.152
respectively).
It is generally agreed that the subject, in both Woolf and Joyce,
is recognizable by his or her linguistic contours. In both,
subjectivity does indeed lie behind the eyes: characters see and
thoughts are formed. In this way language becomes a legitimate subject
of their novels as each writer consciously pulls away from that which
Woolf designates a 'materialist' mode of fiction, at least in the
English novel (' Modern Fiction' p.147). Lawrence uses the term
'materialism' in a related context in 'The Individual V. Social
Consciousness', and echoes Woolf's comments on Galsworthy's uncritical
apprehension of 'reality'. Lawrence: 'in all his [Galsworthy's] books
I have not been able to discover one real individual -- nothing but
social individuals.' (Phoenix, p.763). Whilst it could be debated
whether or not Woolf herself actually uses 'stream of consciousness'
at all, she has for the most part shifted the emphasis in her novels
away from the body to the mind and language of the individual, but
Joyce is the more representative of the two. Given his celebrated
style it is useful to shift the critical gaze momentarily from the
considered use of 'stream of consciousness' to his use of metaphor.
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In Ulysses the relation of Homer's Odyssey to Joyce's fiction is
metaphorical given the extent of substitution and transposition
(Bloom/Odysseus). By the same token it is the Odysseys externality
which is both significant and inescapable as the external structure,
the 'framework', upon and around which Joyce's text is constructed.
There can be no expectation of an equivalent framework in Lawrence
where the central metaphor of a work, as in The Rainbow, arises from a
sense of language and is not separable from the language of the whole.
Were Lawrence to take up the Odyssey, as he sometimes takes up the
story of Christ, he would reinvest it with meaning according to his
personal 'metaphysic'. It would not be a re-writing or a re-
application in self-consciously modern terms precisely because for
Lawrence as a poet-philosopher language is more than simply a tool or
a technique. In his view a purely structural and thematic use of such
a culturally significant text is never more than a matter of making
mechanical equivalents, and 'mechanical' is a word which he would use
to describe the Modernist grasp of 'consciousness'.
Joyce and Woolf are to a significant extent responding to, and
contributing to, a specific historical moment. Their work brings into
relief the relation between a tradition and a counter-tradition, if
this is indeed the appropriate way to refer to the difference between
a Realist tradition and Symbolism/Modernism. Because Lawrence's
language-consciousness is not so consciously informed by the response
which their work manifests, in him the focus must inevitably and
uniquely be on an emergent and highly personal view of language which
can only be inferred and derived from the metaphorical levels in his
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texts. Whilst he is aware of the distance between his own language and
'metaphysic' and a distinct literary tradition, he does not make that
distance a principal and conscious preoccupation in his own work. This
is clearly one of the reasons for allying Lawrence on one level with
figures like Freud and Nietzsche rather than Joyce and Woolf, because
of the recognition among the former pair of metaphorical discourse as
the necessary vehicle of thought. It is now a commonplace to say that
neither consciousness nor language can be discussed non-
metaphorically. Lawrence is a writer who most subtly exemplifies the
reasons why this should be the case. Nietzche is more analytical about
the whole question of metaphor, his point of view being that the
language we use gives us various models of reality, which is the case
in an individual context as well as a cultural one. The highly
metaphorical language of Lawrence's nominally 'discursive' essays
where the reader might expect a barely metaphorical style underlines
this point.
Water as a metaphor for consciousness is not simply illustrative in
an ad hoc way, therefore, but arises intrinsically from Lawrence's
sense of language. It is worth briefly considering, in the light of
this statement, some fundamental attributes of water.
Naturalistically, water has properties which distinguish it from the
other elements. Water falls as rain, for example, and is present on
the earth as such. Nevertheless, the rain which has fallen dries up
leaving no immediately identifiable trace to suggest that it has been
there at all (apart from in memory). This transitory quality of water
can lead us to question, therefore, whether it is in fact part of the
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world at all or whether it simply lies for a time on the surface, to
disappear: if rain evaporates simply to fall again, it is nevertheless
possible for lakes and rivers to be full but to dry up completely.
Water occurs underground, lying at subterranean levels, or it can be
invisible, present on, under and above the earth in different forms.
Even if we do not move beyond the crudest of analogies, these
features help to attend to the nature of language with its multiple
levels of meaning, including subliminal levels, and the fact that
language itself is only ever ambivalently 'present' (at least in
speech). References in The Rainbow reveal clearly enough that, up to a
point, Lawrence had thought about this linguistic analogy, and that
the pertinence of the metaphor is not accidenta1. 2 It came to him
'unwatched' because at some deep level he was conscious of it. In 'The
Marsh and the Flood' (The Rainbow, chapter IX) Tom Brangwen meditates
aloud on the changeable quality of water:
Th' rain tumbles down just to mount up in clouds again. So
they say. There's no more water on the earth than there was
in the year naught. That's the story, my boy, if you
understand it. There's no more today than there was a
thousand years ago -- nor no less either. You can't wear
water out. No, my boy: it'll give you the go-by. Try to wear
it out, and it takes its hook into vapour, it has its
fingers at its nose to you. It turns into cloud and falleth
as rain on the just and unjust.
(The Rainbow, p.227)
This is not simply Tom rambling. In the first place his words recall
the Creation, with the world created from the separation of the waters
(water draws back and reveals presence: this is a recurring idea in
Lawrence). On another level, its being in a continually changing state
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makes water extremely interesting and appropriate for Lawrence who
will throughout The Rainbow use water to talk about something else.
Paul Ricoeur's reference to the 'living event of actual speech' (RM
p.62) underlines its transient non-fixed quality, like
Tom's/Lawrence's sense of water. Speech could be said metaphorically
to 'evaporate' on being uttered, leaving no physical traces. What has
been heard is lodged (temporarily) only in the mind and thoughts of
the listener. It is hardly a coincidence that 'dry up' is a vulgar
euphemism for 'don't say anything more', something which indicates
that the homology between water and speech is lodged in collective
consciousness. This recalls my earlier remarks on 'dead' metaphor, my
references to an existing body of metaphor which as Lawrence reminds
us is increasingly pertinent. ' Dry up' is part of the common stock of
metaphors but it is entirely apposite for Lawrence's view of language
here.
It can be asked of both speech and water, 'Where does it come
from?', a single point of origin, a neutral state, being difficult to
isolate in each. But speech and water are fundamentally physical:
Nietzsche, for instance, refers to the physical event of speech, I. e.
of making metaphors (PT p,82). The suggestion is not that Lawrence
formulated this correspondence consciously. On the contrary, his
recognition of the homologous characteristics of language and water
springs from a very deep source (to employ a watery metaphor) in one
whose perception of the nature of language is acute. We have in
Lawrence a subconscious alertness to the inventiveness and
appropriateness of a certain level of metaphor in a 'philosophical'
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context and to philosophical ends. The reader must recognize that the
water/speech equivalence is serviceable up to a point. What it does
not do is take account of the view of language in terms of particular
categories, of language as a political construct for example, of
language as discourse, but this is because the emphasis is on the
'wholeness', the whole 'body', of language rather than its particular
configurations which cannot in the end be regarded as separate from
the whole.
I hope by this to show that Lawrence's use of water imagery is not
in any sense arbitrary and that its implications are far reaching not
least in the context of The Rainbow. In my second chapter the idea of
the 'phosphorescent wave', from a passage in Psychoanalysis and the
Unconscious, was developed as a metaphor for language in a general
sense, underlining the radar effect of a phosphorescent wave which
reveals the presence of an object in its entirety without necessarily
dwelling on the details of the object. A phosphorescent wave is a
luminous moment set apart from the more familiar repetitive character
of waves. Its importance as an image of consciousness and language is
that it reveals the presence of something in an instant, which makes
It appropriate in the context of Women in Love. The contrast with The
Rainbow has a great deal to do with juxtaposing this sense of
immediacy and simultaneity with the kind of repetition which
characterizes the language of The Rainbow, and the gradual build up
within the narrative language to passages of heightened significance,
which my earlier examples illustrated. This is to underline the
principal difference in styles between the two novels, given that
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'style' itself is a set of principles which characterize a text, and
to go some way to explaining why the styles of The Rainbow can be
called 'undulating'.
So far the emphasis has been explicitly on language as a medium. No
formal 'abstract' view of language has been proposed by Lawrence, and
yet his language-consciousness is evident. The emphasis, then, must be
on a pervasive consciousness of language emerging through the text's
central metaphor, a view which is implied by that metaphor. It has
been stressed how far what is expressed here is a view of language
which is derived from the text rather than from an external source
which is in part Lawrence's strength. The real significance of the
novel then is in the language and in its action, the two being
inseparable. With this in mind I propose to examine 'water and wave'
further, gradually moving towards an understanding of the Lawrencean
individual in The Rainbow who must inevitably be seen in the context
of this vast metaphor.
Crucially, the surface of the wave and the structure of the wave
beneath the surface are meaningful to Lawrence as allotropes of water,
to recall an earlier occasion where Lawrence famously states what is
special in his novels:
You mustn't look in my novel for the old stable ego of the
character. There is another ego, according to whose action
the individual is unrecognisable, and passes through, as it
were, allotropic states which it needs a deeper sense than
any we've been used to exercise, to discover are states of
the same single radically-unchanged element. (Like as
diamond and coal are the same pure single element of carbon.
The ordinary novel would trace the history of the diamond --
but I say 'diamond, what! This is carbon.' And my diamond
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might be coal or soot, and my theme is carbon.)
(Letters, II, p.183)
A wave looks on the surface as though it is moving and breaking at a
point which lies at some distance from its beginning. The surface of
the water, like the space of water observed by Ursula in 'The
Bitterness of Ecstasy' (The Rainbow, chapter XV), appears to be
mobile, a kinaesthetic form. The undulating, repetitive, surface has
its own rhythm. Beneath the surface of the wave, however, a different
condition exists. According to the laws of physics wave formation is
due to a force defined as an energy-carrying disturbance, spreading
through a medium, here water, and causing a local displacement of the
medium. Water particles oscillate up and down in response to the
disturbance, and the up and down motion makes the wave visible on the
surface as areas of water rise above and return to the general level.
The pattern is of swells and troughs alternating. Therefore, on the
surface the effect is of a mobile body of water moving to the shore in
response to a natural phenomenon like the wind, for example, but
beneath the surface water particles are being displaced up-and-down
and are not moving laterally very far at all. So, in macro and micro
terms, whilst there is a sense of continual movement on the surface,
there is also always the node, the point of zero, or minimal, movement
below.
This sense of there being two forms, of something being one thing
on the surface and another thing beneath the surface, is how waves
refer to allotropic states, so significant for Lawrence in the
description of the relation, for instance, of diamond and coal to
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carbon. Despite its various forms water is the 'radically-unchanged
element', as is carbon in the famous example. This supplements the
fact that a wave is composed of countless water particles, and cannot
be what it is without these particles, which makes it a good image of
the Lawrencean individual in The Rainbow. As the great and sweeping
wave is comprised of minute particles indistinguishable from the
whole, so the individual in The Rainbow is a part of the greater life,
an element at home in the external world. The individual consciousness
is submerged in the novel's language, which also sustains it.
The 'wave' metaphor also refers to the life of the single word in
the novel and is, as is evident by now, deeply implicated in the
differences between The Rainbow and Women in Love. It is useful to
begin by imagining a human figure treading water in the sea. A wave
builds up and lifts the figure in its swell so that the figure is
raised, in the area of water s/he inhabits, above the general level.
, As the wave 'passes', the figure is let down (in a trough) to that
same general level until the next wave when the action is repeated.
The figure has not in fact been carried forward by or on the wave, but
is rising and falling with the water level and is consequently staying
in roughly the same place. The wave therefore passes around the
figure, that is to say it passes in spite of the figure. Inasmuch as
the force which causes the wave might be felt by the individual it
could be said to pass through, and not Just around the figure,
although literally of course the water does pass around and underneath
the physical body. This constitutes a very literal representation of
an engulfing medium. In Women in Love, in contrast, as I have implied,
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the distance between the individual and the background is more
explicit. At some point a gulf has opened up between them so that the
Lawrencean individuals do not 'belong' in that novel as they do in The
Rainbow. The drama of this split, this rupture, is contained in the
double meanings of the word 'cleave' in Women in Love, which
simultaneously (and oxymoronically) designates a splitting away from
something and an adhering. In the dance of the three women at
Breadalby, for instance, Gudrun's 'cleaving' is mentioned repeatedly
(WL pp.91-92), and for the most part it is the condition of the
individual in that novel to be apart without achieving positive
singleness.
Women in Love memorably offers its own image of a human figure in
water in the form of Gerald Crich swimming in the lake in 'Diver', an
image which usefully contrasts with my own. In my hypothetical example
the wave passes around the figure which is essentially a part of the
whole, it being displaced with the whole body of water as the wave
passes. Gerald Crich, in contrast, pushes himself through the water of
the lake. Physically in the water, he is isolated from it, a foreign
body in the midst of a medium which is in Lawrence's words
'uncreated', wilfully following his own trajectory. He does not have
an effortless unity with the watery medium, or the larger scene, but
Is fundamentally (as well as literally, of course) 'separate' from it:
this represents the disjunctive relationship of Lawrencean character
to world which characterizes Women in Love, quite different from The
Rainbow's 'belonging'. It is a world which is different from the world
of The Rainbow which is always richly, and sometimes suffocatingly,
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importance of context is discussed briefly by Paul Ricoeur who makes a
useful distinction in pointing out that words 'acquire an actual
meaning only in a sentence'. In other words the meaning of a word
depends entirely on its context. Words listed in a dictionary, he
adds, are only 'lexical entities' having 'merely potential meanings'.
Indeed, metaphor is a 'contextual change of meaning' and not a lexical
one (HHS pp. 169-70). Ricoeur is talking about metaphor at a rhetorical
level, about living metaphor in the sentence, in his view the smallest
unit of proper sense. However, his words apply obliquely in the
present context as The Rainbow dramatizes his point, at least with
regard to Lawrence's key words: 'presence' and 'reality', it is
generally recognized, change their meaning within the narrative
according to context. In Women in Love, an the other hand, actual
meanings are in crisis. Like Gerald swimming, and not merging with the
scene, in Women in Love it is the word which 'pushes through' the
language around it, and this is the 'frictional' quality of the
language. Instead of the word seeming fixed and having language
(sense) passing through it (the sweeping wave of The Rainbow), it is
more active: it interrogates by 'disturbing' and as I argued earlier,
destabilizing, its surroundings.
It is difficult not to talk about the language of Lawrence's
fiction without eventually arriving at the problem, or otherwise, of
these key words. They are distributed evenly and overtly throughout
the important (philosophical) narratives, comprising the Lawrencean
lexicon which includes the words 'presence' and 'reality'. 'Knowledge'
is another, but I need not linger on that word here because its
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importance has been addressed in my second chapter on the conception
of language being thought in Lawrence's essays on the unconscious.
Different thinkers on Lawrence's language have subjected these words
to different pressures. Michael Bell calls them 'verbal motifs' which
constitute a 'speculative discourse' (Bell, p.73) within the narrative
of The Rainbow: they are words which Lawrence deploys so that, at
appropriate moments, they take on a psychological and ontological
weight which they do not ordinarily possess. Once again context is
crucial. So like Ragussis, and to a lesser extent John Worthen,3
Michael Bell has focused on a philosophical vocabulary within the
narrative of a particular novel. Regarding 'presence', 'reality' and
'knowledge' he rightly draws attention to the fact that in The
Rainbow,
Lawrence constantly uses these terms in contradictory
clusters so that their normal meaning is challenged,
modified or reversed Or else he uses the word singly but
with an odd inflection that leads us to construct its
significance anew in context. The effect of this is
progressively to impart a constitutively psychological
factor into the existential claims of these terms.
(Bell, p.73, my italics.)
That is to say, as motifs, they represent a special mode of Brangwen
subjectivity. As before, Michael Bell is identifying certain local
effects within the narrative and in doing so is highlighting
particular ontological structures within Lawrence's language. I would
add that there is also a more general quality of language being
indicated here inasmuch as this quality of a reversal of meaning, a
semantic challenge, sustained in the same word deployed more than once
in a given context is significant because it enables the oxymoronic
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consciousness which permeates Lawrence's narratives to come, once
again, into view. In my last chapter I suggested that the oxymoronic
in Lawrence, and particularly in Women in Love, deserves greater
attention than it has received because it invests Lawrence's language,
In its very grain, with a philosophical specificity. That is to say,
there is more at stake in Lawrence's oxymoronic consciousness than
simply rhetoric. Regarding these key words we must once again confront
the oxymoronic at a level which is below rhetoric but not below
language.
If words like 'reality' are characterized in Lawrence's narratives
chiefly by the opposing meanings they are sometimes made to bear, it
Is a sign of the oxymoronic functioning at even deeper levels in the
text than we previously suspected, as in the word 'love' for example.
Where the reader encounters a reversal of meaning in a single word
which is used repeatedly, s/he is justified in identifying an
oxymoronic movement of meaning within that word. Indeed, this is one
of the effects of deploying the same word more than once in a
relatively brief passage: consciously or unconsciously, the reader
responds to a new suggestion, a different meaning, especially within a
relatively narrow context. Such a deployment of words is typically
'Lawrencean'. The day-to-day meaning of the word is still accessible,
and in play, but interacting with the 'Lawrencean' inflection. Indeed,
we respond to the Lawrencean sense largely because of our familiarity
with the everyday 'proper' sense. The example of Lydia passing Tom on
the road, and his response, is frequently cited in the debate on these
key words in Lawrence 4. and I shall use it again, but this time to
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point up the oxymoronic force of 'reality' juxtaposed with 'reality'.
As Lydia passes, Tom feels himself inhabiting 'a far world, the
fragile reality' which is different from the 'reality' which his new
world is 'beyond' several lines later (R p.29). The novel contains
many such examples. In the first instance, placing the word 'reality'
next to itself in a context like this where each time it signifies
differently is oxymoronic, and by the same token, an oxymoronic
dynamic is being identified in the single word, as it was in 'love'.
Lawrence's point is that the single word 'reality' potentially
contains both its 'proper' meaning, and its reverse. My suggestion is
that the deployment of these words in the manner described is
oxymoronic, not because two different elements are brought together in
unusual proximity (which is how we usually understand oxymoron) but
because the same word is repeated in a context where its meaning is
reversed, I. e. placing the same words together creates the oxymoron.
By extension, in using the word singly, its oxymoronic quality is
Implicitly present as a possibility. The oxymoronic dynamic is thus
the play of opposing meanings in the key word. The real significance
of this is what it communicates of Lawrence's sense of language in
general: once again the suggestion is that meaning has an oxymoronic
tendency, rather than a centripetal or centrifugal one, which are the
usual models of meaning on offer. This recognition which underpins,
indeed is, the 'metaphysic' of Women in Love, is potentially present
In The Rainbow.
Whether the critical enterprise is to point up, as Michael Bell
does, the ontological pressure which Lawrence exerts on single words,
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or whether it is to target their metaphorical (oxymoronic)
significance, these particular words continue to attract the
attention of critics. They are words which are ideally placed to focus
the questions of Self, Being, World and Language which increasingly
preoccupy Lawrence's readers. Some brief examples are sufficient to
demonstrate their importance.
In 'The Cathedral' (The Rainbow, chapter VII) the word 'reality'
occurs repeatedly in a context which expressly underlines the fact
that it does not signify the phenomenological world but Will
Brangwen's 'reality' as it is embodied by the church building. It is a
word which does not enter the narrative until Anna's remarks have
interfered with his illusions about the cathedral's 'absolute' value
for him, and when it does it refers, not to the empirical world but,
apparently paradoxically, to those illusions. We have Will's 'beloved
realities' and the 'mysterious world of reality' (R p.190), the
'reality' which is an 'order' or system for him, within the church
where 'all reality gathered' (R p.191): in plain terms 'reality' is
the wrong word except that it is appropriate for Will, being his
projection, his interpretation of a milieu which is graphically, even
'concretely', apart from the 'chaos' (R p.191). Anna's experience, the
language used to describe her sense of things as they are, underlines
the contradictions in play in the word: in the reality of child-birth
and child-rearing she puts off 'all adventure into unknown realities'
(R p.191, emphasis added). The phrase emphasized is profoundly
oxymoronic, and points up the contradictory play of meaning which
pervades the book but without bearing the 'metaphysic' as it will do
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in Women in Love. Each character, in short, occupies different
realities, and subjectivity is understood as this difference, and the
continual generation of different perspectives. Although the reader
can deduce the meaning of the word in context the whole question of
definition is far from conscious in The Rainbow. The characters do not
struggle with definitions because, as has often been pointed out, they
do not live verbally. This is a further significant point of contrast
with Women in Love and is the force of Ragussis's comments on
contextuality in Women in Love that 'The words seem to define
themselves through context, through their associations with other
words' (Ragussis, p.183). This might, however, be a better description
of the mode of The Rainbow in Women in Love what a word means is less
to do with its immediate context than with the larger problem of
'Language' and how it delimits 'reality'.
An example from Women in Love serves to show how extremely the
function of these key words has changed in that novel. Once again the
word which I have singled out for consideration is 'reality'. The
broad context is 'Excurse' (Women in Love, chapter XXIII):
Even as he [Birkinl went into the lighted, public place he
remained dark and magic, the living silence seemed the body
of reality in him, subtle, potent, indiscoverable. There he
was! In a strange uplift of elation she saw him, the being
never to be revealed, awful in its potency, mystic and real.
This dark, subtle reality of him, never to be translated,
liberated her into perfection, her own perfected being. She
too was dark and fulfilled in silence,
(Women in Love, p.319)
The emphasis on indiscoverability and untranslateability in relation
to the word 'reality' is very important here. Where 'reality' occurs
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for a second time it is very difficult to decide whether it is the
word or the experience which is 'never to be translated'. The meaning
of this passage is palpably more difficult to grasp than that in the
passages above from The Rainbow. The word 'indiscoverable' and the
phrase 'never to be translated', far from explaining the meaning of
'reality', highlight its inexpressibility. Ultimately the reader is
left to question, rather than decide, what it is that they refer to.
That the language is apparently begging questions, that it is in
relation to The Rainbow more problematic, is not a weakness of style
in Women in Love, but points to Lawrence's preoccupation in that novel
with his sense of the limitations of language, anyway a central theme.
Women in Love is making the whole question of meaning more conscious,
which is, I take it, Ragussis's point. Yet in the context of any
discussion on language, language itself is not overtly the subject:
the subject is what Lawrence's sense of language both is and what it
points to.
The emphasis in the passage Just quoted is on Birkin's 'presence';
on a quality which is unconcealed but still mysterious. There follow
two passages from The Rainbow where the word 'presence' is repeated.
The first describes Lydia Lensky becoming more conscious of her
Yorkshire surroundings:
Walking down, she found the bluebells around her glowing
like a presence, among the trees.
Summer came, the moors were tangled with harebells like
water in the ruts of the roads, the heather came rosy under
the skies, setting the whole world awake. And she was
uneasy. She went past the gorse bushes shrinking from their
presence, she stepped into the heather as into a quickening
bath that almost hurt.
(The Rainbow, p.51, emphasis added)
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while the second highlights Will Brangwen's relation with the infant
Ursula:
He left the shed door on the latch. And when, with his
second sense of another presence, he knew she was coming, he
was satisfied, he was at rest. When he was alone with her,
he did not want to take notice, to talk. He wanted to live
unthinking, with her presence flickering upon him.
(The Rainbow, p.201, emphasis added)
The reader is not arrested by a sense that the words highlighted in
each passage are especially challenging. In both examples the context
prevents the word 'presence' from being difficult to understand. In
each instance the sense of the word can be grasped although its
meaning changes from passage to passage, and in some cases from
instance to instance. Although the word signifies differently from
passage to passage, each time it occurs the relevant meaning is
secured by the context. This underlines our general sense that meaning
does not, therefore, belong solely to the individual word, but is
provided by its surroundings. A signified is not cemented to a
signifier in some inevitable and inflexible sense, rather, meaning is
constituted as part of the sentence which is itself constituted as
part of a broader context. The focus here is on emergent meanings
rather than lexical or 'proper' meaning. In the first passage the
context makes it possible for the reader to recognize both the
noumenal and the numinous in Lydia's surroundings. In the second,
'presence' refers explicitly to the young Ursula about to enter and,
from his point of view, enrich, Will's world. In the first passage the
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presence of the environment is felt in a physical sense like pain; in
the second 'presence' refers more to Will's consciousness of Ursula.
Different critics of course approach these key words differently
and in the end their viewpoints are likely to have an accumulative
value. To sum up my position, in the passages from The Rainbow 'where
the key words are explained by their context, this is not the same as
the word acquiring a fixed meaning, and an emergent oxymoronic dynamic
can be identified as continually present in the life of the word. Like
the figure in the water in my example, as opposed to the figure of
Gerald Crich in 'Diver', language is in place in this novel with
meaning passing around, or beneath, the word. It is as if the word is
transparent and the reader sees the relevant meaning (explained by
context) pass 'under' it: sense is constructed relatively
unproblematically. In contrast, in the example from Women in Love
potent words like 'reality' seem to move through the text, as Gerald
The. meanings of
Crich pushes through the water of the lake./ these words are not fixed,
having a more exploratory or experimental, a more conscious,
function. In Women in Love, as the example about Birkin above shows,
the reader cannot unproblematically alight on a meaning and pass on,
because it is not here the function of the sentence, or the larger
context, to provide such easy access to meaning. In examining these
differences between the two novels it has been useful to cite examples
which deal with the individual, like the moment of Gerald swimming,
and the moment of Tom's seeing Lydia on the road. I propose next to
consider further the profound relation of language and the individual,
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principally in The Rainbow, which is something my examination has been
working towards.
4.2 Language and the Individual
The question of individuality furthers the fundamental point about
'belonging' and 'disjunction' made by my analysis of the condition of
the word in each novel. The water images in both Women in Love and The
Rainbow underline the different treatment of individuality and
'belonging' in the books. A passage from 'The Novel' underscores the
significance of the concept of 'belonging' to Lawrence. Constructing
his argument he turns to consider the furniture in the room where he
sits and writes:
That silly iron stove somehow belongs. Whereas this thin-
shanked table doesn't belong. It is a mere disconnected
lump, like a cut-off finger.
('The Novel', in Study of Thomas Hardy and Other Essays,
p.183)
This indirectly describes the condition of the individual in The
Rainbow and Women in Love respectively: the Brangwens belong in the
same way Lawrence's stove belongs in its immediate milieu. In Women in
Love belonging is more problematic, with the Lawrencean figures only
too conscious of their lack of meaningful connection with their
'world', but the Lawrencean figures in The Rainbow experience a more
complex kind of freedom than those in Women in Love. They are 'free'
within an enveloping milieu. Their consciousness is not separable from
that whole environment. So they are not existentially 'free' as the
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'astral' figures of Women in Love may be, but in that novel such
'freedom' itself is shown to be problematic, if not illusory.
This problem of freedom is most thoroughly identified in Ursula
seen first in the context of her family before the narrative shifts to
the details of her personal experience. The wave image continues to
operate remaining a prominent feature of the novel's 'actual'
landscape. Away with her family, Ursula watches a wave at sea. The
description communicates the familiar reality of a 'real' wave,
present in the fictional world, and Ursula's sense of it as
symbolizing her condition:
Then came a time when the sea was rough. She watched the
water travelling in to the coast, she watched a big wave
running unnoticed, to burst in a shock of foam against a
rock, enveloping all in a great white beauty, to pour away
again, leaving the rock emerged black and teeming. Oh, and
If, when the wave burst into whiteness, it were only set
free!
(The Rainbow, p.402)
Ursula's response is to a deep, sweeping, eternal life which the wave
represents to her and which is central to The Rainbow. But it is also
a commonplace that in Ursula Lawrence represents the move towards
individuation which distinguishes the end of the novel from its
beginning. The image of the wave pulling away from the rock, and the
fact that the rock is left singular and distinct from the 'enveloping'
water, foregrounds the violent separateness which I underlined in
Women in Love. At the beginning of 'Moony', for instance, Ursula's
metaphysical state is described in the same language: 'One was a tiny
little rock with the tide of nothingness rising higher and higher. She
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herself was real, and only herself -- just like a rock in a wash of
flood-water. The rest was all nothingness. She was hard and
indifferent, isolated in herself.' (WL p.244).
It is worth highlighting one more example from Ursula's experience.
I propose to consider the force of the water and wave imagery in the
episode which describes Ursula's encounter with the horses in the
final chapter of the novel. Ursula leaves the house in an attempt to
dispel the 'tumult' within her while she waits to hear from
Skrebensky, 'that her course should be resolved' (R p.450, emphasis
added). It is not accidental that she is placed in 'the chaos of rain'
(R p.450) and Lawrence goes to some lengths to establish her watery
context: she sees Willey water at a distance through low c/ouct, 'the
hawthorn trees streamed like hair on the wind' (R p.450, emphasis
added). At this point she feels inside the rain. Her frame of vision,
which is to become filled with the oppressively close flanks and
hooves of the horses, is taken up momentarily with the 'visionary'
colliery before 'the veils closed again. She was glad of the rain's
privacy and intimacy' (R p.450). At this point she is enclosed,
'encircled' (R p.450), by and within the environment but there is a
strong sense in the language of her resistance to this enveloping
milieu:
She turned under the shelter of the common, seeing the
great veils of rain swinging with slow, floating waves
across the landscape. She was very wet and a long way from
home, far enveloped in the rain and the waving landscape.
She must beat her way back through all this fluctuation,
back to stability and security.
(The Rainbow, p.451)
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The final sentence looks ahead to other Lawrencean figures who beat
their way through a watery environment, notably Gerald Crich.
Consequently it is another statement which anticipates Ursula's
individuation in Women in Love, in terms of her separation from the
engulfing world of The Rainbow In the next line she is 'a solitary
thing' herself going 'through the wash of hollow space' (R p.451). It
is significant that it is here the individual who presses on and goes
'through' the world, and this in itself identifies Ursula's
fundamental difference from the other Brangwens of The Rainbow: if
Ursula is now a conscious and 'solitary thing' pushing through her
world, the early Brangwens especially were people through whom
consciousness, language, that is to say life itself, passed, By this
stage Ursula propels herself along her own trajectory: 'She would go
straight on, and on, and be gone by.' (R p.451). Any sense of anything
passing through Ursula now, in this encounter, is equated with pain
and resistance. For a moment the 'wave' is transformed into the
horses:
But the horses had burst before her. In a sort of
lightning of knowledge their movement travelled through her,
the quiver and strain and thrust of their powerful flanks,
as they burst before her and drew on, beyond.
(The Rainbow, p.452, emphasis added)
The horses are now part of the water whilst she is separate. They are
also a mid-term between the driving rain (as pervasive) and Ursula
herself (as becoming singular). Like water, they crash down upon her
'thunderously about her, enclosing her' in a 'burst transport' (R
p.453). After this Ursula herself is 'dissolved like water' with
'limbs like water' (R p.453), before her individuation is articulated
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finally as a separation from the 'wave' of experience:
As she sat there, spent, time and the flux of change
passed away from her, she lay as if unconscious upon the bed
of the stream, like a stone, unconscious, unchanging,
unchangeable, whilst everything rolled by in transience,
leaving her there, a stone at rest on the bed of the stream,
Inalterable and passive, sunk to the bottom of all change.
(The Rainbow, p.454)
So it is that the individuation of Ursula is completed in terms of the
'wave' and, ultimately, her being separate from it. The significance
of the horses is not purely what they might represent in Ursula, which
is the usual critical assumption, but lies, at least equally, in their
relation to the water.
The water images in Women in Love provide a different perspective
on the same theme, stressing the individual's isolation. In 'Water-
Party' water is a boundary, a surface, a dividing line between two
worlds, as in 'Moony' it is a mirror. The human figures are 'on the
water' (WL p.178, emphasis added). The under water of the lake is a
hostile and mysterious world: diving in it for the bodies of his
sister and her potential rescuer Gerald, far from being a part of the
scene, is 'gone' (WL p.181), he is absent. The extent of the isolation
of the human figures in Women in Love, of their separation from the
larger scene, or sweep, of life, is summed up in Gudrun's experience
as she waits for Gerald to surface for the second time:
She was so alone, with the level, unliving field of the
water stretching beneath her. It was not a good isolation,
it was a terrible, cold separation of suspense. She was
suspended upon the surface of the insidious reality until
such time as she should disappear beneath it.
(Women in Love, p. 182)
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'Reality' here is not the whole, but a subtle and treacherous world
with which she has a troubled connection: far from implying
'belonging', the word 'insidious' (insidere, to sit in) signifies a
being 'in' something, like captivity, rather than The Rainbow's 'being
a part of' something. Alienation, loss and separation are the central
ideas rather than integration with the broader natural world which we
perceive even at the moment of Tom Brangwen's death. What follows is
not a statement of integration but of suffocation, deprivation and
ultimately, bereavement: 'everything was drowned within it [the water
of the lake], drowned and lost' (WL p.185). The flood which kills Tom
and the drowning in 'Water-Party' are significant as events but they
are also subtle metaphors for 'belonging' and alienation respectively.
The different perspectives which they represent on individuality and
'belonging' underline the fundamental differences between Women in
Love and The Rainbow. The 'reality' which occupies Gudrun's thoughts
in the passage above seems to be a fragment or part of the whole, but
it resists definition or contextualization. The best that can be said
is that the whole world is now conceived of as fragmented: the
'reality' under the lake's surface; the 'reality' above it; the
'reality' experienced by the highly conscious Lawrencean characters as
individuals; even the underworld of the mines; and the abstract
cosmology of Birkin's 'star-equilibrium'.
It is now possible to see fully how the water image in each book is
linked to the style of each. The 'wave' of The Rainbow incorporates
the whole, and all the Lawrencean figures fit into the broader scheme.
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In Women in Love the human figures are 'suspended', a key word in the
novel which in its literal sense reinforces their lack of connection
with a background. The Rainbow on the other hand presents, in its
language and action, a complex image of freedom within an engulfing
but sustaining medium. This is to underline Lawrence's sense of a
'living continuum' which is so apposite for The Rainbow:
Paradoxical as it may sound, the individual is only truly
himself when he is unconscious of his own individuality,
when he is unaware of his own isolation, when he is not
split into subjective and objective, when there is no me or
you, no me or it in his consciousness, but the me and you,
the me and it is a living continuum; as if all were
connected by a living membrane.
('The Individual Consciousness V. The Social Consciousness'
In Phoenix; p.761)
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Chapter Four. Undulating Styles: The Rainbow
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CHAPTER FIVE
LAWRENCE AND LANGUAGE
I am now in a position to consider Lawrence's view of language in a
broader, more analytical context. Towards the end of 'On Truth and
Lies in a Nonmoral Sense' Nietzsche makes a statement which
anticipates a Modernist idea of language. It also contains a directive
for the real philosopher;
The free intellect copies human life, but it considers this
life to be something good and seems to be quite satisfied
with it. That immense framework and planking of concepts to
which the needy man clings his whole life long in order to
preserve himself is nothing but a scaffolding and toy for
the most audacious feats of the liberated intellect. And
when it smashes this framework to pieces, throws it into
confusion, and puts it back together in an ironic fashion,
pairing the most alien things and separating the closest, it
is demonstrating that it has no need of these makeshifts of
indigence and that it will now be guided by intuitions
rather than by concepts. There is no regular path which
leads from these intuitions into the land of ghostly
schemata, the land of abstractions. There exists no word for
these intuitions; when man sees them he grows dumb, or else
he speaks on15i in forbidden metaphors and in unheard-of
combinations of concepts. He does this so that by shattering
and mocking the old conceptual barriers he may at least
correspond creatively to the impression of the powerful
present intuition. (PT p.90)
It is the iconoclasm of this passage, combined with the positive
effects of restructuring the 'framework' intuitively and in the
'ironic' way described, which anticipates a Modernist view of
language, particularly in the last sentence. It is the liberated
intellect, no longer governed by concepts, which must break down and
recreate differently the 'framework'. The entire essay (which is
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barely more than a creative sketch where Nietzsche can lay down some
first terms), is a dialectic between rational man and intuitive man,
and towards the end it seems to be approaching a sense of art and
philosophy as interacting more than they have done traditionally.
The passage may be compared with Heidegger's lecture on 'The Nature
of Language',' partly because of this concentration on the
interconnectedness of art and philosophy, and because the starting
point for Nietzsche's reflections is
language. The discourses with which Heidegger concerns himself are
poetry and thought, attributing a different language to each.
Obviously poetry and thought do not function alone in a culture, and
many other modes of language exist, but the languages of poetry and
thought have already in part been privileged in the culture because
their respective traits are most prominent and distinctive. Hence,
Heidegger like Nietzsche ascribes a sort of initiative to thought and
to poetry, but not the same initiative in both. These thinkers
sues
	 that human understanding does not occur through deduction
but that understanding (as opposed to explanation) is necessarily
aboak the ne5 Itcl-cci osibiIie3 of tractplior as	 Mode of wick( 66104413
metaphorical. This cir3umenE	 underpins the present chapter and by
extension my entire thesis. At a relatively early point in his lecture
Heidegger draws attention to a fundamental distinction between the
language of poetry and the language of thought, and in so doing
describes the situation in which philosophers, as thinkers, find
themselves:
Poetry and thought, each needs the other in its
neighborhood, each in its fashion, when it comes to
ultimates. In what region the neighborhood itself has its
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domain, each of them, thought and poetry, will define
differently, but always so that they will find themselves
within the same domain. But because we are caught in the
prejudice nurtured through centuries that thinking is a
matter of ratiocination, that is, of calculation in the
widest sense, the mere talk of a neighborhood of thinking to
poetry is suspect. (OWL p.70)
Heidegger's position here is very close to Nietzsche's in 'On Truth
and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense'. Philosophers have for centuries, for
the whole history of philosophy, been used to, and have used, a
ratiocinative (as Heidegger says, a calculating and deliberate)
language. We are reminded here of Nietzsche's distinction between
rational man and intuitive man (the artist and 'real' philosopher). It
is Heidegger's belief, and Nietzsche's, that poetic language is in
Itself a 'thinking about' which is free from the limits of
ratiocination (poetry is a different kind of questioning from that
which is the principal mode of Western philosophizing). As if to
emphasize his radical apprehension of poetry and thought sharing a
'neighbourhood', Heidegger adds metaphorically that 'Thinking is not a
means to gain knowledge. Thinking cuts furrows into the soil of
Being.' (OWL p.70),
He himself institutes a demonstrative play with words in this
lecture, punning on the word 'Aufri2 1 . 2 This play -- and Heidegger can
be seen 'playing with seriousness', to recall Nietzsche's formulation
(PT p.91), to serious ends -- shows how radically Heidegger has moved
from regarding thinking as a matter of ratiocination, making it more
evidently a matter of language 'speaking'. The play of actual and
potential meanings which he institutes signals the 'speaking' of
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language and returns us to the final paragraph of the essay called
'Language' where he says 'It is not a matter here of stating a new
view of language. What is important is learning to live in the
speaking of language.' (PLT p.210). As we expect, he is not about to
theorise metaphor. Bringing 'living' and 'speaking' into proximity,
the reference is to the subject's 'dwelling in' language: a
formulation which reduces the gulf between language and speaker or
language and auditor. The metaphors of 'neighbourhood' and of language
as the 'house of Being' underscore this point.
The artist, and Lawrence is exemplary, is already at some
deep level attuned to the 'Heideggerian' recognition. These domestic
metaphors of being 'at home in' language have been developed more
recently by theorists like Derrida and Gadamer, influenced by
Heideggerean perceptions. In 'White Mythology', his essay on 'dead'
metaphor, Derrida rehearses the idea that because we use metaphor to
communicate the concept of metaphor (as Heidegger does) then we are
anyway already 'at home in' metaphor, which is, I take it, a
Heideggerean recognition. This raises the question, how conscious are
we of being 'at home in' language? Do we know we are at home there?
Because consciousness is linguistic we are immersed in language and,
therefore, never at a remove from it. Some language we can be
conscious of, but the rest we simply inhabit unconsciously. This
understanding, and this is really the point, is very strongly written
into Lawrence's work. Heidegger's position, in punning, is that if we
can hear the difference between the language of thought and the
language of poetry, then we are hearing the 'saying' of language. His
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own play with words -- and 'AufriI3' becomes 'his' word in 'The Nature
of Language' -- must be seen in this context. Heidegger foregrounds
his own word play (which is naturally more obvious in the German text
than in the English), to turn us back into the language from which his
key words are first generated. By extension, all metaphor turns us
back to language and language to metaphor.
In the course of his lecture -- which like all of Heidegger is
extremely metaphorical, which is part of the point -- the following
meanings are implied. The principal meaning of 'Aufrita l is 'design' or
'sketch'. However, we can also 'hear', to recall Heidegger's sense of
the auditor, 'aufreiBen' meaning 'to tear open' and 'to cut open'
which refers to his phrase that thinking 'cuts furrows into the soil
of Being'. In the same vein there is 'ausreiBen' meaning 'To tear up',
'to tear out' as in 'to uproot'. There is also 'aufritzen' meaning 'to
slit open'. We also have 'ausreisen' with its sense of 'leaving a
country', which recalls Heidegger's metaphor of the 'neighbourhood',
'domain' and 'clearing'. All these meanings can affect the hearer as
Heidegger insists that we must let ourselves be reached by the hidden
richness of words. The artist (intuitive man) of course already knows
this. The philosopher can be seen coming to this understanding.
Consequently, and Heidegger's texts assert this point, there is no
sense of being able to control the proliferation of language: the
individual cannot pretend to legislate when he speaks from within
language.
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Anyone who is not Nietzsche's
'intuitive man', might encounter difficulties when reading or hearing
Heidegger because of the unfamiliarity of the language; and surely it
is partly Heidegger's aim to defamiliarize. After all, his language
does not seem to occupy a known, or clearly demarcated, intellectual
register. Hence the special urgency of the question as to whether
Heidegger can actually be 'translated', with all the complexities
which the word implies, into another discourse without anything being
lost. The answer would conceivably focus on the apparent arbitrariness
with which Heidegger proceeds. To what extent could the play on
'aufriB' be expressed non-metaphorically or be substituted by another
metaphor? Would such a substitution be possible or, when one gets
close to the heart of the problematic, is 'aufriB' in fact the only
possibility? The implicit distinction here is between metaphor and
metaphoricity. The proliferation of meanings can be traced in a work
ad infinituA but the value of the exercise will not be on the fact of
dissemination but on understanding-as-metaphorical, which word-play
like Heidegger s signals.
If by this stage the differences between the language of poetry and
the language of thought have become in any way polarized, even in the
process of considering their interconnectedness, or alternatively have
begun to seem indistinguishable, Heidegger provides the following
account:
We must discard the view that the neighborhood of poetry
and thinking is nothing more than a garrulous cloudy mixture
of two kinds of saying in which each makes clumsy borrowings
from the other. Here and there it may seem that way. But in
truth, poetry and thinking are in virtue of their nature
268
held apart by a delicate yet luminous difference, each held
in its own darkness: two parallels, in Greek pars allelo, by
one another, against one another, transcending, surpassing
one another each in its fashion. Poetry and thinking are not
separated if separation is to mean cut off into a relational
void. The parallels intersect in the infinite. There they
intersect with a section that they themselves do not make.
By this section, they are first cut, engraved into the
design of their neighboring nature. That cut assigns poetry
and thinking to their nearness to one another. The
neighborhood of poetry and thinking is not the result of a
process by which poetry and thinking -- no one knows from
where -- first draw to each other and thus establish a
nearness, a neighborhood. The nearness that draws them near
is itself the occurrence of appropriation by which poetry
and thinking are directed into their proper nature.
(OWL p.90)
So poetry and thinking are parallel uses of language and yet they
intersect: they pass through and across each other in Heidegger's
concept of 'nearness'. The verbal play here is on the meaning of cut,
of cutting through, cutting a 'furrow'. It is on intersection and
incision, cut and inscription. Art and philosophy achieve nearness in
the 'cut'. That which Heidegger calls the 'luminous difference'
between them is a positive quality. The nearness itself depends on the
difference of the two 'neighbourhoods'. The sense here is of a
productive fusion of these neighbourhoods but a fusion which pays
attention to their fundamental differences. As a quite abstract
description it is another way of drawing attention to the important
relation (in Lawrence, for instance) between generality and
particularity.
These passages help to establish the important interconnectedness
of poetry and thinking as recognized in Heidegger's own thought, and
by extension in Lawrence's. They show a philosopher attempting to cast
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off the burden of ratiocinative questioning, so that the philosopher's
consciousness of language emerges as the text, with its multiple
levels, unfolds. One more passage, because of its significance to the
artist writing literature, also helps us to reflect on the closeness
of Heidegger and Lawrence: it confirms our sense of the importance of
the 'at home' metaphor for both, and the necessity of the intersection
of the two domains, or neighbourhoods, under discussion. Heidegger's
'we' refers, I take it, to the body of philosophers:
We speak of language, but constantly seem to be speaking
merely about language, while in fact we are already letting
language, from within language, speak to us, in language, of
itself, saying its nature. This is why we must not
prematurely break off the dialogue we have begun with the
poetic experience we have heard, for fear that thinking
would not allow poetry to find its own words any longer, but
would force everything into the way of thinking. (OWL p.85)
Poetry is the place where language does not hold back. The Dasein of
the human being is fundamentally and especially in poetry. In day-to-
day negotiations between people 'language' has to hold back: if it
intervened in our day-to-day speaking the effect would be too
disruptive. But poetry is understanding finding 'its own words'.
The distinction made in this passage between speaking about
language and speaking from within, or in, language, is a useful one
when the focus is shifted to Lawrence. As I have continually
suggested, Lawrence's language demonstrates his consciousness of being
'in' language rather than simply writing 'about' it. Heidegger seems
to be a little surprised (although this surprise is probably a
strategy) at the sense of the concealed richness of language which he
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initially gets from poetry. But his own language, his own meaning,
depends precisely on this richness. As a philosopher he is writing,
not about language -- he says that linguists, philologists,
psychologists and analytic philosophers have done this practically to
saturation point -- but, in what is more than simply a poetic
gesture, he is giving language the space to reveal its sense of itself
as sense He repeats that his experience with language must be a
thinking one. If Heidegger as a philosopher is responding to the need
to slough off an acculturated ratiocinative mode of thinking because
he perceives it to evade the real issue of language, then the artist
is in a similar position when s/he recognizes the need to shatter and
mock 'the old conceptual barriers' (PT p.90). The specifically
Modernist consciousness of language is something to do with this
recognition.
So there is in Lawrence's language (and in the particular
inflections of the works examined in this study, for instance),
precisely such a neighbourly nearness, to use Heidegger's terms,
between poetry and thought which characterizes language at large
('Language'). The Heideggerean recognition in Lawrence distinguishes
him from the mainstream Modernists where radical practice is not so
much a philosophical question of language, but a question of
technique. There is in Joyce, Woolf, Richardson, H. D., for example
(as producers of some of the Modernist 'master narratives'), that kind
of Modernist consciousness which might actually impede the real
'neighbouring'. We cannot help but be aware, particularly in his
mature writing, of the sense of language and the metaphoricity of
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understanding in Lawrence. The actions and events described in the
novels are inseparable from the language, indeed as was stated at the
outset, the only event is language. Paul Ricoeur restates what seems
to be an obvious assumption here and in doing so highlights its force:
'In written language, the reference is no longer ostensive (as it is
in spoken language, 'ostensive' designating the immediate reality
which is the situation of the interlocutors]: poems, essays, works of
fiction speak of things, events, states of affairs and characters
which are evoked but which are not there. And yet literary texts are
about something. About what? I do not hesitate to say: about a world,
which is the world of the work.' (HI-IS p.177). Ricoeur's literary
criticism is something I will come to presently. This observation
includes all works, but in Lawrence we really are trInging ista f,c.cgs
a different level of attention to language than the broad one implied
here. In Lawrence we have access to a language which is in itself a
thinking about language from within language. This thesis has been
after precisely this sense of it in Lawrence. Language does not simply
mediate emotions, events, and personal philosophies (theories), it is
itself a 'thinking'. It is in itself a sense.
Given this understanding a principal difference between Lawrence
and Heidegger is that Heidegger must in the end say something about
language, which Lawrence is not constrained, explicitly, to do.
Heidegger's thinking about language notably returns to the single word
'Being': the act of thought (a linguistic act) determines what it
means to Be. In his essays poetry is the essence of language because
it is the best example of the 'saying of language' in part because of
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its verbal play, its plurality of meanings, but crucially because of
its potentiality, its metaphorical presence. The word in Heidegger is
a 'giver' (just as authentic seeing in Lawrence is a 'going forth'):
If our thinking does justice to the matter, then we may
never say of the word that it is, but rather that it gives
-- not in the sense that words are given by an "it," but
that the word itself gives. The word itself is the giver.
What does it give? To go by the poetic experience and by the
most ancient tradition of thinking, the word gives Being.
(OWL p.88)
Being is not a word which the philosopher arrives at in a dramatic
way, like 'Aufri g ', in the context of verbal play and richness: it is
the single monolithic word towards which the whole movement of meaning
In Heidegger tends. Recent philosophical thought about language in a
climate of deconstructive procedures has discounted the relevance of
searching for the one word 'Being' and yet the relation of Being and
language persists even in texts which deny that relation. The
important thing about Lawrence, whatever can be said 'locally' about
his handling of language, use of metaphor and so on, is that language
itself is the legitimate subject of his texts in a Heideggerean sense
because the 'neighbouring' about which Heidegger speaks is not
obstructed by a concern with modes which are in the end merely, or
reductively, self-reflexive.
The strategic value of the ludic dimension of 'The Nature of
Language', and of Heidegger's work in general, is that in challenging
traditional ratiocinative modes of proceeding he institutes a radical
way of coming at the elusive quantity, Being, in language. The
particular ontological focus of his language makes Heidegger a
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'Modern' and the way in which he is so is partly what he has in common
with Lawrence. If the focus of this thesis was more explicitly on the
ontological character of language there would be scope to consider in
greater detail Lawrence's and Heidegger's awareness of Being as
continuously present, and their awareness of its inexpressibility. It
is something which is available to our intelligence inasmuch as the
individual both is, and is aware of Being. Thought, that is to say
consciousness, presupposes language, making Being, or thinking about
Being, in some senses a 'writerly' preoccupation. Consequently both
Lawrence and Heidegger proceed in a way which demonstrates the
inseparability of language and Being. The use of metaphor is at the
heart of this understanding: in both writers it is central to the play
of language, where 'play' implies a highly serious goal and becomes in
both of them a serious mode of arguing. To philosophize in a given
language -- Heidegger privileging German as the language of philosophy
-- is in part to make use of the concealed semantic wealth of words.
In taking this position I have not sought to Justify Lawrence to
Heidegger, or to use Heidegger to make Lawrence seem philosophically
legitimate. Heidegger's value for present purposes lies, as both
Michael Bell and Michael Black have argued, in his ontologically
attuned awareness of the richness of language. Lawrence's recognition
is that language is at the heart of human experience. To talk of the
Heideggerian dimension of Lawrence is simply to underscore this
fundamental recognition. The 'philosopher', since Nietzsche, seems to
be reaching, or reaching for, a consciousness of language which the
major creative writer intuitively possesses.
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The way in which Heidegger uses language in 'The Nature of
Language' recalls Lawrence's consciously explorative use of pun and
metaphor in Fantasia of the Unconscious. This is an essay where
Lawrence is consciously bringing something particular about language
to notice. As I have argued, a non-metaphorical (or scarcely
metaphorical) style simply is not conscious enough for his purposes.
We can recall one of the central puns of Fantasia of the Unconscious,
an essay where Lawrence exploits all the meanings of the word 'solar'.
The solar plexus acquired its name because of the resemblance between
the radial network of abdominal nerves and the sun's rays 'radiating'
from its centre. Lawrence brings the life-giving force of the sun to
bear on his assessment of the solar plexus as 'where you are. It is
your first and greatest and deepest centre of consciousness' FliP
p.28). He is also making a play on 'sympathetic'. The autonomic
nervous system, controlling the voluntary actions of certain organs
including the heart, is organized according to sympathetic and
parasympathetic systems. The solar plexus constitutes, as Lawrence
says, part of the network of sympathetic nerves with certain
specialized anatomical functions. Aware of this, Lawrence also plays
on 'sympathetic' as characterizing the feelings. Both meanings are
brought to bear on his statement that the solar plexus is a
'sympathetic centre' (F&P p.28) as he seeks to close the gap between
the physical and the emotional.
A play on the notion of a blood tie between child and parent is
also instituted, turning on the idea of emotional and physical
connections. The navel is unproblematically a sign of physical
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connection with, and rupture from, the mother but Lawrence is
insistent on the 'tie of blood' (F&P p.29) with the father as having a
special quality, in some sense balancing the significance of the
corporeal thread which connects the mother and child in the womb. The
reality of a life-giving blood flow from the mother to the child is
given its Other in the concept of non-physical 'unknowable
communications' (F&P p.33) between the child and father:
On the contrary, the true male instinct is to avoid physical
contact with a baby. It may not even need actual presence.
But, present or absent, there should be between the baby and
the father that strange, intangible communication, that
strange pull and circuit such as the magnetic pole exercises
upon a needle, a vitalistic pull and flow which lays all the
life-plasm of the baby into a line of vital quickening,
strength, knowing. And any lack of this vital circuit, this
vital interchange between father and child, man and child,
means an inevitable impoverishment to the infant.
The child exists in the interplay of two great life-waves,
the womanly and the male.
(Fantasia of the Unconscious, in F&P p.33)
The passage is dense with metaphors and double meanings, not least the
reference to 'life-waves' which underlines the importance of the
water/wave imagery in Lawrence's thought in a context which is not
fiction, and which points up the mutually supplementary nature of
fiction and discursive writing in Lawrence, both chiefly
distinguishable by their metaphoricity. Blood and sustaining milk are
the more literal waves of life on which the infant depends. Between
the father and child the 'vitalistic pull and flow' is a non-literal
(or ambivalently literal) equivalent of the flow of maternal milk from
breast to infant. It is the 'flow' which Deleuze and Guattari rightly,
in my view, recognize as anti-Oedipal: it is a subversive 'flow' of
response which cuts across and through the rigid Oedipus metaphor
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which Lawrence is so clearly deconstructing here. It is evident from
the end of 'The Holy Family' (Fantasia of the Unconscious, chapter 2),
from which this passage comes, that 'the womanly and the male' stand
principally for the parent figures, and as such recall Tom Brangwen
and Lydia 'bestriding', as it were, the child Anna in 'Childhood of
Anna Lensky' (The Rainbow, chapter III). It should be noted, however,
that the 'natural' 'Oedipal' father, Lensky, is dead.
The metaphoricity of this passage is precisely because there are no
non-metaphorical equivalents in which the same could be said:
obviously the metaphorical language is not ornamental but bears the
weight of knowing or understanding the meaning of something. Lawrence
is not, after all, simply writing on child development. He, and we,
would not expect his book to answer the general need for textbooks on
that and related subjects. The point is that metaphor is the condition
of finding something out: it is the medium of knowledge. The barely,
or routinely, metaphorical (there is no language which is non-
metaphorical), fails to 'think', being limited to a more blandly
descriptive function.
In fact Lawrence can be more exploratory with metaphor in a text
like Fantasia of the Unconscious because there he is free from the
demands and exigencies of fiction. Writing 'discursively' Lawrence
takes advantage of the absence of a certain type of narrative in order
to focus more explicitly on metaphor, and to be more experimental with
it (or within it) as a way of getting to the bottom of a problem, as
well as addressing the related problem of how to say anything in
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language. This is how language comes into view, in the essays on the
unconscious, as the legitimate subject of Lawrence's writing. As I
have stressed this is also true of the fiction but there, the
exigencies of fiction being different from those of the 'discursive'
text, the question of language is subtilized and assimilated to other
narrative purposes. My purpose in beginning my extended discussion of
Lawrence's language with an examination of the question of metaphor in
Fantasia of the Unconscious and Psychoanalysis and the Unconscious was
in order to underline precisely this difference, but this is not to
argue that the language in each of these texts is either one thing or
the other: the need to avoid such absolutes has already shown itself.
The immediate point is that where the question of language is
conscious in the essays on the unconscious, in the fiction it is both
conscious and yet subliminal.
So far the emphasis has been on the view of language which Lawrence
and Heidegger share. Contrast with a different kind of philosophical
thought can further throw Lawrence's position into relief. Paul
Ricoeur has methodically examined the relation between text and
metaphor, representing metaphor as in some senses a 'work in
miniature' (HHS p.167) and a work, specifically a literary work, as a
metaphor writ large. The critical practice of examining a metaphor
itself becomes a metaphor for the larger hermeneutical exercise of
interpreting a work. But rather than addressing understanding as
fundamentally metaphorical (pace Heidegger and Lawrence), Ricoeur sees
metaphor as motivating thought rather than being thought (a mode of
thinking) itself. So it is that Ricoeur treads what Jonathan Culler
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calls the via rhetorica 41 with metaphor only ever a stage on the way
to understanding. Ricoeur says that we focus on metaphor to understand
something, not that metaphor is already a sign of understanding
reached. This is the point at which Lawrence's sense of being 'at home
in' metaphor pulls away from Ricoeur's theorizing of it. I propose to
examine exactly why their ways part by first underlining Ricoeur's
reservations about Heidegger: these reservations apply obliquely to
Lawrence.
Ricoeur is insistent that, although Heidegger's language is
radical, and is indeed the means by which he attempts to step out of
the circle of Western thought, he is in fact continuing B tradition of
speculative philosophy and that his value does not lie in constituting
a break with that tradition but in contributing to 'the continuous and
unceasing problematic of thinking and of being' (RM p.312).
Reinforcing his point about placing Heidegger firmly in this tradition
Ricoeur embarks upon what is for him a distinctively and self-
consciously rhetorical passage in which a series of questions rather
defensively put Heidegger in his place, and attempts to ground his
work within the context of Western thought rather than outside it. In
doing so Ricoeur underscores a number of Heidegger's central
metaphors, and consequently universalizes them perhaps more than
Heidegger intends:
What philosopher worthy of the name prior to Heidegger has
not meditated on the metaphor of the way and considered
himself to be the first to embark on a path that is language
itself addressing him? Who among them has not sought the
'ground' and the 'foundation,' the 'dwelling' and the
'clearing'? Who has not believed that truth was 'near' and
yet difficult to perceive and even more difficult to say,
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that it was hidden and yet manifest, open and yet veiled?
Who has not, in one way or another, linked the forward
movement of thought to its ability to 'regress,' to take a
step 'backward'? Who has not attempted to distinguish the
'beginning of thinking' from any chronological starting
point? Who has not conceptualized his own task essentially
as a labour of thought directed toward itself and against
itself? Who has not believed that to continue one must make
a break and 'leap' outside the circle of accepted ideas? Who
has not opposed thinking based on a horizon to knowledge
based on objects, opposed meditating thought to
representative thought? Who has not known that ultimately
the 'way' and the 'place' are the same, and 'method' and
'thing' identical? Who has not seen that the relation
between thinking and being is not a relation in the logical
sense of the word, that this relation presupposes no terms
preceding it but, in one way or another, constitutes the
belonging-together of thinking and being? Finally, what
philosopher before Heidegger has not attempted to think
identity other than as tautology, on the basis of this
belonging-together of thinking and being? (RM pp. 311-12)
Ricoeur's aim is not to be iconoclastic for the sake of it, but to
challenge any sense from Heidegger that his ontology constitutes an
authentic alternative with its implicit renunciation of the kind of
thinking which precedes it. Ricoeur insists that, 'it [Heidegger's
ontology] cannot assume the privilege of opposing all other ontologies
by confining them inside the bounds of 'the' metaphysical. Its
unacceptable claim is that it puts an end to the history of being, as
if "being disappeared in Ereignis." (RM p.312, my brackets).
Heidegger's language provides the focus for Ricoeur's criticism.
The later works, Ricoeur argues, are ambiguous because they are
'divided between the logic of their continuity with speculative
thought and the logic of their break with metaphysics' (RM p.312). Far
from seeing this tension resolved by, or in, Heidegger's language,
Ricoeur is actually extremely critical of it, seeing it, and therefore
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the thought behind it, as in some sense in crisis:
The second logic [that Heidegger's later works have broken
with Western thought (metaphysics)] leads to a series of
erasures and repeals that cast thought into the void,
reducing it to hermeticism and affectedness, carrying
etymological games back to the mystification of 'primitive
sense.' Above all, this second logic invites us to sever
discourse from its propositional character, forgetting
Hegel's lesson in regard to speculative propositions, which
do not cease to be propositions. This philosophy gives new
life in this way to the seductions of the unarticulated and
the unexpressed, even to a kind of despair of language
resembling that found in the next to last proposition in
Wittgenstein's Tractatus. (RM p.313, my brackets)
This parting shot invites us to question whether in fact Ricoeur is
misreading Wittgenstein too. Ricoeur, in the course of his book, will
oppose the self-reflexivity of a certain kind of philosophical
discourse with the reflective capacity of (implicitly) his own
speculative discourse. He concludes by praising Heidegger's
affirmation of the dialectical relation of thinking and poetry as
modes of discourse, and The Rule of Metaphor closes with a statement
from Heidegger about the distance between poetry and speculative
thought as an important theme in Heidegger's later lectures and essays
on language. However, quite apart from what he finds positive in
Heidegger, the criticisms to which attention has here been drawn can
be turned back onto Ricoeur by way of assessing his own language and,
therefore, his own relation to metaphor.
Towards the close of The Rule of Metaphor Ricoeur begins to flesh
out his reasons for insisting on the fundamental difference between
speculative (philosophic) discourse and metaphoric discourse. The
latter, like the work of literature, is transformed by acts of
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interpretation into something other than itself. It is acted upon by
speculative discourse which is characterized by 'univocity' (RM
p.302). 'Metaphorical utterances', says Ricoeur, demand 'elucidation',
being in themselves difficult and obscure (RM pp.295-6). Having
established a hierarchy, with speculative discourse as the principal
term, Ricoeur proceeds to articulate the relation between these
discourses. He is then in a position to describe the dynamics of
interpretation, but is constrained by the necessarily metaphorical
character of language. He has no choice but to admit that speculative
discourse, 'the conceptual order', cannot eliminate the 'metaphorical
order' (RM p.302). In order to make his point about the metaphorical
as a catalyst for the speculative his argument is given, briefly, a
consciously metaphorical inflection. His theme is the relation of the
two discourses. The representation here of a dialectical interchange
between them is undercut and weakened by his tendency to hierarchize
later:
My inclination is to see the universe of discourse as a
universe kept in motion by an interplay of attractions and
repulsions that ceaselessly promote the interaction and
Intersection of domains whose organizing nuclei are off-
centred in relation to one another; and still this interplay
never comes to rest in an absolute knowledge that would
subsume the tensions. (RM p.302)
Ricoeur seems to be labouring with metaphor to make a quite general
point, in a passage which is consciously, but uncomfortably,
'metaphorical': 'applied' rather than 'emergent' metaphor. The
'interplay' is halted in his eventual insistence that the value of the
metaphorical is to provoke and stimulate the speculative to begin the
process of conceptual thinking, of interpretation. Interpretation is
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described as 'the work of concepts. It cannot help but be a work of
elucidation, in the Husserlian sense of the word, and consequently a
struggle for univocity.' (RM p.302). As we shall see, Ricoeur's
literary criticism exemplifies this desire to rein in plurivocity, and
to circumscribe the text.
It is when Ricoeur addresses reductive interpretations, where
'rationalization culminates in clearing away the symbolic base' (RM
p.302), that he has to deal conclusively with the metaphorical.
Because the abolition of the metaphorical is unthinkable
he must rethink the immediate problem and
proposes 'a hermeneutic style where interpretation would conform both
to the notion of concept and to that of the constitutive intention of
the experience seeking to be expressed in the metaphorical mode.' (RM
303). We are now in a position to see how Ricoeur will insert the
metaphorical into the dynamic of interpretation, but still manage to
keep the speculative as the principal term. The 'dialectic' is
summarized in this way:
Interpretation is then a mode of discourse that functions at
the intersection of two domains, metaphorical and
speculative. It is a composite discourse, therefore, and as
such cannot but feel the opposite pull of two rival demands.
On one side, interpretation seeks the clarity of the
concept; on the other, it hopes to preserve the dynamism of
meaning that the concept holds and pins down. (RM p.303)
Via Kant, however, the metaphorical is conflated with 'imagination'
and, operating with 'understanding', the two of them push back the
boundaries of ignorance: 'where the understanding fails, imagination
still has the power of "presenting" (Darstellune the Idea. It is this
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"presentation" of the Idea by the imagination that induces conceptual
thought to think more.' (RM p.303), a view which effectively leaches
metaphoricity of its own significance: its relation in this theory of
creativity is unequivocally one of servitude to the speculative. On
the other hand, and this is very much the point, without the
metaphorical, the speculative or conceptual order is severely
restricted. In which case what is the status, ultimately, of 'living
metaphor' in Ricoeur's work?
Metaphor is living not only to the extent that it vivifies a
constituted language. Metaphor is living by virtue of the
fact that it introduces the spark of imagination into a
'thinking more' at the conceptual level. This struggle to
'think more,' guided by the 'vivifying principle,' is the
'soul' of interpretation.' (RM p.303)
In the way he asserts the necessity of metaphor in 'thinking more' it
is evident that Ricoeur sees the Heideggerean point about metaphor in
the abstract, but actually fails really to see it because of a deep-
lying resistance to it. In short, metaphor is only the vehicle of
thought if it functions as the stimulus to the conceptual.
Interpretation is essentially a part of the conceptual order.
Ricoeur thus presents us with a theory of interpretation which is
fundamentally uncomfortable with the metaphorical. His own discourse
provides one point of focus for this discomfort: its lack of
metaphorical richness enacts his suspicion, which is also stated, of
the penetrating metaphoric language of Heidegger and Derrida, the two
theorists he makes a point of challenging. This is more of an
undercurrent in Ricoeur than a crisis. If he is nostalgic for a
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speculative mode that he perceives Heidegger particularly as
problematizing, then this nostalgia does not disrupt the overall
argument which turns on the redescriptive power of metaphor, or, as he
puts it in the preface to Time and Narrative, which is the logical
sequel to The Rule of Metaphor, the 'power of the metaphorical
utterance to redescribe a reality inaccessible to direct description.'
(TN I, xi).
So it is that, on the back of metaphor, speculative discourse is
raised to the highest level, its singleness asserted in the midst of
numerous other discourses. In the introduction to The Rule of Metaphor
Ricoeur talks about a discourse which will 'recover the ontology
implicit in the metaphorical statement' (RM p.7). I take it that
speculative discourse is the one that will be seen to function as the
principal recoverer. This is what leads Ricoeur critically to
Heidegger -- 'the final stages of his philosophy attempt to make
speculative thought resonate with the poet's utterance,' (RM p.309) --
and to a statement about what is acceptable in Heidegger and what is
inadmissable. Ricoeur's comments obliquely illuminate his own
practice:
Heidegger's philosophy steps forth as intermingled and
Inescapable attempt and temptation. It is an attempt from
which we must draw inspiration whenever it manifestly
contributes to clarifying speculative thought in accordance
with the semantic aim that animated Aristotle's
investigation into the multiple meanings of being; and it is
a temptation we must shun when the difference between
speculative and poetic threatens once again to disappear.
(RM p.309)
That Ricoeur is witholding his final judgement on Heidegger for the
285
time being is evident, s but these remarks explain Ricoeur's style. Yet
in the final stages of his study praise is reserved for the sense of
difference which Heidegger, in his later work, maintains between the
poetic and the speculative, allowing the dialectic between them to
flourish. His brief critique of Heidegger's 'The Thinker as Poet16
communicates Ricoeur's appreciation when he believes that the
philosopher has sustained this central dialectic:
Does this mean that once again speculative discourse
threatens to merge with poetry? Not at all. Even if Ereignis
is called a metaphor, it is a philosopher's metaphor, in the
sense in which the analogy of being can, strictly speaking,
be termed a metaphor, but one which always remains distinct
from a poet's metaphor. The very way in which Heidegger
juxtaposes poetic discourse and philosophical discourse
without confusing them, as in Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens,
confirms that the gulf cannot be bridged between the Same
that is to be thought and poetic resemblance. What is
remarkable, in this short text, is that the poem does not
serve as an ornament to the philosophical aphorism, and that
the latter does not constitute the poem's translation. Poem
and aphorism are in a mutual accord of resonance that
respects their difference. To the imaginative power of
thought-full poetry, the poet replies with the speculative
power of poeticizing thought. (RM p.310)
Ricoeur's exercise here is still taxonomic; his focus is on
resemblance, translation and difference (meaning disparity,
dissimilarity and divergence: there is no intended reference to
dIff6rance which might bridge the 'gulf'). 'Mutual accord' is very far
from Heideggerian 'intersection'. It is with the emphasis on 'the
speculative power of poeticizing thought' that the focus can be set
more powerfully on Lawrence. Any suggestion of a Heideggerian
dimension in Lawrence would have to be underpinned by a sense of the
poetic and the 'thought-full' being contained in the whole language,
and inseparable from it.
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These passages give some sense of Ricoeur's position relevant to
the current study. For my purposes the major weakness in Ricoeur is
that he can treat metaphor in such a localized way as he does in The
Rule of Metaphor. His book does not properly account for the fact, so
crucial to his own argument, that the 'local' question of metaphor
cannot be understood separately from the whole body of language in
which it occurs. The same can be said about such general concepts as
word, sentence and discourse, which constitute Ricoeur's central
criteria. Ultimately there are strong reasons for arguing that Ricoeur
has anatomized language too much, and, in pursuing its 'smaller'
elements as in some way self-contained has postponed considering the
ciifferenE	 levets c'E lanva3e.	 Regarding
Lawrence it would have to be said of word, sentence, discourse,
metaphor, action, that none of these could be accounted for
effectively in a way which localized them or separated them from the
whole. Ricoeur's insistence on such rigid categories reveals his
limitation to the extent that it can be asked whether he is in fact
reaching towards a consciousness of language at all. Lawrence's
strength, on the other hand, is his recognition that all actual uses
of language transcend the theory of them, a crucial point which
Ricoeur's account of metaphor neglects. In fact, because the critical
debate on metaphor has focused for the most part on rhetoric,
resemblance, substitution and so on, this observation has been wholly
Ignored. Ricoeur's biggest limitation (in common with theorists I. A.
Richards, Monroe Beardsley, Max Black, admired by Ricoeur) is his
critical distance from language itself. It can be confidently stated
that Ricoeur takes a route through language whilst Heidegger and
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Lawrence dwell in it; Lawrence, Nietzsche's 'intuitive man', is also,
crucially, doing something with it.
A recent commentator has justly called Ricoeur's style in The Rule
of Metaphor 'unashamedly academic, at times laboriously precise and
reiterative, with no charismatic aspirations', whilst praising the
book for the 'wit and elegance in many of its argumentative
manoeuvres'. 7
 These remarks underscore the fact that Ricoeur's
relationship to language is traditional rather than radical: as I have
argued his own style evinces a suspicion of a radically and
consciously explorative language; a suspicion which works against his
subject, metaphor. Consequently Ricoeur himself can be characterized
as being on the outside looking in at language. There is no sense in
his writing of a view of language emerging, as it does, and as Ricoeur
recognizes it does, in Heidegger, for example, and certainly as it
does in Lawrence. My interest here is in the actual handling of
language because it is in the handling that Lawrence's consciousness
of language, for example, emerges from distinctive texts, and is
principally responsible for their distinctiveness, their
particularity, within the 'metaphysic'.
With Heidegger, Lawrence and Ricoeur defining the parameters of the
approaches to language represented in this study, the issue
unproblematically breaks down into two basic approaches. These are
'creativity' (Lawrence and Heidegger) and 'interpretation' (Ricoeur).
It is evident from his argument in The Rule of Metaphor that Ricoeur
Is not, like Heidegger and Lawrence, working from the mystery of
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creation. It is Ricoeur who shifts from this to the comparative
hygiene of interpretation, a switch exemplified in the 'sequel' study
Time and Narrative where his readings of Woolf, Proust and Mann are
startlingly and revealingly banal. If The Rule of Metaphor is marked
by the scarcity of reference to literature, Time and Narrative is
disappointing in its superficial treatment of the same. Here
interpretation is indeed fundamentally elucidation and reduction. I
propose to develop these observations by briefly reviewing Ricoeur's
readings and comparing his literary criticism with Lawrence's,
exemplified by Studies in Classic American Literature. The point could
similarly be made by a comparison with Heidegger's apprehension of
poetry.
Ricoeur chooses three texts which in different ways address time.
They are Virginia Woolf's Mrs. Dallowv, Thomas Mann's Der Zauberberg
and Marcel Proust's A la recherche du temps perdu These are intended
to illustrate his theoretical position. His readings are contained in
a chapter called 'The Fictive Experience of Time' (TN II, pp. 100-52)
where the intention is to consider the imaginative refiguring of time
as distinct from phenomenological or 'clock' time, or 'monumental
time' as he calls it. The reading begins with the observation that:
Literature • . . proceeds by way of imaginative variations.
Each of the three works under consideration, freeing itself
in this way from the most linear aspects of time, can, in
return, explore the hierarchical levels that form the depth
of temporal experience. Fictional narrative thus detects
temporalities that are more or less extended, offering in
each instance a different figure of recollection, of
eternity in or out of time, and, I will add, of the secret
relation between eternity and death. (TN II, p.101)
289
He proceeds to give a description Of the events, first of all in Mrs.
Dalloway, underlining particular narrative techniques like the
'progressive accumulation' of viewpoints (TN II, p.103). The contrast
with the official time of Big Ben striking, the narrator's ability to
switch from one consciousness to another, and so on, are noted
methodically. Indeed, it may be this insistence on method which first
alerts us to the 'flatness' of the analysis. The problem is that the
fictional narrative serves purely as a model. It is a secondary thing,
a collection of techniques, and this must be the reason for the
palpable chasm which opens up between Ricoeuri, reading, and the
literary text. The text is viewed principally as rule-governed, an
Invention, a collection of heterogeneous tropes and figures; a
narrative is a variation of a stable form. At best his observations
are competent but, compared to the insights about language and
creativity shared by Lawrence and Heidegger in their literary
criticism, fundamentally superficial. With Ricoeur, there is always
this theoretical distance from the text, and therefore from language,
and this distance, also a feature of The Rule of Metaphor, weakens his
critique. In itself it constitutes a, perhaps unconscious, resistance
to the 'dwelling in' and therefore 'thinking in' language which we
expect in Heidegger and Lawrence. Indeed there is no sense of the
metaphorical provoking the speculative into 'thinking more' as we
might expect. The character of the interpretation makes Ricoeur a
questionable arbiter of language, a serious thing in one who writes
with such authority on metaphor. The ultimate result is that having
chosen 'interpretation' over 'creation' language itself is out of
Ricoeur's reach, indeed it is barely an issue for him, in spite of
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Heidegger's assertion, of which he is well aware, that 'We encounter
language everywhere' (PLT p.189). And the argument that Ricoeur's
theme in Time and Narrative is time, not language, is particularly
weak given the writers that he chooses, that is to say given the
crucial importance of 'style' in each of them.
By way of contrast, Lawrence's critical astuteness is famously
represented in Studies in Classic American Literature. Here Lawrence
is reading to 'get somewhere' but without the reductiveness of
Ricoeur. In contrast to the critical ideals of his day Lawrence's aim
Is never closure. Furthermore, the fact that Lawrence's best literary
criticism is psychoanalytical testifies, in my view, to his parergonal
relation with Freud's thought. e Lawrence's starting point is his sense
of language as a profoundly mysterious medium and the psychoanalytical
recognitions grow out of this understanding. We confront Lawrence's
Intelligent creativity in reading the American writers as well as
being alert to his analytical astuteness. Studies in Classic American
Literature is the text where Lawrence famously articulates his dictum
that art-speech is the only truth, and where he characterizes art as
subterfuge and identifies the artist's moral as different from the
tale's. However, the study's lasting significance lies in the fact
that Lawrence does work from the mystery of creation rather than from
a desire merely to interpret the text in hand and, typically, his
Interpretations expand rather than reduce.
Lawrence's 'metaphysic', his own philosophy, is also inescapably a
factor in his reading of the Americans. For him the text cannot be
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construed simply as a model, as it can for Ricoeur, whose approach
stifles the particular 'metaphysic' of the text/language under
consideration. Lawrence reads by way of his own
metaphors/'metaphysic', brought to these texts. His 'metaphysic'
interacts with the metaphysic he apprehends in the text as part of
that text's specificity. There are many examples but the comments on
'blood-knowledge' and 'mind-knowledge', 'blood-consciousness' versus
'mind-consciousness' in the chapter 'Nathaniel Hawthorne' are a case
in point (SCAL pp.90-91). Finding these concepts appropriate is not
the same as imposing them. Like Heidegger in his readings of German
poetry, Lawrence's response is the result of 'inhabiting' the text.
His critique does not have to be about language in order for him to
write from 'in' language: 'in' as in being 'at home' in. At the
beginning of Studies in Classic American Literature the (Heideggerean
as well as Lawrencean) metaphor of 'listening' to language complements
the Heideggerian notion of language 'speaking' or 'saying' itself.
Lawrence puts this complex recognition quite informally: '/t is hard
to hear a new voice, as hard as it is to listen to an unknown
language. We Just don't listen. There is a new voice in the old
American classics. The world has declined to hear it, and has babbled
about children's stories.' (SCAL p.7).
The notion of listening to an unknown language is one formulation
of reading creatively. Comments in 'The Spirit of Place' (Studies in
Classic American Literature, chapter 1) underline his recognition that
what is needed is to touch whatever resides at the unconscious level
of expression in the essays. This is called variously the 'deepest
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self' and the capitalized 'IT' (SCAL p.13), which represents the
'deepest self', or, sometimes, 'soul'. The capitalization awards 'it'
a special significance: 'IT' is what Lawrence reads in the American
novels, in the language, but his readings also represent Lawrence's
own relation to that language:
American consciousness has so far been a false dawn. The
negative ideal of democracy. But underneath, and contrary to
this open ideal, the first hints and revelations of IT. IT,
the American whole soul.
You have got to pull the democratic and idealistic clothes
off American utterance, and see what you can of the dusky
body of IT underneath.
(Studies in Classic American Literature, p.14, my italics)
These metaphors of uncovering and revealing, of inside and outside, in
this context may owesomekrig ibrreud anciotre.ctrEainix given a special meaning
because of our, and Lawrence's, familiarity with him, These are
conventionally the metaphors which present themselves when we are
after a 'concealed' or subliminal level of human experience. But it is
this division between inside and outside which Lawrence's actual
reading dismantles. In my view Lawrence reads the American writers
dialetically, or parergonally; having a dialectical relation with the
unconscious level of creativity in their expression, and it is
precisely this dialectical or parergonal relation which is absent from
a Ricoeurian reading. Lawrence is not simply interpreting the texts in
any crude diagnostic sense: he lets the narratives 'give' of their own
'metaphysic' yet in reading Lawrence himself is also being
constructed. One of his comments on the Melville of Moby Dick (Studies
in Classic American Literature, chapter 11) sounds, towards the end,
like a description of Lawrence whilst at the same time remaining true
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to Melville.
In his 'human' self, Melville is almost dead. That is, he
hardly reacts to human contacts any more; or only ideally:
or just for a moment. His human-emotional self is almost
played out. He is abstract, self-analytical and abstracted.
And he is more spell-bound by the strange slidings and
collidings of Matter than by the things men do. In this he
is like Dana. It is the material elements he really has to
do with. His drama is with them. He was a futurist long
before futurism found paint. The sheer naked slidings of the
elements. And the human soul experiencing it all. So often,
it is almost over the border: psychiatry. Almost spurious.
Yet so great.
(SCAL p.154)
The actual writers, in Lawrence's readings, are by turns
irresponsible (in relation to their art), hypocritical, naive, or,
like Benjamin Franklin, the writer is a 'recreant European' (SCAL
p.26) battling with an 'old' and persistent mode of consciousness.
When they succeed in the battle they do so by loosening their
conscious grip on their material, by writing from a less conscious
level, giving Lawrence a glimpse or sense of 'IT'.
In focusing on an unconscious level within the language, Lawrence
is also focusing on creativity. The studies represent Lawrence's own
relation to this unconscious, or half-conscious, level. Not only does
he 'uncover' it, he 'frames' himself (in a positive sense) in relation
to it. In 'Benjamin Franklin' (Studies in Classic American Literature,
chapter 2) he articulates his own 'creed' by way of criticising
Benjamin's moral and educational programme (SCAL p.22), using the
language and imagery of Fantasia of the Unconscious. He concludes that
'only America and old Benjamin have at last goaded me into trying to
formulate it [this 'creed'].' (SCAL p.24, my brackets). In short,
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Lawrence the reader of the American texts is not simply outside them,
but is creating himself in reading them, and expanding their
significance for us as he does so. This is a truly dialectical process
showing us how to read Lawrence as he reads the Americans.
This chapter makes explicit my sense that while Lawrence is a
writer who engages on several levels with metaphoricity -- in the act
of writing rather than self-consciously addressing the distinctive
nature of a trope -- he is ahead of most recent commentators on
metaphor, not least Paul Ricoeur whose distance from language
contrasts with Lawrence's immersion in it. Ricoeur, as I come to argue
ultimately avoids language. He does so by maintaining a theoretical
distance from it, something which is particularly apparent, as I have
shown, when he undertakes literary criticism as well as in his own
style. In contrast, Lawrence's recognition about language, his sense
of it, has to do with our, and his, relation to its totality. The fact
Is, as Lawrence recognizes, language is not an object at a remove from
the individual: it is not anywhere else, separable from the reader
because it is on a page. It is quite clearly all around, and the
individual is at home in it, and so there is no virtue in a Ricoeurean
distance which implicitly denies its all pervasiveness. Whilst
Lawrence is not in a position, of course, to criticize Ricoeur,
Ricoeur's 'distance' typifies a universal relation to language which
Lawrence's work subtly and intelligently challenges. It is Lawrence's
work which shows that we do not have to rely on living metaphor to
stimulate language into thought. The reason for calling this chapter
'Lawrence and Language' should be clear by now. I have examined
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precisely how Lawrence's own language is the proper medium for his
'metaphysic', but this study has lead to 'Language' because Lawrence's
language is a particular instance of how language works at large.
Indeed, his philosophical importance rests on this quality of his
writing. The argument is not that this is Lawrence's conscious aim:
this study has dealt not with Lawrence's aims but with his alertness
to language, which is variously conscious and subliminal. The
consciously metaphorical language of the essays on the unconscious has
lead, through the major fiction, to a recognition of Lawrence's
sensitivity to metaphor as the principle mode of understanding. If we
looked for this in Lawrence, that is to say if we looked for
equivalences between his style and a theory of 'Language', we might
miss it. And arguably we would miss it because his language on the
face of it seems unphilosophical. A determination to find in his
language a theory of language might mean a concentration on the
rhetorical which, I have shown, would be to misconstrue the real
weight of metaphoricity in his work.
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NOTES
Chapter Five. Lawrence and Language.
1. Martin Heidegger, 'The Nature of Language', in On the Way to
Language (New York: Harper & Row, 1982), pp. 57-108, Further references
to this book follow quotations in the text. Hereafter cited as OWL.
2. Christopher Fynsk of the State University of New York drew
attention to this word-play in a lecture given at the University of
Warwick in Autumn 1991.
3. This is Michael Bell's theme in D. H. Lawrence: Language and
Being:
4. See Jonathan Culler, The Pursuit of Signs: Semiotics, Literature,
Deconstruction (London and Henley: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981),
p.204.
5. See The Rule of Metaphor, p.364 n91: 'I am postponing taking a
firm position in regard to Heideggerian thought as a whole until such
time as my own analysis has reached a more advanced critical state,
namely, when it is no longer possible to evoke the "early" Heidegger
without forming an opinion in regard to "late" Heidegger.'.
6. Martin Heidegger in Poetry, Language, Thought, trans. and
introduction by Albert Hofstadter (New York: Harper & Row, 1971),
pp. 1-14. Further references to this book follow quotations in the
text. Hereafter cited as PLT.
7. S. H. Clark, Paul Ricoeur (London and New York: Routledge, 1990),
p.120.
8. Elizabeth Wright discusses Lawrence's psychoanalytical reading of
the Americans in Psychoanalytic Criticism: Theory in Practice, New
Accents, General Editor, Terence Hawkes (London and New York:
Routledge, 1989), pp.49-55. She concludes that 'The value of
Lawrence's reading is bound up with the effect the text has had upon
him.' p.55.
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CHAPTER SIX
CONCLUSION
This study has focused on metaphor as the indispensable vehicle of
Lawrence's 'metaphysic', his personal philosophy. In the course of
reading the texts which form the basis of this examination the concept
of 'metaphor' has expanded in a necessarily philosophical direction
away from any merely rhetorical status. Indeed, the constant, implicit
interrogation of the merely rhetorical is intrinsic to Lawrence's
thought. In arguing that Lawrence is supremely a poetic thinker I have
consistently argued against the seductive view that he has a
systematic theory of language, or poetry, or even that he has a
programme of questioning language, although language is his true
subject. After all, which of the major creative writers among
Lawrence's contemporaries did not question language? But Lawrence
never explicitly tells us anything. If Lawrence is outstanding as one
who poetically thinks, it is because of his unique metaphoricity as a
medium for thought. That is why, concentrating on Lawrence's successes
rather than otherwise, I have also resisted aligning myself with those
critics of Lawrence who stress the limitations of language, and in
particular Lawrence's own struggle with these limitations.
The recurrent water and wave imagery, the 'flows' and 'vibrations',
the (linguistic) Journey, are implicitly and subtly metaphorical
rather than plainly or overtly so. They pervade Lawrence's language
and thought rather than existing as isolated structures and,
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therefore, static metaphors to be self-consciously employed at an
appropriate moment in the narrative. Lawrence's metaphors are never
simply substitutes, neither are they directionless. They constitute a
mode of thinking which is not oppressed by a sense of language as a
medium of fixed structures which are in place and as such prevent a
truly free capacity for creativity. The swift movement of metaphor in
Lawrence is the movement of thought. We do not have to visualize the
'flow', the 'flood', the 'wave', the oxymoronic dynamic: these
collectively constitute a subliminal poetic thinking which is special
to Lawrence. This is language at a deeper level than rhetoric.
So it is that this thesis has argued that a proper response to
Lawrence is to his language as much as to his 'thought', whilst being
aware that his thought is frequently not taken seriously because of
the way it is expressed. The language is typically viewed as sometimes
too informal, too polemical, too 'purple'. In short, much of what is
important in Lawrence is overlooked or dismissed because his language
is not conceptual enough. The result is an insensitivity to Lawrence's
repudiation of the conceptual because of his view that in the end a
conceptual language circumscribes, delimits and represses:
Psychoanalysis and the Unconscious and Fantasia of the Unconscious in
particular are candidates for dismissal in this context. Their
extensive and intense metaphoricity, if it has been noticed at all,
has been regarded as a weakness rather than a strength. Daniel
Albright's response to them, for instance, is a case in point. The
fault hardly lies with Lawrence who must think metaphorically.
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This thesis began with the unexpected metaphoricity of
Psychoanalysis and the Unconscious and Fantasia of the Unconscious
because this was a context where the reader might anticipate a
discursive, barely metaphorical, conceptual language. But purely
conceptual discourses represent a theoretical distance from the matter
in hand, for instance 'presence', which Lawrence cannot tolerate: part
of his skill, therefore, lies in dealing with sophisticated ideas in a
non-speculative medium. This recognition leads us to metaphor but not
as the substitution of one word for another in the cause of
resemblance. Metaphor is not even one of Lawrence's conscious themes
unlike the visual, presence, and the difference between knowing and
conceiving, for instance, but it is the medium for these more overt
and apparently more central preoccupations. And none of these can be
communicated non-metaphorically because metaphorical levels, which are
deeper than the structures of rhetoric, constitute a thinking further.
This is not simply a re-stating of the Nietzschean view that there is
no non-metaphorical place from which to speak. It is what Lawrence
half-consciously does with this recognition, and his sense that what
is most naive is a belief in the literal.
The concentration on the 'discursive' essays at the start of this
thesis makes it possible to focus a different level of attention to
language when it comes to rereading Women in Love and The Rainbow than
would otherwise have been the case. By standing back from the fiction
I have been able to focus critically on the larger question of
language and metaphor (both in Lawrence and in general), before
addressing Women in Love and The Rainbow. In my third and fourth
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chapters I have shown how metaphor functions differently in both
novels, and considered how the metaphorical bears the 'metaphysic' in
each work. In my analysis of these novels the focus has been on the
deep-lying levels of metaphor in each: on the 'frictionality' and
oxymoronic mode of Women in Love in contrast to the ceaseless 'flow'
of language in The Rainbow. These differences are not, as I have
argued, the result of a conscious strategy in Lawrence to match
metaphor with 'metaphysic'.
This approach to the novels, or to a particular level of language
within them, also makes it possible to shift the view away from
Lawrence, briefly, towards what is intrinsic both to Lawrence and to
language in general. There is a clear sense, and this is the vaDle of
Nietzsche and Heidegger in this study, that Lawrence's language is an
instance of more general potentialities of language. What Heidegger
and Nietzsche can explain conceptually, Lawrence knows in practice.
Whilst it is necessary for Heidegger to try to say something about
language, the 'nature' of language, Lawrence does it. There is no need
for Lawrence to write on or about language in the same way. This is
really my point when I come, in the fifth chapter of this thesis, to
consider 'Lawrence and Language'. My position is that Lawrence's
cer6in given
highly individual sense of language evinces/qualities of language.
If we want to understand the nature of language
therefore, we can do worse than go to Lawrence. He has distanced
himself from the usual empty paradoxes of language, chief among them
the sense that although language is a principal realm of creative
freedom, a medium where consciousness is most liberated, it is also a
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highly structured and determined medium. The radical and often
subversive 'flow' of Lawrence's language disempowers this paradox.
Yet in understanding the language of any writer the focus must
still be on the relation of the particular to the general. There is
always that collective body of language within which the individual
labours: a study of any writer is fundamentally a study of the
relation of the language of the individual to this collective body.
Once again this is not a relation which can be satisfactorily
described in terms of an inside/outside dichotomy. The problem focused
in the present study is that there is language in general, and
'within' that body there is also Lawrence's language (the individual
case), Just as his novels are further levels of individuation within
Lawrencean language. This general-individual relation is extremely
difficult to articulate. The question which we are ultimately always
left asking, which Lawrence asks, and which I ask again now, is, given
that we for the most part unconsciously inhabit it, 'how do we talk
about language?'. In a very important sense it is not a question which
can be settled. There is no standing back from language because a
remove from it is not possible, or when it is achieved, it is
falsifying. Lawrence's critics often find that, in starting to talk
about language, they invariably end up talking about something else.
That is why I have attempted to stay with language in this thesis,
reading Lawrence on his own terms, negotiating a way through the
layers of metaphor in these works, attending to his words on metaphor
where they occur as in Psychoanalysis and the Unconscious. It cannot
be said that there are rigid distinctions between language in general
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and Lawrence's language because of the inevitable interaction between
them, and yet we have a strong sense of something particular about
Lawrence and, furthermore, of the particularity of individual texts
within his body of work. And yet who can say, any more than very
generally, what is 'Lawrencean'?
The texts which form the basis of this study are not even
generalizable in Lawrence's oeuvre. There is always the particular
existing within the general which is the case whatever text we
examine: there is not only the particularity of the fiction but, as I
have shown, of the non-fiction as well. But I am now in a position to
say that the texts on which this study is grounded have a parergonal
relation to Lawrence's other works. They are not separate from them
since they are a part of Lawrence's substantial output and they indeed
constitute the philosophical core of his work. Their parergonal
relation to the corpus can be represented in these terms: they do not
exist apart from that body of writing but within it, and yet the sense
of language which constitutes the grain of their own narratives
'encloses' Lawrence's life's work. They have been isolated in the
present study in order to stand back from the oeuvre to understand
better Lawrence's 'sense' (in all its meanings) of language. There is
scope to consider the other novels, particularly the earlier works, in
the light of this thesis, which could form the basis of another study.
Finally, the 'frame' metaphor with which I began can now return as
a means of describing the reader's relationship with Lawrence's
language. As before, 'frame' does not mean the same thing as
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'framework' which either sustains or contains something and which is
more literally a supporting structure. Throughout it has been argued
that 'models' and 'frameworks' should not be imposed on the writer.
The 'frame', the parergan, has on the contrary a supplementary
relation to a body of work, as I explained in my second chapter. I
have read Lawrence parergonally; letting his view of language appear
by addressing the conscious and unconscious levels of metaphor in his
language. This contrasts with the general practice of the language
critics outlined in this thesis, notably Bonds, Doherty, Ingram and
Ragussis, although they have dealt with language often with a view to
Lawrence's metaphors. These critics, in their different ways,
demonstrate very well the problem of speaking about language which
this thesis addresses. Indeed, they represent a range of critical
approaches to Lawrence's language. Bonds can be located at one end of
the scale. Doherty is her immediate neighbour, and then Ingram, with
Ragussis occupying the end furthest from Bonds. This distribution is
explained by their approaches to Lawrence's language. Bonds never
really gets to the problem of language as a 'domain' which we all
already inhabit and does not examine Lawrence's relation to it, which
is crucial. Doherty has, in my view at least, a greater sense of
language than Bonds but paradoxically overlooks Lawrence. Ingram, on
the other hand, situates himself within Lawrence's narrative language
and responds to the literary text, but confines himself to a certain
level, focusing quite specifically on the grammatical texture of the
language in hand. Lawrence is seen as going beyond 'conventional
language' (Ingram, p.118), beyond 'conventional writing in English'
(Ingram, p.68), but to say so is to impose a spatial metaphor which
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still puts a distance between Lawrence and language. Ragussis, at the
other end of the scale from Bonds, has a more speculative
philosophical approach, writing more than the others from within
Lawrence. Between them they represent the current tendencies in the
reading of Lawrence's language. My own view is that in the act of
reading Lawrence there is not finally an inside (the text) and an
outside (the reader): there is principally the interaction between
these two domains. Without the phosphorescent wave we do not see the
ship, without the ship we remain unaware of the nature of the wave:
understanding comes from the interaction of the two. If Lawrence is
right, the reader is not detached and separate from the language
Lawrence uses, but has a profound internal relation with it.
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